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ABSTRACT

“THIS FLESH WILL RISE AGAIN”: RETRIEVING EARLY
CHRISTIAN FAITH IN BODILY RESURRECTION

By
J. Robert Douglass
December 2007

Dissertation Supervised by Professor Michael Slusser
The doctrine of bodily resurrection is fundamental to the Christian faith. Its
significance is grounded in the fact that the Christian faith arises from and is dependent
upon the belief that Jesus returned to life after having been dead and buried. As a result
of this belief and the teaching of Christ’s first followers, the early Church articulated a
hope for a similar resurrection. In spite of the centrality of the doctrine of bodily
resurrection for the early Church, the doctrine’s present relevance is questionable. This
dissertation provides an answer to the question, What does it mean to affirm faith in
bodily resurrection? Through its response, this study also demonstrates that the doctrine
of bodily resurrection can be articulated in a way that is meaningful to contemporary
Christian faith.
iv

This study explores the various expressions of faith in resurrection from AnteNicene Alexandria. After the examination of these ancient testimonies, three more recent
interpretations of the doctrine are considered. They are found in the explanations of the
Apostles’ Creed provided by Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI), Wolfhart
Pannenberg, and Hans Urs von Balthasar. The dissertation concludes with an articulation
of the doctrine of bodily resurrection intended for an audience who does not view the
epistemological foundations of previous generations as valid.

v

Therefore we are not discouraged; rather,
although our outer self is wasting away,
our inner self is being renewed day by day.
For this momentary light affliction is producing for us
an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison,
as we look not to what is seen but to what is unseen;
for what is seen is transitory, but what is unseen is eternal.
For we know that if our earthly dwelling,
a tent, should be destroyed, we have a building from God,
a dwelling not made with hands, eternal in heaven.
2 Corinthians 4.16 - 5.1, NAB
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PREFACE
The Scripture found in the epigraph is the text for the sermon I preached at my
father’s funeral four months after I started at Duquesne University. My father contributed
to my development as a theologian by playing a significant role in my faith development
throughout my life, but the way in which his illness and death intertwined with my
doctoral studies intimately connected my studies to the Christian hope of bodily
resurrection. As significant as my father’s death has been for me, it is only one of the
ways the doctrine of bodily resurrection intersected with my personal life and my doctoral
studies.
In my first doctoral class, I met a bright young man with whom I had many things
in common. We were both young Protestant ministers, married, and fathers of young
children. We were also just beginning the doctoral program at Duquesne. This second
fact resulted in us having several classes together. I appreciated his friendship and think
of him often. Unfortunately for his family and for all who knew him, Sam Brunsvold was
murdered. In light of these life-changing experiences and their connectedness to my
studies, it seems only proper to be concluding my doctoral studies with an exploration of
the hope expressed by the doctrine of bodily resurrection.

x

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of bodily resurrection is fundamental to the Christian faith. Its
significance is grounded in the fact that the Christian faith arises from and is dependent
upon the belief that Jesus returned to life after having been dead and buried. As a result
of this belief and the teaching of Christ’s first followers, the early Church articulated a
hope for a similar resurrection. In the words of Cardinal Christoph Schönborn, “Since its
earliest beginnings the acknowledgment of a resurrection of the flesh for the dead
belonged to the fundamental beliefs of Christianity.”1 This hope was included in the
creeds of the Church and has been transmitted as part of the Christian faith throughout its
history.
While the centrality of the doctrine of bodily resurrection for the early Church is
beyond dispute, the doctrine’s present relevance is questionable. I am not suggesting that
the doctrine has been abandoned altogether, since it is frequently affirmed in the Creed,
but the inclusion of a doctrine in a creed is no guarantee that the doctrine is understood or
genuinely regarded as an integral part of the Christian faith.
In his book The Creed, Luke Timothy Johnson identifies two negative attitudes

1

Christoph Schönborn, “‘Resurrection of the Flesh’ in the Faith of the Church,”
Communio 17 (Spring 1990): 8.
1

2
that some people have about the Creed. He first notes an apathy toward the Creed when
he writes, “Some sleepwalk through the words they memorized as children, bothered not
at all by the outrageous ideas to which they are declaring their commitment.”2 Even more
troubling than this apathy is the antipathy that Johnson describes in people who are aware
of the radical claims of the Creed but “deal with the scandal by freelance editing, passing
over in silence or altering the statements” with which they disagree.3 In terms of the
article on bodily resurrection, I submit that in spite of the Creed’s clarity on the subject
and the frequency with which it is professed, there are indications that most contemporary
reflection on eternal life lacks an expectation of bodily resurrection.
In my ecclesiological experience, which is primarily confined to American
Protestantism, I have encountered a peculiar avoidance of the hope of bodily resurrection.
Even within evangelicalism, which likes to think of itself as most closely resembling the
primitive Church, we talk about saving souls. Seldom do our sermons elucidate it, few of
our people contemplate it, and almost none of our songs celebrate the doctrine of bodily
resurrection. While this assessment could be attributed to my limited experience, I
believe that the problem is more pervasive.
My experience and concern seem to be supported by Caroline Walker Bynum as
she writes in her book, The Resurrection of the Body,
Although opinion polls tell us that most Americans believe in heaven, it is clear
that the resurrection of the body is a doctrine that causes acute embarrassment,
even in mainstream Christianity. Thoughts of “life after death” still conjure up for

2

Luke Timothy Johnson, The Creed (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 6.

3

Johnson, The Creed, 6.

3
most people some notion of a disembodied soul flying, rather forlornly, through
pearly gates and golden streets. Preachers and theologians (especially Protestants)
pride themselves on avoiding soul-body dualism, but pious talk at funerals is
usually of the departed person surviving as a vague, benign spirit or as a thought
in the memories of others.4
I am convinced that the incongruity between the clarity of the Creed on bodily
resurrection and the “acute embarrassment” expressed by many Christians is a crisis of
faith.5
In the search for a solution to this problem it may be tempting to consider either
retaining the doctrine solely for its historic value or jettisoning it altogether. Yet, as
convenient as these options may appear, when we recall the fundamental nature of the
doctrine for the early Church, we are confronted with the fact that the doctrine was once
understood as an indispensable part of the Christian faith. Consequently, I believe that if
the Church in the twenty-first century is to retain any legitimacy with the previous two
millennia of Christian history, the only real remedy to the present neglect of the doctrine
is a renewed commitment to the hope of bodily resurrection as expressed in the Creed.
But what do I mean by a “renewed commitment?”
By calling for and working toward a renewed commitment, I am not arguing for

4

Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity,
200-1336 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 14-15.
5

The prevalence of this doctrinal confusion is further substantiated by David
Toolan in his essay Reincarnation and Modern Gnosis. In it, Toolan refers to a
Eurobarometer study from 1989 that reportedly finds that 31% of practicing European
Catholics and 37% of European Protestants believe in reincarnation. David S.
Toolan, “Reincarnation and Modern Gnosis” in Resurrection or Reincarnation? ed.
Herman Haring and Johann-Baptist Metz (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 3334.

4
the mere reaffirmation of dogma nor for some radical reinterpretation that is an
abstraction of the historic doctrine. Rather, the approach that I propose is a renewed
understanding that seeks to maintain the tension between fidelity to the faith and
relevancy to the world. While this method is considerably more difficult than either the
rejection of or repetition of historic dogma, it has the potential to inspire a genuine hope
for bodily resurrection, since it is a hope that is held not in spite of modern objections but
in the midst of the uncertainty that they create. Dorothy Sayers addressed a similar
situation several decades ago when she wrote, “What is urgently necessary is that certain
fundamentals should be restated in terms that make their meaning - and indeed the mere
fact that they have meaning - clear.”6
The process of pursuing the meaningful re-articulation of doctrine is not a new
enterprise; instead, it is one of the ongoing duties of the Church. This has been clearly
set-forth in Gaudium et spes where we read of the Church’s duty to be continually
adapting Christian doctrine in ways that are both relevant and faithful. It states,
With the help of the holy Spirit, it is the task of the whole people of God,
particularly of its pastors and theologians, to listen to and to distinguish the many
voices of our times and to interpret them in the light of God’s word, in order that
the revealed truth may be more deeply penetrated, better understood, and more
suitably presented.7
This is an important passage for the present study and will be explored briefly.
In the exhortation for a more suitable presentation of the revealed truth, the

6

Dorothy Sayers, Creed or Chaos? (Manchester, NH: Sophia Institute Press,
1995), 57-58.
7

Gaudium et spes, 44.

5
Church is acknowledging its perpetual obligation to re-articulate the faith. In addition,
this teaching places part of the responsibility for the meaningful presentation of doctrine
at the feet of theologians. By doing so, it establishes this study as a legitimate exercise of
theological inquiry. Lastly, this instruction is important because it offers direction for this
study by providing a model for pursuing doctrinal renewal.
Using the language of the Church’s teaching, the goal of this study is to facilitate a
deeper understanding of the doctrine of bodily resurrection with the hope of contributing
to a more suitable presentation or meaningful re-articulation of it. According to this
teaching, the means of accomplishing this goal involve a process of listening,
distinguishing, and interpreting the “many voices of our times.”
I am convinced that among the “many voices” that need to be heard on the subject
of bodily resurrection are those of the early Church. At this point one may ask, How can
the ancient voices of the Church qualify as being among the “many voices of our times”?
I believe that this is possible in at least three ways. First, the segment of Christianity
which this dissertation examines has been largely ignored by scholarship on the subject of
resurrection.8 Second, the many archeological discoveries that have occurred within the
last fifty years have revolutionized what is known about early Christianity so that its
testimony can be said to be a relatively new voice. Third, there is similarity between
current attempts to understand resurrection and those of the early Church. Even Christ’s
8

To my knowledge, all of the works that address early Christian faith in
resurrection from Alexandria concentrate primarily on Origen. Only a few even
bother to mention Clement of Alexandria. This does not allow either Clement or
Origen to be understood within the larger context of Egyptian Christianity nor does it
adequately represent the diversity found in Ante-Nicene Alexandria.

6
first followers reportedly discussed among themselves “what ‘rising from the dead’
meant.”9 Similarly, the debates about resurrection during the first centuries of this era are
the Church’s attempt to wrestle with the fundamental question that confronts a renewed
commitment to the doctrine, namely, What does it mean to affirm faith in bodily
resurrection?
As stated above, it is my conviction that a renewed understanding of the doctrine
made possible by a retrieval of early Christian faith has the potential for reinvigorating
hope for bodily resurrection in popular devotion. While I believe that it is imperative that
the present situation is addressed, it is not the only contribution offered by this study.
Many significant works have been published recently on the subject of early
Christian belief in resurrection.10 This indicates that the doctrine is a timely subject.

9

Mark 9:10. All references to Scripture will be from the New American Bible
translation unless otherwise specified.
10

See Jaroslav Pelikan, The Shape of Death: Life Death and Immortality in the
Early Fathers (London: Macmillan and Co., 1962); Pheme Perkins, Resurrection:
New Testament Witness and Contemporary Reflection (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1984); Joanne E. McWilliam Dewart, Death and Resurrection (Wilmington,
Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1986); Brian E. Daley, The Hope of the Early
Church: A Handbook of Patristic Eschatology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991); Horacio E. Lona, Über die Auferstehung des Fleisches: Studien zur
frühchristlichen Eschatologie (New York: De Gruyter, 1993); Catherine Walker
Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1995); Katharina Schneider, Studien zur Entfaltung der
altkirchlichen Theologie der Auferstehung.(Bonn: Borengässer, 1999); N. T. Wright,
The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003); Alan F.
Segal, Life after Death: A History of the Afterlife in Western Thought (New York:
Doubleday, 2004); Claudia Setzer, Resurrection of the Body in Early Judaism and
Early Christianity (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, Inc., 2004); James H.
Charlesworth, C. D. Elledge, J. L Crenshaw, and W.W. Willis, Jr., Resurrection: The
Origin and Future of a Biblical Doctrine (New York: T & T Clark, 2006).
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These works also validate what has been noted already that despite the scholarly attention
given to the subject of resurrection in the early Church, there is no deliberate and
extensive treatment of early Alexandrian Christianity in the way that this study addresses
it. Furthermore, while these studies do a wonderful job examining the subject from the
perspective of historical theology, most do not make a concerted effort to contribute to
the larger theological conversations on the doctrine as this study does.11
In summary, this dissertation contributes to a renewed understanding of the
doctrine of bodily resurrection in order that it might be shown to be meaningful to
contemporary faith. This will be accomplished by examining some of the ancient
testimony of the Church on the subject. The enriched understanding that results can serve
as a corrective to the negative attitudes toward the doctrine and can contribute to the
current theological conversation on the doctrine of bodily resurrection.

Defining Early Christian Faith
In 1934 Walter Bauer’s revolutionary work Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest
Christianity was published. In it he argued that early Christianity was more diverse than
unified and that it was inaccurate to refer to a single orthodox position before the fourth
century. At the moment, it is sufficient to note that there were significant variations of
Christianity before Nicaea. The effect of this variety on the doctrine of bodily
resurrection was significant. Despite the fact that the hope for resurrection was a
11

I am not suggesting that the authors listed above are disinterested in broader
theological dialogue, but their primary concern is the investigation of historical
theology as its own worthwhile discipline.

8
universal aspect of early Christian faith, there were differing opinions as to how the
doctrine should be understood. Why examine early Alexandrian Christianity?12 There
are several reasons for this decision.
Chronologically, I will be restricting my examination of early Christian faith in
bodily resurrection to the Ante-Nicene era because it is during this time that the Church
was confronted with the threat of Gnosticism.13 Gnosticism presented a competing
understanding of eternal life that challenged the Christian idea of bodily resurrection.
The challenge presented by Gnosticism necessitated that the Church articulate its faith in
resurrection. This is particularly relevant given the fact that some believe that Gnosticism
is alive and well.14
Geographically, the focus will be on the Church in Alexandria. The Alexandrian
Church is an appropriate subject for this type of endeavor for practical and theological
reasons. In terms of practicality, the views of the Alexandrian Church are welldocumented. An impressive amount of primary literature has survived which is believed

12

For the remainder of this work, references to the Church in Alexandria should be
understood as meaning before Nicaea unless otherwise noted.
13

The issues surrounding the use of the terms Gnostic and Gnosticism will be
addressed later.
14

In his book Omens of the Millennium: The Gnosis of Angels, Dreams, and
Resurrection, the late Yale professor and renowned literary critic Harold Bloom offers
what he calls his spiritual autobiography. In explaining why he considers himself a
Gnostic, Bloom writes “our American Religion . . . is more of a gnostic amalgam than
a European kind of historical and doctrinal Christianity.” To those who would reject
his notion, Bloom cites America’s fixation with angels, near-death experiences, and
astrology as evidence of a prevalent Gnosticism. See Harold Bloom, Omens of
Millennium: The Gnosis of Angels, Dreams, and Resurrection (New York: Riverhead,
1996), 31.
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to be of Egyptian provenance or which can be shown to be connected to the Alexandrian
Church. As a result of the extant primary literature, a sizeable collection of secondary
literature is also available.
Theologically, the faith of the Alexandrian Church is significant because of the
aforementioned challenge of Gnosticism.15 While Gnosticism was widespread in the
Greco-Roman world, it was particularly prevalent in Alexandria. This study will
document the creativity with which the early Alexandrian Christians expressed their faith
in bodily resurrection in and to a culture that was largely antagonistic to the idea.
In this study, it will not be suggested that the notions of bodily resurrection
associated with Alexandrian Christianity are the most orthodox or the most widely
accepted perspectives.16 On the contrary, the faith explored in the following pages
represents the largely neglected testimonies of Christians who struggled to articulate a
genuine faith in bodily resurrection in a context where competing ideas regarding the
nature of eternal life challenged the foundations of Christianity.

The Method for the Retrieval
The first chapter of the study provides the necessary foundations for the retrieval

15

References to “the faith of the Alexandrian Church” should be understood in a
collective sense. As this study will demonstrate, I do not wish to infer that there was
only one Christian view of bodily resurrection that existed in Alexandria.
16

The Alexandrian understanding of resurrection tends to be characterized as only
involving the immortal soul. This dissertation will demonstrate that this does not
adequately reflect the diversity in Alexandrian thought nor the nuance with which the
hope was articulated.
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of early Alexandrian faith in bodily resurrection. It begins by examining several aspects
of the context of Alexandria and concludes with a brief analysis of the origins of Egyptian
Christianity. The second chapter examines a number of individual primary texts that are
connected to early Alexandrian faith in bodily resurrection. Some of them have been
attributed to an author and others are anonymous. The third chapter considers the works
of several Ante-Nicene Church bishops and teachers who are connected in some way to
Egyptian Christianity. The fourth chapter explores ways in which ancient Alexandrian
faith in bodily resurrection can both inform and be informed by contemporary
understandings of the doctrine.

CHAPTER 1
THE CONTEXT OF ALEXANDRIAN FAITH IN BODILY RESURRECTION

Interpretation is a key component of any form of communication, and part of the
process of interpretation is understanding the context(s) of a message. The purpose of
this chapter, then, is to supply an adequate understanding of the context of faith in bodily
resurrection in Ante-Nicene Alexandria.17 This is done in order to provide the requisite
foundation for the chapters that follow. Although the focus of this study is on Alexandria
as it existed in Roman Egypt, it is necessary to consider earlier eras.
The process of becoming aware of the context of Alexandrian faith in bodily
resurrection can be divided into two distinct tasks. First, in order to fully appreciate early
Alexandrian Christianity, it must be considered in relationship to the geopolitical aspects
of Pre-Christian Alexandria. These geopolitical factors will be explored in the first
section of this chapter. Second, a thorough understanding of the Christian hope for
bodily resurrection is only possible when one is aware of its antecedents. For this reason,
the second section of this chapter examines the ways in which the various Alexandrian
religious and philosophical traditions conceptualized the nature of the afterlife. For this

17

I have intentionally avoided defining the term, resurrection, in an attempt to
allow the various texts to speak for themselves.
11
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study, the Jewish and Christian Scriptures are particularly important. Consequently, the
second section of this chapter concludes with an examination of the testimony of the New
Testament concerning the nature of resurrection. The chapter concludes with an
investigation into origins of Egyptian Christianity.

The Geopolitical Elements of
Pre-Christian Alexandria
Alexandria was founded in 331 BCE by Alexander the Great on and around the
site of the Egyptian village of Rhakotis. It is important to recognize that Alexandria was
not an Egyptian city that was conquered by Alexander and Hellenized; instead, it was
created at the command of Alexander.18 It is true that the location of the city included the
area of Rhakotis, but any comparison between Rhakotis and Alexandria must conclude
that Alexander founded the city rather than merely renaming a conquered Egyptian
town.19
The significance of this lies in the fact that while Alexandria is geographically
located along the Nile in northern Egypt, and while there was always a significant
Egyptian presence there (primarily in the old area of Rhakotis), early Alexandria was
much more characteristically Greek than Egyptian. In fact, Alexandria was so thoroughly

18

For this document, Hellenization will be understood to mean the process of
dissemination of Greek culture from the time of Alexander throughout the GrecoRoman empire. This process was not a unilateral interaction, but neither was it an
equal exchange between cultures.
19

Atilla Jakab, Ecclesia alexandrina: Évolution sociale et institutionnelle du
christianisme alexandrin (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 8-9.
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Hellenic that it has been viewed by some as the best representation of Hellenization.20
As alluded to above, Alexandria was founded at what was then one of the major
mouths of the Nile. This area had a port which was protected from the Mediterranean Sea
by the Island of Pharos. The city also enjoyed the benefit of careful planning exemplified
by its having two major streets that connected at right angles to one another and several
secondary streets running perpendicular and parallel to the two main thoroughfares.21 The
transportation made possible by these streets and the various surrounding waterways
allowed Alexandria to become one of the centers of commerce in the ancient world. As
Alexandria grew as a center of commerce, it also emerged as a center of culture.
Alexander died in 323 BCE and was eventually interred in Alexandria. After his
death, Alexandria became the capital of the region controlled by the Ptolemies. Around
295 BCE the Museion was commissioned. It was reportedly an exceptional place of
learning and contemplation, comparable to a modern university, and like a modern
university, it had an impressive library. Josephus indicates that the library sought to have
books from all over the world.22 The actual number of volumes that had been acquired is

20

Barry Henaut, “Alexandria or Athens as the Essence of Hellenization” in
Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within a Greco-Roman World,
ed. Wendy E. Helleman (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 99.
21

Edward A. Parsons, The Alexandrian Library: Glory of the Hellenic World
(New York: The Elsevier Press, 1952), 58.
22

Josephus, Ant. 12.12. Unless otherwise noted, all reference to the works of
Josephus are from the Loeb Classical Library translation.
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in dispute, but it is believed to have been considerable.23 In fact, there was even a library
in the Egyptian quarter of the city.24
Demographically, the city was comprised of three major ethnic groups. These
were Greeks, Egyptians, and Jews. As is often the case in relationships between the
conquered and the conqueror, there was tension between the Egyptians and Greeks from
the beginning of the city. According to Henri Riad, “The native Egyptians formed the
majority of the population on whose labors the economic prosperity of the country
depended.”25 Despite this, they were generally excluded from the rights of citizenship.26
The presence of Egyptians and Greeks in Alexandria is to be expected, but the Jewish
presence deserves further comment.
The existence of a Jewish community in Alexandria is attributable to voluntary
and involuntary immigration occurring over several hundred years. There are numerous
sources that attest to a Jewish presence in Egypt as early as the sixth century BCE. One
of these is the testimony of Scripture. The Hebrew Bible gives indication of Jews in
Egypt before the fall of Jerusalem when it describes an encounter between Egyptian Jews

23

While the trustworthiness of the testimony is questionable, Josephus records that
the number was approaching 500,000. See Ant. 12.13.
24

Parsons, 72.

25

Henri Riad, “Egyptian Influence on Daily Life in Ancient Alexandria” in
Alexandria and Alexandrianism, ed. Kenneth Hamma (Malibu, CA: The J. Paul Getty
Museum, 1996), 30.
26

Riad, “Egyptian Influence,” 30.
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and the prophet Jeremiah.27 There is also non-biblical evidence for Judaism in Egypt
before the Greek conquest in what is known as the Elephantine papyri, which mention the
existence of a Jewish military community in Egypt before the fifth century BCE at
Elephantine Island.28 The community even had a temple for the worship of “Yahu.”29 In
light of the Jewish presence in Egypt, the existence of an early Jewish community in
Alexandria is less remarkable than it may first appear.
While there was a noteworthy Jewish presence in Egypt, it increased dramatically
under Alexander according to Josephus’ account.30 Josephus records the existence of a
significant Jewish presence before Alexander’s death. This is inferred from Josephus’
claim that Alexander gave the Jews in Alexandria privileges equal to those of the Greeks
for their assistance against the Egyptians. They were also reportedly given their own

27

Jeremiah 43-44.

28

Yochanan Muffs, Studies from the Aramaic Legal Papyri from Elephantine,
with a prolegomemon by Baruch A. Levine (Leiden: Brill, 2003), xii. For the English
translation of these texts, see Textbook of Aramaic Documents from Ancient Egypt,
trans. Brezalel Porten and Ada Yardeni (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1986). For a
survey of the history of Judaism in Egypt, see chapter three in Peder Borgen, Early
Christianity and Hellenistic Judaism (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996).
29

30

Borgen, 71.

As pertinent as this information may be to this study, its accuracy is
questionable. There is scholarly consensus that Josephus was trying to offer an
apology for the status of the Jews, who had apparently tried to gain full citizenship.
While this does not necessarily mean that his account is fictional, it suggests that it
could be. See Harald Hegermann, “The Diaspora in the Hellenistic Age,” in The
Cambridge History of Judaism, ed. E. D. Davies and Louis Finkelstein, vol. 2, The
Hellenistic Age (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 121-122.
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quarter, which was set apart from the Gentiles.31
Whether the Jewish presence in Alexandria during its earliest years was as
prominent as Josephus suggests or more meager, the size of the Jewish community in
Alexandria increased significantly under Alexander’s successors. Josephus attributes this
growth to Ptolemy, who took many Jews to Egypt as captives.32 Others went of their own
accord apparently being drawn by the “goodness of the soil and the liberality of
Ptolemy.”33
In 30 BCE the city fell to the Romans and remained under Roman control
throughout the Church’s first centuries. This changed the political climate in that
Alexandria had once again become a part of a larger empire and was no longer the
political center that it had been under the Ptolemies. G. W. Bowersock elaborates on the
effect of these changes on the city by stating,
The mixed population of Egyptians, Jews, and Greeks made civil disturbances
inevitable. Alexandria became notorious for its unruly citizenry. With a
diminished political role in the world at large, Alexandria could devote itself to its
own internal enthusiasms and animosities.34
The limited Egyptian influence in Hellenic Alexandria continued after the city fell
to the Romans. Henri Riad has noted that the official name of the city during the Roman
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era was Alexandria ad Aegyptum and that “the full title of the prefect of Egypt was
praefectus Alexandriae et Aegypti.”35 Like that of the Egyptians, the social position of
Alexandrian Jews remained relatively unchanged at the beginning of Roman rule.
According to Robert Wilken, the Jews of Alexandria enjoyed some privileges at first
unlike the Egyptians. He writes, “There is every indication that they played a prominent
and influential role in Alexandria, especially during the early Roman period.”36
It is clear from this analysis of the geopolitical aspects of Alexandria that it was an
ethnically diverse city with three main ethnic groups occupying different social strata.
The result of the ethnic diversity in Alexandria extended beyond the geopolitical realm.
Having considered the geopolitical aspects of Alexandria, we shall now attend to the
ways in which the city’s diversity expressed itself through religious and philosophical
beliefs in the afterlife.

Views of the Afterlife in Pre-Christian Alexandria
Since this dissertation is concerned with bodily resurrection and not merely the
Ante-Nicene religious environment in Alexandria, the following section is devoted to
understanding the ways in which the major religious and philosophical perspectives,
Greco-Roman, Egyptian, and Jewish conceptualized the nature of the afterlife. The first
to be considered is Egyptian religion.
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Afterlife in Egyptian Religion37
There is irrefutable evidence that belief in the afterlife was an integral part of early
Egyptian society. In fact, it has been noted that “belief in the afterlife is among the
fundamental concepts of Egyptian culture.”38 The centrality of the afterlife to Egyptian
culture is attested to by a significant number of sources, most of which are connected to
Egyptian mortuary practices. The evidence of these practices has been well preserved.39
Since Egyptian belief in the afterlife is an important facet of the religious environment in
Alexandria, we shall examine ancient Egyptian anthropology and the Osiris myth.40
According to Maya Müller, there were several elements of an individual in ancient
Egyptian thought.41 These included the ren, ka, the ba, the shadow, the khat, and the
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ahk.42 The ren was the person’s name. In Egypt people did not just have names, they
were names. A ren was an expression of a person’s individuality.43 The ka is a difficult
concept to describe, since it had no European counterpart.44 Despite our present inability
to fully appreciate its role, it was profoundly important to Egyptian mortuary ritual. It
was often understood as a double or twin.45 There was a strong connection between the
ka and the “life-force” of an individual.46 After death, the ka was believed to continue
living. This was most frequently conceptualized as occurring within the tomb. As such,
the ka was the recipient of food offerings. By providing food for the ka the individual
was kept alive.47
The ba was also a complex term, but unlike the ka it had some similarity to
European concepts. It is most frequently translated as “soul.”48 Like most understandings
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of “soul,” the ba was invisible and intimately connected with belief in life beyond the
grave. While it was invisible, the ba was not amorphous.49 In the words of John Taylor,
“The capacity for free and unrestricted movement was in fact the single most important
characteristic which the ba possessed; it was the means by which the dead were
empowered to leave the tomb and to travel.”50 In spite of its freedom, the ba was
inextricably connected to the body. In fact it had to return to the body every day.51 The
ba continued to be a central aspect of Egyptian thought. There are representations of it in
Egyptian tombs from the Roman Period.52
There was also a shadow or shade. It was similar to the ba in that it was thought
to be able to separate from the body. Other references intimately connect the shadow to
the body.53 Khat referred to the body. E. Wallis Budge notes that “the word seems to
indicate something which decayed.”54 In addition to comprising a material component of
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the individual, the body was believed to bear a person’s consciousness.55 As a result,
there was great care given to the preservation of the khat. This is demonstrated by the
ritual practice of mummification.
It is important to realize that early Egyptians understood a person as a unity. Each
part, the ba, ka, ren, khat, and shadow were all elements of the individual. Taylor
observes that “the deceased could survive through each of the aspects described above,”
but that “the ideal was for all of these forms to be perpetuated after death, and to be
united.”56 Moreover, while these elements were important, the ultimate goal was
becoming ahk after death.
The ahk was “capable of unhindered movement and full physical functioning.”57
Taylor explains that “To be akh, then, was to be an effective spirit, enjoying the qualities
and prerogatives of gods, having the capacity for eternal life.”58 There was also a close
connection in the funerary texts between the concept of an ahk and transfiguring light.59
It is noteworthy that not everyone was thought to become ahk. Again, in the words of
John Taylor, “Those who had lived wicked lives were denied the blessed state, and were
condemned to a second death, total extinction, after suffering horrifying punishments.”60
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Becoming an ahk at death also depended on having a properly prepared body, the correct
tomb goods and the knowledge of magical spells.61
In addition to anthropological information derived from Egyptian funerary
practices, we are given an insight into Egyptian understanding of the afterlife through the
myth of Osiris. In an article entitled, “Resurrection in Ancient Egypt,” Jan Assmann
offers a concise summary of the Osiris myth:
Osiris, a god and a king of Egypt, had been killed by his brother and rival Seth,
who moreover, tore his body apart and scattered his limbs all over Egypt. Isis, the
sister and wife of Osiris, traverses Egypt in search of the membra disiecta of her
brother, reassembling them into the shape of a body. Together with her sister
Nephthys she bewails the body in long songs of lamentation using the power of
speech as a means of reanimation. Isis and Nephthys were so successful in their
reanimating recitations that Isis was able to receive a child from the reanimated
body of Osiris.62
The child’s name is Horus, who battles his uncle Seth, in an attempt to restore order from
chaos.63 This Osiris story indicates that the notion of a reanimated body was not a
completely foreign concept in ancient Egypt.
What can we conclude about the afterlife? There is little agreement on the answer
to this question. Scholars like Henk Milde interpret the data to indicate that Egyptians
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“yearned for the resurrection of their own body.”64 Jan Assmann is also quite comfortable
applying the term “resurrection” to early Egyptian belief but is less specific than Milde
about the role of the body. He writes,
Virtually all the religions of the ancient world around the Mediterranean and in
the Near East make the distinction between the world of the living and the world
of the dead, the upper world and the underworld. . . . In the context of these
religions, ancient Egypt seems to have been the sole exception. Only here, human
existence encompassed three worlds, the world of the living, the world of the
dead, and an Elysian world for which there are many names and descriptions in
Egyptian
texts. . . . Here “resurrection” does not mean to return to life on earth, but to be
redeemed from the world of the dead and to be admitted into the Elysian world.65
Jon Davies seems to be of two minds on the matter. At one point, Davies argues that
resurrection is an inappropriate term for characterizing the Egyptian view of the afterlife
when he writes,
The Egyptian fourfold concept of the person in effect sees it [a person] as
immortal, with “death” providing more of an opportunity for fulfillment, rather
than experienced as a negation requiring rebirth, a resurrection. The whole point
of Egyptian funerary ritual was to prevent a second death (feared as oblivion)
from taking place by transcending any gulf there might be between the two
worlds.66
However, he writes later, “The Egyptians were essentially ritual optimists, believing
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fervently in the ‘resurrection’ of the dead as an individualised, embodied self.”67 The
apparent ambivalence of Davies can be contrasted to N. T. Wright, whose understanding
of Egyptian afterlife belief is best summarized by his statement, “What does not belong
here is the word ‘resurrection.’”68 Whether or not the Egyptian ideas about the afterlife
should be called a belief in resurrection, it is clear that before the arrival of the Greeks,
Romans, Hebrews, and Christians ancient Egyptians had a hope for an afterlife and that
this expectation was intimately connected to one’s physical body.69

Afterlife in Greco-Roman Religion and Philosophy
Any attempt to understand the dominant views of the afterlife common to Roman
culture must begin by considering those of Greek culture. This is due to the profound
influence that Greek anthropology and religion had on its Roman counterparts.70 N. J.
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Richardson warns of the complexity of Greek concepts of the afterlife when he writes,
“There is surely no society in which people’s view of death and the after-life are entirely
coherent and consistent, and the Greeks were no exception.”71

Afterlife in Early Greco-Roman Religion
It is commonly accepted that the work of Homer is the most important surviving
source for ancient Greek anthropology and mythology. Yet, German scholar Albrecht
Dihle writes, “At the earliest accessible level, namely, Homer, Greek has no words for
our concepts of body and soul.”72 Dihle’s emphasis on our concepts must be highlighted
since both sw/ma and yuch/ occur in Homer. The questions that arise are, How were these
terms used in early Greek anthropology and what implications did they have for
understanding the afterlife?
In Homer, the use of sw/ma is primarily limited to referring to carcasses.73 When a
person dies, her or his body becomes a sw/ma. The person’s yuch,, on the other hand,
“leaves to Hades and does not return.”74 Drawing on the work of Scandinavian
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anthropologist Ernst Arbman, Jan Bremmer has made some interesting observations
concerning the early Greek understanding of yuch,. Arbman distinguishes between “body
souls endowing the body with life and consciousness and the free soul, an unencumbered
soul representing the individual personality.”75 Bremmer notes that in Homer the yuch, is
inactive when the body is active; it leaves the body when one swoons; and it represents
the person after death.76 Thus, according to Arbman and Bremmer, yuch, should be
identified with the “free soul.” The “body soul” is represented by terms like nou/j, qumo,j,
and me,noj. The significance of this is that in Arbman’s framework, it is the body soul that
is the animating principle so that the free soul or yuch, does not give a person life.77
While yuch, is not the animating element, it is the part of the person that goes to
Hades. It is not the only term used to describe the dead, however. The term ei;dwlon was
also employed and is somewhat more revealing about the nature of the afterlife. An
ei;dwlon means a "copy" or "ghost."78 It can mean the figure of a person, but cannot mean
the person him/herself.79 The use of the term "suggests that the Greeks believed the dead
soul looked like the living being."80 Ei;dwlon has also been understood as a shadow or
75
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ghost. The dead, therefore, have only a shadowy existence in Hades. While there are
some similarities between the idea of yuch, and ei;dwlon, it should be understood that
Homer never used ei;dwlon to refer to the soul of a living person.81
During the sixth century BCE an important variation of Greek religion emerged,
called Orphism. Orphism was a mystery cult based upon the writings of a great poet,
Orpheus. Orphism is important for this study for three reasons. First, it clearly
articulated a radical dualism between the sw/ma and the yuch,. Second, the initiate was
promised an afterlife among the blessed.82 This is a significant development over the
soul's dreary existence in Hades described by Homer. Third, for those who were not
granted a place among the blessed, followers of Orphism believed that the yuch, could be
reincarnated in another body. This is known as the transmigration of souls or
metempsychosis and was understood as a form of punishment. The famous comparison
of this group is sw/ma- sh/ma. The body was viewed as the tomb of the soul.83 Only
through a radical release, or e;kstasij, could one's yuch, be freed and true essence be
realized.84
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Afterlife in Greek Philosophy
The dualism often associated with Greek philosophy is most clearly articulated by
Plato. In his account of the death of Socrates, we read that the soul is divine and
immortal and is merely entrapped in the body.85 Related to this is his understanding of
knowledge, which emphasizes the task of reasoning over sense experience. For Plato
"the most the senses can do is to remind us of realities accessible only to reason."86
Perhaps the most striking indicator of the diminished view of the body's worth in Plato is
the term ei;dwlon. You will recall that from the time of Homer ei;dwlon was an image or
ghost of something but never the real thing. By using the term to refer to the disembodied
dead, the implication is that Homer understood life in the physical body to be reality. In
Plato we find the opposite. Life in the body is the ei;dwlon and real life occurs when the
yuch/ is free from the body. This is demonstrated quite clearly in Laws, where Plato uses
ei;dwla in reference to this temporal life. He states, "And of those who have met their
end, it is well said that the bodies of the dead [italics mine] are mere images, but the
actual essence of each of us is called the deathless soul, which goes off to other gods to
render account."87
85
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Not all philosophies agreed with Plato's understanding of the role of the body.
One of the most important of these groups for understanding resurrection faith in
Alexandria is the Stoics. The Stoics were followers of Zeno. He was a younger
contemporary of Epicurus, born around 336 BCE. For the Stoics, yuch, was the unifying
element that held the organic body together.88 The Stoics believed that the yuch, was
material. It was fundamentally composed of fire. Upon death it returns to its pure state
and thus is consumed by fire. While there was a sense of immortality in the unity with
the world-soul, the yuch/ did not provide any means of personal immortality.
While this survey has demonstrated a variety of beliefs in the afterlife arising from
ancient Greek religion and philosophy, it did not reveal a strong indication of the idea of
resurrection. The majority of scholars do not find convincing evidence of resurrection
belief from Greek culture.89 Recently, Stanley Porter has argued that the Jewish concept
of resurrection may have some roots in Hellenistic thought.90 The idea is derived from
T.F. Glasson’s book, Greek Influence in Jewish Eschatology, where Glasson observed
that resurrection is not a theme in Judaism before the onset of Hellenism and that there
are some accounts of resuscitations in Greek mythology.91 There is little scholarly
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support for attributing emergence of Jewish belief in resurrection to the Greeks. In fact,
there is considerable agreement that avna,stasij was always understood as involving some
form of re-embodiment after death and that the Greeks understood this to be impossible.92

Afterlife in Ancient Judaism
There is no doubt that the Christian belief in bodily resurrection is dependent
upon the Jewish belief in resurrection that existed at the turn of the era. While the ancient
Jewish belief in bodily resurrection is important to this study, it is not necessary to offer a
detailed account of its origin and development in ancient Hebrew culture. Consequently,
the issue of its development will be discussed only briefly.93 Before examining the notion
of resurrection, it is helpful to briefly address the ancient Hebrew notion of the soul.
About fifty years ago, the understanding of ancient Hebrew anthropology changed
dramatically. Oscar Cullmann presented the Ingersoll lectures in which he set dualism of
Greek thought against the wholism of ancient Hebrew thought and subequently that of
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Christianity.94 It is now generally agreed that Cullmann overstated the difference by
failing to acknowledge the diversity in ancient Hebrew thought particularly concerning
intertestamental Judaism. In fact, the existence of dualistic thought in some early Jewish
anthropologies has been well established.95
While there were various ways of understanding the soul's relationship to the
body, it remains that vp,n< "is never given the meaning of an indestructible core of being,
in contradistinction to the physical life," nor is it "capable of living when cut off from that
life."96 This is in contrast to the recent work of James Barr, who has argued that it is
possible to discern occurrences where vp,n< is used in reference to being immortal in the
Greek sense. He also believes that the current sense of a monistic anthropology or a
"unity of being" is a modern projection onto the Old Testament.97 While intriguing, there
is little support for the idea of

vp,n< being understood as the core of personal identity as
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was common in Greek understanding.98 Thus, while Cullmann's position did not reflect
all of the nuances of ancient Hebrew anthropologies, his notion that the central Hebrew
anthropology refers to the whole person remains relatively intact.

Jewish Resurrection Belief within the Agreed Canon99
While there is little scholarly consensus regarding the origin of Jewish belief in
bodily resurrection, two things are generally conceded.100 The first is that the earliest
articulations of Hebrew faith included a notion of a “shadowy” postmortem existence in

lAav. (Sheol) .

The second is that by the second century BCE, hope for individual bodily

resurrection, while not universal, was extremely common in Hebrew thought. For this
reason, we shall begin by considering the Hebrew concept of Sheol.
Sheol is the most common term for the netherworld in the Old Testament, and yet,
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it is not found in the languages of the people surrounding Israel.101 Among the suggested
derivations are the Akkadian word for “underworld” and another which means “the place
of decision.”102 Other options include the Hebrew verbs meaning “to ask,” “to lie
desolate,” “to hollow out,” and “to be quiet.”103 Sheol was perceived as the unavoidable
lot of every human being, as Richard Longenecker notes in the introduction to Life in the
Face of Death,
The hope of the faithful in Israel was not that they would never die or escape
Sheol. Sheol was as much a part of every person’s experience as birth and family.
. . . The hope of the righteous in the religion of Israel was simply 1) a long life, 2)
for a good death, 3)for the continuance of one’s ideals in one’s posterity, and 4)
the continued welfare of the nation.104
It was a place characterized by forgetfulness and captivity.105 Philip Johnston states that
descriptions of Sheol "suggest a somnolent, gloomy existence without meaningful activity
or social distinction. There is certainly no elaborate journey through the gates or stages of
the underworld, in Meopotamian or Egyptian style."106 Martin-Achard is even less
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optimistic when he describes it as “the lifeless land where demons and the spirits of dead
men prowl.”107
The dead in Sheol were called ~yaip r
' > or shades. This has led some scholars to
question whether the belief in bodiless existence in Sheol can legitimately be called a
belief in the afterlife.108 Roland Murphy, for example describes this existence as "nonlife."109 This poses the question, How did resurrection become prevalent in Judaism
given the absence of a real expectation of an afterlife?
The generally accepted explanation is that there was a relatively straightforward
development from belief in Sheol to the hope of individual resurrection. This position is
summarized by Roland Martin-Achard in his study From Death to Life when he writes
“the Old Testament, after having asserted the quasi-decisive power of death over those
who, seemingly forgotten by Yahweh, dwell in Sheol, proclaims, at first hesitantly and
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then with more assurance, the resurrection of the dead.”110 Those who subscribe to this
view believe faith in resurrection to be a late development in Judaism with little
indication of it before the second century.111 While the origin and development of
afterlife belief in Judaism is fascinating, it does not directly benefit this study. It is
sufficient to understand that at least by the second century BCE, belief in an afterlife was
widespread and that resurrection was one of the prominent expectations of this
postmortem existence. In order to substantiate this we will consider three biblical texts:
Ezekiel 37, Isaiah 26, and Daniel 12.112
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Ezekiel 37:1-10
Ezekiel 37 is likely from the sixth century BCE and is a vivid account of God’s
power over death describing dry bones resuming flesh and becoming re-animated. The
first ten verses state,
The hand of the LORD came upon me, and he led me out in the spirit of the
LORD and set me in the center of the plain, which was now filled with bones. He
made me walk among them in every direction so that I saw how many they were
on the surface of the plain. How dry they were!
He asked me: Son of man, can these bones come to life? "Lord GOD," I answered,
"you alone know that."
Then he said to me: Prophesy over these bones, and say to them: Dry bones, hear
the word of the LORD!
Thus says the Lord GOD to these bones: See! I will bring spirit into you, that you
may come to life. I will put sinews upon you, make flesh grow over you, cover
you with skin, and put spirit in you so that you may come to life and know that I
am the LORD.

and

I prophesied as I had been told, and even as I was prophesying I heard a noise; it
was a rattling as the bones came together, bone joining bone. I saw the sinews
the flesh come upon them, and the skin cover them, but there was no spirit in
them.
Then he said to me: Prophesy to the spirit, prophesy, son of man, and say to the
spirit: Thus says the Lord GOD: From the four winds come, O spirit, and breathe
into these slain that they may come to life.
I prophesied as he told me, and the spirit came into them; they came alive and
stood upright, a vast army.

afterlife existed throughout Judaism and into the Christian era. This is exemplified
most vividly in the Wisdom literature of the Bible. Both Proverbs and Qoheleth
generally express the view that death is the end of the human life. See Roland
Murphy, 103-116. As will be evident, this diversity continues for centuries until after
the time of Jesus. See Acts 23:65-68.
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Andrew Chester notes that Exekiel 37 "represents the most sustained, and in
many respects the most famous, 'resurrection' passage within the Old Testament."113
Scholars agree that the idea of resurrection should be understood as a metaphorical
reference to the restoration of the nation following exile.114 However, understanding the
pericope in Ezekiel as metaphorical does not mean that the passage has no implications
for early faith in resurrection. Andrew Chester, while accepting the majority opinion
regarding the passage's symbolic nature, still finds profound theological depth in the
account. According to Chester, resurrection in Ezekiel signifies a re-creation, not merely
restoration, of the people, an overcoming of death, and a connection between resurrection
and the eschata.115
Leila Bronner believes that physical resurrection is present in Ezekiel 37. In her
opinion, the physical description of restored bodies, particularly in verse 6, addresses
bodily resurrection. She does not disagree with the scholarly consensus on Ezekiel 37,
instead she expands on it. She concedes that the passage is mainly about the restoration
of the nation but adds “the vision also embodies a(n) expanded dimension of physical
revival for the individual at a time when the wish for personal vindication was
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developing.”116
Whether one agrees with Bronner’s opinion or not, she raises an important issue.
Scholars agree that around the time of the exile, perhaps just before, there was a “growing
emphasis on the worth and responsibility of the individual . . . and shift in Israel’s hope
from the historical to the eschatological plane.”117 At a minimum, there is in Ezekiel a
testimony of faith in God's ability to give life and to reclaim the dead.

Isaiah 26:19
Isaiah 26:19 states, "But your dead shall live, their corpses shall rise; awake and
sing, you who lie in the dust. For your dew is a dew of light, and the land of shades gives
birth." This passage is part of the Isaiah Apocalypse. For this reason, some have
suggested a date contemporaneous to Daniel 12.118 This is nearly impossible due to the
fact that a complete scroll of Isaiah, found at Qumran, has been dated to the second
century BCE. This is further unlikely since many scholars believe that Daniel 12 is an
interpretation of Isaiah 26:19.119 Other have suggested a date as early as the sixth
century.120 In any event, it is very likely that the text is older than Daniel 12.
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Scholars disagree about whether Isaiah 26:19 teaches the resurrection of the
nation or of individuals, but the view that it is a reference to personal resurrection is
becoming increasingly popular. Gerhard Hasel delineates the case for bodily resurrection
in Isaiah 26 when he writes, "A purely metaphorical interpretation seems to fail because it
does not fit into the context."121 He also points out that verse 19 seems to be the
antithesis of verse 14, which is a clear reference to physical death. He further states that
it is difficult to identify a definite reference to Israel in the pericope.122 Hasel believes
that this is evidence that the text is addressing the world more than Israel, which would
lead toward an understanding of resurrection that has universal implications, rather than
merely national ones.123 Hasel finishes his examination of Isaiah 26:19 by noting that he
is "led to conclude that the 'heart' of the Isaiah Apocalypse climaxes in the apocalyptic
revelation of the physical resurrection of the faithful."124
Other scholars have not been as convinced as Hasel. They believe that this
passage is only a metaphor and can only refer to nation restoration. Most notably is John
Collins, who has observed, "Isa. 16:19 can be read by analogy with Ezekiel 37: Israel was
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dead in Exile, and its restoration is as miraculous as resurrection." Later he states "Isaiah
26:19, then, does not necessarily involve actual resurrection of dead Israelites, and its
value as attestation of such a belief is doubtful."125 Others like Paul Redditt are
somewhere in between the two. In his commentary on Isaiah, Redditt concludes that the
passage is referring to national restoration, but interestingly, he does so only after
acknowledging that the terms used in the passage refer to personal and physical
matters.126

Daniel 12:2-3
Daniel 12 is often dated to the second century BCE. Verses 2-3 are the most
significant Old Testament passage for understanding early belief in resurrection because
of its explicit reference to personal resurrection. In fact, Daniel 12 has been called “the
first undisputed evidence of a belief in the resurrection.”127 It states, "Many of those who
sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake; some shall live forever, others shall be an
everlasting horror and disgrace. But the wise shall shine brightly like the splendor of the
firmament, and those who lead the many to justice shall be like the stars forever."
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An interesting qualification of the anticipated resurrection occurs in verse 2 with
the use of the Hebrew word, ~yBir;. The word is generally translated "many," but in
Daniel 12, it is followed by the preposition !mi. Scholars do not agree on what impact the
preposition has on the understanding of ~yBir;. One option is to understand that many,
but not all of the dead will awaken.128 The other option suggests a more inclusive
interpretation of

~yBir;, rendering it "all."

This also can be understood in two ways. The

first understands the “all” of this passage to refer to all Israelites. The second interprets it
as referring to a general resurrection of which everyone will take part.129 Whether this
passage refers to a general or specific resurrection, it is noteworthy that resurrection is
connected to the idea of final judgment.
Before preceding to examine the relevant intertestamental literature, Jon Levenson
has provided a helpful summary of the passages considered here. He writes,
Whether in the vision of national restoration in Ezekiel 37, the ambiguous revival
of the dead in Isaiah 26, or the clear prediction of resurrection with judgment in
Daniel 12, resurrection does not simply vindicate the justice of God. It also
fulfills the promise to Israel of the God of life. And in that, all these texts in their
differing ways adumbrate the affirmation that the ancient rabbis ordained that
Jews must make every day of their lives - the affirmation that God “keeps faith
with those who sleep in the dust.”130
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Intertestamental Judaism131
It has already been observed that prior to the beginning of the intertestamental
period various opinions about the afterlife existed in Judaism and that belief in
resurrection was emerging. This is expressed by George Nickelsburg when he writes, “In
the intertestamental period there was no single Jewish orthodoxy on the time, mode, and
place of resurrection, immortality, and eternal life.”132 Whether these diverse beliefs can
be attributed to the development of belief in an afterlife as has been asserted by MartinAchard or to the simultaneous existence of divergent ideas is difficult to say with
certainty. Regardless, it is undeniable that in the intertestamental period there are beliefs
that differ greatly from one another existing concurrently.133 While many texts could be
examined to demonstrate this variety, there are only two texts that will be considered
because of the likelihood of their connection to Alexandria.134
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The Wisdom of Solomon
One of the most important intertestamental texts for this study is the Wisdom of
Solomon or the Book of Wisdom (Wisdom hereafter). It was written in Greek and is
believed to have been composed about a century before Christ. The two factors that make
Wisdom important to this study are the scholarly consensus regarding an Alexandrian
provenance and the text’s positive, albeit somewhat obscure, attitude toward the afterlife.
The first thing that should be noted about Wisdom is the fact that the text does not
mention bodily resurrection. It does mention several related themes, but there is no
explicit reference to resurrection. For example, in the first chapter there is a discussion of
the judgment that all people will face. Verses 8-11 state,
Therefore no one who utters wicked things can go unnoticed, nor will chastising
condemnation pass him by.
For the devices of the wicked man shall be scrutinized, and the sound of his words
shall reach the LORD, for the chastisement of his transgressions;
Because a jealous ear hearkens to everything, and discordant grumblings are no
secret.
Therefore guard against profitless grumbling, and from calumny withhold your
tongues; For a stealthy utterance does not go unpunished, and a lying mouth slays
the soul.

Not only will there be a judgment, the text indicates that the soul can be killed. Later in
chapter one, we read of the goodness of creation: “Because God did not make death, nor
does he rejoice in the destruction of the living. For he fashioned all things that they might
have being; and the creatures of the world are wholesome, And there is not a destructive
drug among them nor any domain of the nether world on earth” (1.13-14).
In chapter 2, the author states that the wicked wrongly think that “Brief and
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troublous is our lifetime; neither is there any remedy for man's dying, nor is anyone
known to have come back from the nether world,” and “For our lifetime is the passing of
a shadow; and our dying cannot be deferred because it is fixed with a seal; and no one
returns” (2:1,5).
Chapter 3 is perhaps the most important passage of Wisdom for this study. It
begins with the observation that “The souls of the just are in the hand of God” (3:1). This
emphasis on souls sets the tone for the rest of the chapter. In verses 2-3, we read “They
seemed, in the view of the foolish, to be dead. . . . But they are in peace,” and their hope
is “full of immortality” (3:4). In verse 8, we learn that the just “will judge nations and
rule over peoples.”
In light of the fact that there is no explicit indication in the text of an intermediary
state, it seems that the souls of the dead continue living in the presence of God. Passages
like this, combined with the fact that Wisdom does not contain a single explicit reference
to resurrection have caused scholars like Nickelsburg to conclude that Wisdom teaches
immortality of the soul rather than bodily resurrection.135
While Nickelsburg’s position is the prevailing opinion, the evidence is by no
means definitive. Dubarle is among the scholars who find indications of resurrection
faith in Wisdom. While not fully committing himself, Dubarle identifies, among other
things, the positive attitude toward the material world found in Wisdom. As he writes,
Certainly nothing expressly contradicts the hope of resurrection in the Book of
Wisdom. The author knew of the belief and perhaps made it his own. But he
preferred, probably in order not to shock his Greek readers, to emphasize the
135
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spiritual elements of the after-life and leave in obscurity the fate of the body.
There is no positive evidence for the resurrection of the body to be drawn from his
writing, but nor is it possible to find any denial of the concept there.136
N. T. Wright also believes that the teaching of Wisdom does not refute belief in
resurrection. His position is based on the role of the soul in the intermediate state, so that
while he agrees that the emphasis in Wisdom is on the soul, he understands it as likely
referring to the intermediate and not the final state. In this way, immortality of the soul
and bodily resurrection are not irreconcilable.137 In support of his position, Wright
discerns that 3:7 begins a description of a second stage of existence.138 Interestingly, on
this point Wright and Nickelsburg agree.139
While Wisdom teaches the immortality of the soul either as an intermediate or
final state, it differs from Greek thinking on the subject in a fundamental way. Whereas
in Greek thought the soul was considered to be immortal by its nature, the author of
Wisdom establishes its immortality with God. In Wisdom the soul’s immortality is a gift
from God (3:15-16). Several passages support this idea. One of the more obvious
examples of this is the fact that only the souls of the just are said to be immortal (3:1).
Additionally, the text indicates that the soul can be killed (1:11). Finally, as Roland
Murphy observes, it is righteousness and not the soul in 1:15 that is declared to be
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immortal.140 Immortality is the condition the soul enjoys; it is not an aspect of its nature.
Murphy presents another important issue relevant to the study of this text when he
questions whether the use of the soul in the text presupposes a Greek or Hebrew
anthropology.141 This is important because according to Murphy, if Hebrew anthropology
is assumed, the references to soul should be understood within the framework of the
integrity of the human person. This would mean the inclusion of the body. While this is
profoundly important to the interpretation of the passage, it is not easily resolved. The
evidence suggests that Wisdom is a Jewish text, believed to be originally written in Greek,
at a time when both bodily resurrection and immortality of the soul were increasingly
popular. Additionally, some would take issue with Murphy’s limited notion of Hebrew
anthropology.

The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides142
Perhaps the best example of the diversity of beliefs in Alexandria is the Sentences
of Pseudo-Phocylides. Its supposed author, Phocylides, was a Greek poet from Melitus
who lived in the sixth century BCE.143 The Sentences comprise a Greek poem written in

140

Murphy, 116.

141

Murphy, 116.

142

References to the Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides are from Pieter W. Van der
Horst’s translation. See The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, ed. James H.
Charlesworth (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985), II: 574-582. See also Horst’s
introduction in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, II: 565-573.
143

Horst, 565.

47
the style and name of Phocylides. It is believed to be composed by a Hellenistic Jew
around the turn of the era.144 The text is relevant to this study because it addresses the
subject of resurrection and is thought to have an Alexandrian provenance.145 The text has
a perplexing quality in that it seems to affirm different, even conflicting views of the
afterlife. As will be demonstrated, the text seems to affirm both a postmortem hope for
the temporal body and the idea of incorporeal immortality. This is best established
through a survey of the relevant passages.
The passage most relevant to this dissertation is found in lines 97 through 115.
The first two lines include a call for moderation when grieving (97-98). We read, “Sit not
in vain at the fire, weakening your heart. Be moderate in your grief; for moderation is
best.” The passage continues with a call for the proper burial of the dead in line 99,
which states, “Let the unburied dead receive their share of the earth.” It is reasonable to
assume that this was not always occurring. Afterward, the author employs the negative
imperative. In lines 100-101a we find a condemnation of the mistreatment of corpses. It
states, “Do not dig up the grave of the deceased, nor expose to sun what may not be seen,
lest you stir up divine anger.”146
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Here the author is providing a rationale for the careful treatment of the dead. For
example in line 101b, the author advises that the mistreatment of corpses can invoke
God’s anger. In verses 103-104a, we read of the “hope that the remains of the departed
will soon come to the light again out of the earth.” In other words, the bodies of the dead
should not be disturbed because of the hope of resurrection.
Another reason for respecting corpses is in line 105 where we read that “the soul
remains unharmed among the deceased.” The author then instructs in line 106 that the
spirit “is a loan of God,” and in lines 107-108 that “we have a body out of earth, and
when afterward we are resolved again into earth we are but dust; and then the air has
received our spirit.” Walter Wilson offers a concise summary of verses 110-111 when he
writes “money and possessions are worthless in Hades (verse 110), everyone is alike in
the afterlife (verse 111a), and God rules over all souls after they die (verse 111b).” In line
115, the passage concludes with a statement that the soul “is immortal and lives ageless
forever.”
While it is tempting to try to coalesce the numerous perspectives mentioned above
into a single message, it does violence to the text. As Hans Cavallin writes in his Life
After Death, “In the same writings, and even the same passages, concepts, symbols from
widely differing anthropologies are used in order to express the hope of personal survival
of death.”147
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The majority opinion during the intertestamental period was that a good afterlife
awaited the just and punishment awaited the wicked. This afterlife was commonly
understood in terms of bodily resurrection, but this was not the only way of expressing it.
During this time, the notion of an immortal soul also grew in popularity. It is, therefore,
not surprising that some texts like Wisdom have a preference for the soul over the body as
a means of discussing the afterlife given the degree to which Alexandria was the symbol
of Hellenism. It should be remembered that even in these instances however, the idea of
an immortal soul was significantly redacted from the Greek concept since the soul’s
immortality was a gift of God, not a part of its nature.

Philo on the Afterlife148
Before proceeding to the New Testament, it is important to consider the work of
Philo. He is significant to this study for a number of reasons. The first is the fact that he
was from Alexandria. Second, he lived at the turn of the era, which means that he is able
to give another perspective on early Jewish belief in the afterlife. Third, Philo remains
one of the most vivid examples of Hellenistic Judaism from the turn of the era. As Henry
Chadwick once wrote, “It seems clear that of all the non-Christian writers of the first
century A.D. Philo is the one from whom the historian of emergent Christianity has the
most to learn.”149
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As a Hellenistic Jew, he was both aware of and influenced by Greek philosophy.
Even a casual reading of Philo reveals the fact that he subscribed to a form of dualism,
but because he understood Greek philosophy as being dependent on early Jewish wisdom
traditions, he does not share the negativity towards the material world that often
accompanied dualism.150 This is demonstrated in Philo’s Quaestiones et Solutiones in
Genesim (QG) where he interprets the two creation accounts in Genesis.
In Genesis 1, we read of the creation of humans in the image of God. Genesis 2
has a second account of the creation of humanity which indicates that God “formed man
out of the clay of the ground and blew into his nostrils the breath of life” (2:7). Rather
than parallel accounts of the same event, Philo understands these passages to be about
two different acts of creation. In commenting on Genesis 2:7 Philo writes, “The moulded
man is the sense-perceptible man and a likeness of the intelligible type. But the man
made in accordance with (God’s) form is intelligible and incorporeal and a likeness of the
archetype, so far as this is visible” (QG 1:4) Thus, according to Philo, the creation
account in the second chapter of Genesis details the creation of visible humans.
Naturally, the influence of Greek philosophy also expressed itself in Philo’s
understanding of the nature of the afterlife.
As a result of his dualism, Philo believed in the immortal soul rather than bodily
resurrection. This is noteworthy because of what it may indicate for Christian faith in
150
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bodily resurrection at Alexandria. This will be demonstrated by a brief consideration of
the vocabulary Philo employs.
In all of the extant works of Philo there are only seven occurrences of the word
avna,stasij.151 One passage includes three of the occurrences and is the only place that
clearly uses the term in reference to the afterlife (QG 2:15).152 It is, therefore, interesting
that in a passage about the afterlife that includes the term avna,stasij, Philo would argue
for the idea of an immortal soul. As Philo’s writes in this passage, “by the grace of the
Father we wish to cast off and wash off from the mind all the sensible and corporeal
things by which it was stained as if by ulcers” (QG 2:15c). Philo’s preference of the idea
of immortality over resurrection is also reflected in his vocabulary. In comparison to the
seven instances of avna,stasij, avqanasi,a and avqanatoj occur 139 times in Philo’s
surviving texts.153
There is a second term that Philo uses in reference to his idea of an immortal soul.
The word is paliggenesi,a which is often understood as rebirth. It also connotes the idea
of restoration.154 Within a Platonic system, this would imply the transmigration of souls
or reincarnation. This does not seem to be how Philo is using the term, however. In an
article in Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Fred Burnett has suggested that the central theme
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of Philo’s work is “the migration of the soul towards immortality” and that Philo uses
paliggenesi,a to that end.155 Later, he writes that the use of “paliggenesi,a in Philo refers
to the soul’s immortality, but his is a view which does not fit precisely into any Jewish or
Hellenistic conception.”156

Resurrection in the New Testament
There are two basic sources for information on resurrection in the New Testament.
They are the portrayals of the words and deeds of Jesus in the canonical gospels and the
teaching of Christ’s early followers contained in the letters of the New Testament. Each
has something to contribute to understanding the Christian hope of resurrection and will
be considered. In light of the fact that entire volumes have been written on the subject of
resurrection in the New Testament, the following offers only a sampling of the most
significant texts and issues related to the topic. In particular, the question that this survey
seeks to answer is What is the understanding(s) of the nature of the resurrected body
taught in the New Testament?

Resurrection in the Portrayals of Jesus
The portrayals of Jesus in the canonical gospels inform the understanding of
resurrection in the New Testament in two ways. The first is through the teachings and

155

Fred W. Burnett, “Philo on Immortality,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 46
(1984): 447.
156

Burnett, “Philo on Immortality,” 470.

53
deeds of Jesus; the other is through the accounts of his resurrection appearances. Among
the texts of the first variety, two stories will be studied here. The first is the account of
the transfiguration.157 It is found in Mark 9:2-8, Matthew 17:1-13, and Luke 9:28-36. In
Mark’s account we read,
After six days Jesus took Peter, James, and John and led them up a high mountain
apart by themselves. And he was transfigured before them, and his clothes became
dazzling white, such as no fuller on earth could bleach them.
Then Elijah appeared to them along with Moses, and they were conversing with
Jesus.
Then Peter said to Jesus in reply, "Rabbi, it is good that we are here! Let us make
three tents: one for you, one for Moses, and one for Elijah."
He hardly knew what to say, they were so terrified.
Then a cloud came, casting a shadow over them; then from the cloud came a
voice, "This is my beloved Son. Listen to him."
Suddenly, looking around, they no longer saw anyone but Jesus alone with them.
The most important aspect of this passage is the connection between the
transfiguration and the resurrection of Christ. This is implied by the fact that in each
gospel account the transfiguration immediately follows Jesus’ foretelling his own death
and resurrection.158 As Stephen Barton notes, “Seen in this light, the transfiguration is an
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anticipation - a temporary unveiling in the form of an apocalyptic vision - of Jesus’ postresurrection glory. . . . From Mark’s point of view, the transfiguration is an invitation to
see the fate of Jesus and followers of Jesus in eschatological terms, as a prelude to
glory.”159 The extent to which the transfigured body exemplifies the resurrected body
indicates that the resurrected body involves a radical transformation of the temporal body
into a luminous one.
While the transfiguration served as an “object lesson” of sorts for the disciples,
Jesus also taught about the resurrection.160 The most primary occurrence of this is a
conversation between Jesus and the Sadducees on the subject of resurrection. In fact, N.
T. Wright calls this pericope “far and away the most important passage about the
resurrection in the whole gospel tradition.”161 The encounter is recorded in Mark 12:1827 and in parallel versions in Luke 20 and Matthew 22. There is an emerging consensus
that the pericope is likely authentic to a Sitz im Leben Jesu.162 Mark’s account states,
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Some Sadducees, who say there is no resurrection, came to him and put this
question to him, saying, "Teacher, Moses wrote for us, 'If someone's brother dies,
leaving a wife but no child, his brother must take the wife and raise up
descendants for his brother.'
Now there were seven brothers. The first married a woman and died, leaving no
descendants. So the second married her and died, leaving no descendants, and the
third likewise. And the seven left no descendants. Last of all the woman also
died. At the resurrection (when they arise) whose wife will she be? For all seven
had been married to her."
Jesus said to them, "Are you not misled because you do not know the scriptures or
the power of God? When they rise from the dead, they neither marry nor are given
in marriage, but they are like the angels in heaven. As for the dead being raised,
have you not read in the Book of Moses, in the passage about the bush, how God
told him, 'I am the God of Abraham, (the) God of Isaac, and (the) God of Jacob'?
He is not God of the dead but of the living. You are greatly misled."

In this passage Jesus is confronted by the Sadducees on the subject of Levirate
marriage in an attempt to refute the idea of resurrection. Two aspects of this exchange
should be noted. First, Jesus rejects the view of the Sadducees by asserting the reality of
the resurrection in Mark 12:25. He teaches that the resurrection is evk nekrw/n. Equally
important is the second part of Jesus’ response in which he emphasizes the discontinuity
between this life and the resurrected life. He states that in the resurrection even the basic
relationship of marriage will not exist as we think of it now (Mark 12:25). Instead, we
will be like the angels. Unfortunately, nowhere is it specified the way or ways the
resurrected life can be said to be like that of angels.163 Jesus is clearly attempting to
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correct the ideas of some who believed that resurrection was simply a continuation of the
temporal life.164
As indicated above, the teaching of the New Testament about the nature of
resurrection is informed by the teaching of Jesus and the accounts of Christ’s own
resurrection. This second source is less direct in that any information about the nature of
bodily resurrection must be inferred from the text. Nevertheless, the accounts of Jesus’
resurrection are fundamental to this study since the Christian hope for bodily resurrection
is dependent on Christ having been raised. Moreover, it is generally believed that the
resurrected body of Christ is the model par excellence for that of his followers.165
As will become apparent, the resurrection appearances of Jesus indicate that the
nature of the resurrected body will be both consistent with and dissimilar from the
temporal body. Given the limitations of this study, it is impossible to consider each of the
resurrection stories found in the gospels. Instead, Luke’s account of the resurrection and
resurrection appearances will be considered in that he provides evidence for
understanding the resurrected body as being both consistent and inconsistent with
temporal body.166
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The first and most obvious element of the resurrection accounts is the fact that
the tomb was empty (Luke 24:3,12).167 Hans-Joachim Eckstein has suggested that the
fundamental question of the exegete in the resurrection stories is “Why is it so important
for all the Gospel writers to record that the grave of the Risen One was empty? And why
did not or could not the early Christians combine their faith in the continuous living and
working of the crucified Lord with the concept that his dead body had decayed in the
grave?”168 The resurrection had to be bodily because as Raymond Brown has observed,
“there was no other kind of resurrection.”169
This means that the empty tomb and grave clothes integrally connects the
temporal and resurrected bodies. Somehow, Christ’s resurrected body involves the
corporeality of his earthly body. Taken out of context, this passage could even indicate
the reanimation of Jesus’ unchanged temporal flesh, but the next pericope prohibits this
interpretation.
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Immediately after Luke appears to identify the temporal body with the resurrected
one, he includes an encounter between the risen Christ and two of his disciples which
demonstrates the radical discontinuity between the temporal and resurrected bodies. In
the story, we learn that while the disciples were speaking, “Jesus himself drew near and
walked with them, but their eyes were prevented from recognizing him” (24:15-16). The
two likely explanations for this phenomenon are that Christ’s identity was miraculously
hidden or that there was something about his resurrected body that was sufficiently
different to cause his followers to not recognize him. The manner in which Luke records
the encounter gives the impression that the disciples were kept from knowing his
identity.170 I. Howard Marshall has noted that “the lack of recognition is more due to a
spiritual blindness by the disciples than to something unusual about the appearance of
Jesus.”171 As if the unrecognizable character of Christ were not enough, Jesus disappears
just as they are ready to eat (24:31).
The emphasis on the change from temporal to resurrected body continues in the
next pericope. In Luke 24:36-49, Jesus appears in the midst of a gathering of his
disciples.172 Something about Christ’s appearance leads them to conclude that they are
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seeing a ghost (Luke 24:37). Whatever is the case, Christ claims to have flesh and bones
(Luke 24:39), and his remedy to their fear is to invite them to see and touch his wounds
(Luke 24:39-40). Like the empty tomb, Christ’s display of his wounds affirms the
continuity between the two bodies. He also eventually eats with them (Luke 24:41-43).173
Pheme Perkins comments on this passage that like Luke’s account of the empty tomb,
“his account of the resurrection appearance of Jesus is equally concerned with the
demonstration that Jesus’ resurrection is bodily and not an apparition.”174 In other words,
this last pericope begins by emphasizing the radical discontinuity of Christ’s resurrected
body to that of temporal bodies by his sudden appearance in their midst and concludes by
emphasizing the way in which it is the same body by the demonstration of the wounds,
the invitation to touch, and the eating of fish.
From the various resurrection appearances, we can conclude that the afterlife
existence exhibited by Jesus and anticipated by his followers involves some form of
body. Christ’s resurrected body has some similarities with the earthly body in that Jesus
eats and is apparently able to be touched. It is equally true that the gospels give evidence
of some significant differences, such as his unrecognizable body and his ability to appear
and disappear at will.

Resurrection in the Pauline Letters
Resurrection in I Corinthians 15. There is little debate among biblical scholars
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that Paul is attempting to correct wrong thinking in the Corinthian church about
resurrection, but is it possible to determine what their error was?175 The answer seems to
occur in verse 12 where Paul indicates that some people in the church were saying that
there was no resurrection from the dead (I Cor. 15:12). Unfortunately, understanding that
some did not believe in Paul’s understanding of resurrection from the dead does not
explain what was believed in its place. In an attempt to understand this situation better, it
is necessary to look at this verse more closely.
To begin, there are two elements of Paul’s use of evn u`mi/n tinej in this verse
which should be noted. First, through this phrase Paul is indicating that only some,
probably a minority hold to the erroneous view of resurrection. Second, Paul writes,
“some of you.” At the beginning of this discussion, Paul calls the recipients his brothers
(I Cor. 15:1). Here, he includes those in error in his audience. This likely means that he
understands even those who are in error to be included in the household of faith. The
question that some scholars have asked is, Given the centrality of resurrection in Paul’s
thought, could he have included anyone who denied the resurrection among the brothers
of faith? It does not seem likely. As E. Earle Ellis has noted, Paul “regards the bodily
resurrection of the dead as the sine qua non for a future life since without it Christ
himself has not been raised.”176 So, if the problem is not an outright denial of
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resurrection, what other possible explanations does the text support?
Karl Plank has suggested that instead of denying any notion of resurrection, some
in the Corinthian church had a belief in a realized and spiritualized resurrection. He
writes,
The problem in Corinth is not the denial of the kerygma but its enthusiastic
interpretation: the scandal of the crucified Messiah has been overcome by an
uncontrolled exaltation christology. . . that understands redemption to have
already been effected. The difficulty is not the failure of the Corinthians to
believe in the resurrection, Christ’s or their own, but the fact that they believed
“too much”!177
While a realized resurrection is not a denial of resurrection per se, it results in a denial of
a future bodily resurrection, which Paul desires to address. Richard Longenecker agrees
with Plank’s position and finds evidence in the structure of the chapter. He writes,
Evidently some Christians at Corinth were claiming that a future, personal,
corporeal resurrection of believers in Jesus was (1) irrelevant since the
eschatological hope of the gospel was already fulfilled in a believer’s present,
spiritual experience; (2) impossible, since the corporeal in Greek religious thought
was excluded from divine redemption . . . and (3) even unnecessary, since
believers were thought to possess an already immortal soul.178

Longenecker sees Paul arguing for the idea of a future bodily resurrection in verses 12-35,
the manner of this resurrection in verses 35-49, and the necessity of it in verses 50-58.179
In light of the fact that no serious interpretation has been offered to contradict the idea
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that Paul is arguing for a future resurrection of the body in 15:12-35, we will proceed to
Paul’s statements on the nature of the resurrected body, which is of particular relevance to
this study.
In 15:35-38, Paul describes the nature of the resurrected body and its relationship
to the earthly body through the use of a seed metaphor. He states,
But someone may say, "How are the dead raised? With what kind of body will
they come back?" You fool! What you sow is not brought to life unless it dies.
And what you sow is not the body that is to be but a bare kernel of wheat, perhaps,
or of some other kind; but God gives it a body as he chooses, and to each of the
seeds its own body.
By employing this metaphor, Paul indicates that there is an implicit connection
between the two bodies - one proceeds from the other. However, while a connection
exists, the metaphor more directly affirms the significant differences between the two
bodies as the plant is different from the seed from which it grows. The difference
between the earthly and resurrected bodies is also emphasized by Paul in 15:42-44 where
he resumes the seed metaphor. He writes, “It is sown corruptible; it is raised
incorruptible. It is sown dishonorable; it is raised glorious. It is sown weak; it is raised
powerful. It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a natural body,
there is also a spiritual one.”
This brings up one of the central issues for understanding Paul’s teaching on
resurrection and about which there is little agreement: What does Paul mean by the term
sw/ma?180 Some have argued that Paul’s use of sw/ma should be understood in a Semitic
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way as referring to the unity which is a human person.181 Others have even suggested that
“community” is a suitable equivalent.182 More recently, Robert Gundry has made a
somewhat convincing case for understanding sw/ma as referring to the physical body.183
As he states,
We conclude that in neither the Pauline epistles, nor the literature of the NT
outside those epistles, nor the LXX, nor the extra-biblical ancient Greek literature
does the definition “whole person” find convincing support. . . . Rather, apart
from its use for a corpse, sÇma refers to the physical body in its proper and
intended union with the soul/spirit. The body and its counterpart are portrayed as
united but distinct - and separable, though unnaturally and unwantedly separated.
The sÇma may represent the whole person simply because the sÇma lives in union
with the soul/spirit. But sÇma does not mean “the whole person.”184

A.J.M. Wedderburn seems to support this view when he writes, that for a Hellenistic
audience, the concept of resurrection would have meant something physical and earthy.185
In addressing the issue of corruption of the body, C. K. Barrett comments that
Paul does not mean that the body placed in the grave is in a process of physical
decomposition, though this is a part of the truth and the clearest expression of it.
Corruption is an evil power, by which the world is dominated in the old age
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(Rom. Vii.21). It affects not only human life, but the whole of creation. Its
domination will be ended in the age to come, at the beginning of which the
resurrection takes place. Thus Paul’s point is not simply that we shall have a new
body, no longer subject to change and decay, but that the new body will be
appropriate to the new age in which God, having reasserted his sovereignty, is all
in all.186

I believe that verse 50 is the most important verse of Scripture for this study. Paul
writes, “that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God nor does the perishable
inherit the imperishable.” As will become evident in the following chapters, there has
been little agreement about the meaning of the phrase “flesh and blood” since the
composition of I Corinthians 15:50. Among the interpretations that presently exist,
Pheme Perkins has noted that “‘flesh and blood’ is a Semitic expression for human
being.”187 Joachim Jeremias has argued that “flesh and blood” refer to alive humans and
“perishable” refers to decaying bodies with the result being that “neither the dead nor the
living can take part in the Kingdom of God - as they are.”188 N. T. Wright has offered a
more traditional view when he writes, “‘flesh and blood’ is a way of referring to ordinary,
corruptible, decaying human existence.”189 As we shall see, the question that the early
Church Fathers endeavored to answer is, What did Paul mean by flesh and blood? We
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shall return to this question later.190
Romans 8. Resurrection can be found throughout the book of Romans, as N. T.
Wright states, “squeeze this letter at any point and resurrection spills out.”191 It is not
necessary, nor is it practical to examine each instance when the idea occurs in the book.
Instead, I will focus on chapter eight because I believe it is most fruitful for this study.
I am convinced that chapter eight offers the most profound material on the
resurrection in the entire letter. One of the first aspects of the section that I wish to note
is Paul’s return to the theme of being “in the flesh.” In 8:8 we read, “those who are in the
flesh cannot please God.” While this shares a resemblance to I Corinthians 15:50, this
passage does not suffer from the same ambiguity. Taken in context, it is clear that Paul is
using the phrase “in the flesh” as a means of discussing being in a state of sin, for in 8:9
he states, “But you are not in the flesh; on the contrary, you are in the spirit, if only the
Spirit of God dwells in you.”
The next verse that I wish to address is 8:11. Romans 8:11 reads, “If the Spirit of
the one who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, the one who raised Christ from the
dead will give life to your mortal bodies also, through his Spirit that dwells in you.” This
verse is particularly noteworthy because Paul only speaks of the resurrection in the future

190

It is not possible nor necessary for our purposes here to resolve this debate. In
fact, as I will propose later, the various interpretations of I Corinthians 15:50 is one
way of distinguishing various notions of resurrection.
191

Wright, 241.

66
tense.192 Romans 8:11 is also important because Paul promises that God through his
Spirit will give life to our mortal bodies. Pheme Perkins interprets the phrase “will give
life to your mortal bodies” as referring to God’s present activity of giving us life, which
she understands as the basis for Christian ethics.193 While I completely agree with the
truthfulness of her statement, I disagree that this passage is ultimately about the present
life. I believe that 8:11 is an uncomplicated affirmation that the resurrected body
somehow involves the temporal body. If, as I suspect, Paul is referring to the
eschatological redemption of bodies, then it would seem to be evidence against those who
believe that Paul’s view of resurrection underwent considerable development during his
lifetime.194
Understanding this passage as a reference to resurrection seems to be supported by Paul’s
return to the topic in 8:23. Paul teaches that “we wait for adoption, the redemption of
our bodies.”195 This both offers hope to our bodies as well as placing that hope in the
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future.196
In this sampling of the teaching about resurrection from the New Testament, two
aspects of the nature of the resurrected body have been noted. First, there is continuity
between the temporal and resurrected bodies. Second, life in the resurrected body
involves a radical change from that of the temporal. While evidence has been supplied
demonstrating both, the second seems to be a more dominant theme.
Having examined the theological precursors to resurrection faith in the Jewish and
Christian Scripture as well as various aspects of Alexandria before the arrival of
Christianity, the final section will sketch the early history of Alexandrian Christianity, the
Christianity that produced the texts that will constitute the focus of the rest of this
dissertation.

The Origins of Egyptian Christianity
In order to fully appreciate Alexandrian Christianity, it is necessary to consider
what is known or not known about its origin. In the words of Colin Roberts, “The
obscurity that veils the early history of the Church in Egypt and that does not lift until the
beginning of the third century constitutes a conspicuous challenge to the historian of
primitive Christianity.”197 The lack of substantive evidence has resulted in varying
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explanations being proposed about the Christian beginnings in Alexandria. Despite the
diverse opinions about its origin, scholars agree that there was some form of Christianity
in Egypt by the early second century.198
The first theory to be considered here is that the earliest form of Christianity in
Alexandria was Gnostic. This was proposed in 1934 by Walter Bauer in his book,
Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity.199 In it, Bauer argued that Christianity in
its earliest form was much more diverse and geographically localized than portrayed by
Eusebius. He writes, “perhaps certain manifestations of Christian life that the authors of
the church renounce as ‘heresies’ originally had not been such at all, but, at least here and
there, were the only form of the new religion - that is, for those regions they were simply
‘Christianity.’”200 In the book, Bauer marshals evidence to demonstrate that different
geographical areas tended to produce different forms of Christianity.
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According to Bauer, the earliest form of Christianity in Egypt was Gnostic.201 In
support of his position, Bauer observed the peculiar silence from the Church Fathers
concerning the Christian beginnings in Egypt. His supposition was that if there was
something about the beginning of the Egyptian Church which would support orthodox
Christianity, it would have been reported.202
The lack of an account favorable to proto-orthodox Christianity is not the only
evidence which Bauer presents for his position. As Attila Jakab writes, “L’hypothèse de
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the New Testament,” in The New Testament and Gnosis, ed. A. H. B. Logan and A. J.
M. Wedderburn (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1983), 21-37.
Among the more recent attempts at addressing the issue are Michael Allen
Williams in his Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious
Category (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) and Karen L. King’s, What is
Gnosticism? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). Williams states that the
term, Gnostic, “has come to mean too much, and therefore perhaps very little.”(4)
Similarly, his view of the term Gnosticism is that it obscures more than it enlightens
(50). In place of Gnosticism, Williams suggests “biblical demiurgical tradition”(51).
King both applauds and critiques William’s study (214). In spite of her conviction
that the term “Gnosticism” should be abandoned, she uses it throughout her work.
Therefore, while I am aware of the complexity of the terms, this study will employ the
terms Gnostic and Gnosticism in the absence of acceptable alternatives. When used,
it should be remembered that it is in reference to a complex system of loosely related
beliefs not a unified heretical movement.
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W. Bauer est fondée sur deux éléments majeurs - des textes . . . et des personnes.”203 The
texts are the Gospel according to the Hebrews and the Gospel according to the
Egyptians.204 Bauer argues that these texts are likely representative of the two primary
forms of Christianity in Egypt.205 The dominant form would eventually be called Gnostic
and the minority one, orthodox or catholic.206 He also notes that the earliest known
Alexandrian personalities who articulate some form of Christian teaching are individuals
the Church eventually label as Gnostics. The most famous of these are Basilides and
Valentinus.207 The connections between these teachers and Alexandria have been well
established.208
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The present state of evidence supports Bauer’s thesis about Egypt on two
important points. First, apart from Eusebius’ account there are no known “orthodox”
bishops before the episcopacy of Demetrius (189-232).209 Second, there can be little
doubt that there were early Christian Gnostics in Egypt and that they exerted influence on
the emergence of Christianity there. The issue for this study is, To what extent were they
representative of early Egyptian Christianity?
It does not now appear that Bauer’s thesis holds for the origins of Christianity in
Egypt. In the second half of the twentieth century several scholars began to raise serious
objections to Bauer’s thesis. Among the earliest is Henry Turner. In his book, The
Pattern of Christian Truth, Turner presented a thorough critique of Bauer’s thesis and
demonstrated several of the weaknesses in Bauer’s argument.210 Concerning the origins
of Egyptian Christianity, Turner states, “Most of the new discoveries have the effect of
moving what we know of Alexandrine Christianity further to the right. The probability
that the Gospels according to the Hebrews and the Egyptians represent splinter groups on
the fringe of the Church rather than the official Gospels of two halves of an equally

Peter Lang, 1995).
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These include Bauer’s habit of overstating the conclusions suggested by the
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narrow definition of orthodoxy. See H. E. W. Turner, The Pattern of Christian Truth:
A Study in the Relations between Orthodoxy and Heresy in the Early Church
(London: Mowbray, 1954), 46-58.
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tainted orthodoxy is correspondingly strengthened.”211 While acknowledging the absence
of testimony regarding early “orthodox” bishops in Egypt and the prominence of specific
Gnostic teachers, Turner is not convinced that this is sufficient to conclude the primacy of
Gnostic Christianity in Egypt. He states, “The further inferences drawn by Bauer seem to
carry us beyond the limits which we can safely traverse.”212
Among the more recent and interesting criticisms of Bauer’s position is that
provided by James McCue. His position is that “the orthodox play a role in Valentinian
thought such that they seem to be part of the Valentian self-understanding.”213 McCue
believes that the way in which Valentinians used the books of the New Testament is best
explained if one understands Valentinianism as arising within a context of second-century
proto-orthodoxy. McCue raises another objection to Bauer based upon the selfunderstanding of the Valentinians. McCue questions whether or not a group like the
Valentinians who seemed to understand themselves as the few against the many and who
reveled in their exclusiveness could ever rise to be the majority form of Christianity that
is required by Bauer’s thesis.
Four years after Turner’s book was released, Jean Daniélou published Théologie
du Judeo-Christianisme wherein he presents the second view of the origins of Egyptian
Christianity namely, that the earliest form of Christianity in Alexandria was Jewish, not
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Gnostic.214 Daniélou does not follow Bauer, but he does not refute him either. He simply
presents an alternative interpretation of the evidence. Daniélou posits that both the
Gospel according to the Hebrews and Gospel according to the Egyptians display the
effects of a Jewish Christian influence rather than Gnostic.215 More specifically, Daniélou
asserts that Christianity was likely brought to Egypt by Essene Christians.216
Another important study on the subject of the origins of Egyptian Christianity has
been offered by Colin Roberts. Based upon the surviving manuscripts, Roberts has also
asserted the Jewish origins of Egyptian Christianity. Interestingly, he suggests that it is
the Jewish nature of early Egyptian Christianity that may offer an explanation of the
relative silence concerning the “orthodoxy” nature of early Egyptian Christianity. In
order to appreciate his reasoning, it is necessary to be aware of the Kitos War, or the
Second Jewish-Roman War.
According to historian Victor Tcherikover, “In the Roman period the Jewish
population in Cyrene developed considerable strength, and at the end of the reign of the
Emperor Trajan made its desperate attempt to rebel against Rome, a rebellion which
brought destruction not only on the Jewish population of the county but also on the Jews
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of Egypt and Cyprus.”217 Similarly, Robert Wilken has commented on the Jews in Egypt
that “the war of 115-117 destroyed Jewish social and cultural life.”218
Colin Roberts has noted that during the first 150 years of Roman rule, there are
nearly 300 documents that refer to the Jews, but from 117-337 there are only 44 known
documents with references to the Jews.219 Roberts concludes, “It is precisely when the
evidence for Judaism grows scarce that that for Christianity begins to appear.”220 The
significance for this study is that “For the first time Christians in Egypt were free of the
legacy of their past; in the course of the war they may have been able to disassociate
themselves from the Jews.”221
Wilfred Griggs had suggested that the earliest stage of Egyptian Christianity “was
founded on a more broadly-based literary tradition and a less defined ecclesiastical
tradition than was the same religion in the region from Syria to Rome.”222 He makes a
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convincing case that later, around the end of the second century, a more stringently
defined version of Christianity arrived in Egypt.223 Griggs observes that “no argument
can be presented and defended which shows that doctrinal or ecclesiastical unity in the
Christian church definitely was of great concern in the first and early second century
Egypt. This argument is usually assumed, but its presence in Egypt cannot be established
earlier than Irenaeus.”224 It has been noted previously that the end of second century
brings the episcopacy of Demetrius, who is the first known “orthodox” bishop in Egypt.
Griggs further indicates,
the time span from Demetrius to Dionysius in Egyptian Christianity can be
characterized as the period when Alexandria begins to emerge as an important
center of the church in the Mediterranean world and when the Alexandrian bishop
acquired an authoritative position equaling and sometimes rivaling that of other
bishops in the major cities such as Rome, Antioch, and Jerusalem. The primary
reason for this development occurring in Alexandria . . . was the imposition into
Egypt of an ecclesiastical and doctrinally well-defined Christianity . . . near the
end of the second century.225
The third century proved to be difficult for Egyptian Christianity. Prior to the
third century, most of what is known of Egyptian Christianity comes from Alexandria,
but beginning around the third century there is increasing evidence about local versions of
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Egyptian Christianity.226 Griggs notes, “it is clear that much of Egypt for a long time
continued to have a sizable portion of its Christian population following what later came
to be defined as heretical doctrines and practices.”227 Later he states, “as the Alexandrian
church became more aligned with Catholicism, much of the native population would
appear to be increasingly heretical in religious matters.”228 The result of these trends in
third century Egypt is that as the prestige and authority of the Egyptian bishops increased
so did the potential for conflict.229
This survey of the origins of Egyptian Christianity has identified numerous
varieties of Christianity observable in Egypt. It has also demonstrated how the work of
scholars like Turner, Daniélou, and McCue has led to the widely-accepted opinion that
Bauer was wrong about the Christian origins of Egypt and that the origins of Egyptian
Christianity lies with Palestinian Judaism rather than Gnosticism.230 While I believe
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Bauer to be wrong in his final conclusion about Egyptian Christianity, it is undeniable
that significant diversity existed in Egypt. Bart Ehrman writes that in light of these
discoveries we must conclude that “If anything, early Christianity was even less tidy and
more diversified than he realized. . . . It is widely thought today that proto-orthodoxy was
simply one of many [emphasis mine] competing interpretations of Christianity in the early
church.”231
Ehrman seems to be operating with Bauer’s narrow definition of orthodoxy. As a
result, this statement exemplifies one of the difficulties that arises with an overemphasis
on the diversity of early Christianity: the neglect or denial of a core or center to
Christianity. I do not think that such a position is supported by history, however. From
the Church’s earliest years there are indications of nonnegotiable aspects of the faith.232
In contrast to this interpretation, I believe a more adequate understanding of protoorthodoxy acknowledges that there was both an observable variety within early
Christianity and that there was some core to the faith. This is expressed in the words of
Robert Wilken when he writes, “What is required is to discover ways of talking about
Christian identity which are sensitive to the complexity of early Christianity, yet
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recognize the continuity within early Christian life and the sense of a center among early
Christians.”233

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have endeavored to provide a foundation for the retrieval of early
Christian faith in bodily resurrection from Alexandria. First, the various social and
religious dimensions of pre-Christian Alexandria were considered. Afterward, the
biblical evidence for resurrection faith was surveyed. Throughout this process it has
become clear that there were numerous ways of expressing hope for an afterlife and some
of them included the physical body.234 Even within the canon of Christian Scripture a
variety of expressions has been observed.235 Lastly, we have explored the origins of
Alexandrian Christianity. As will become evident in the next chapter, regardless of
exactly how and when Christianity arrived in Egypt, it included some notion of
resurrection.
In his book Our Victory over Death: Resurrection?, Marie-Émile Boismard has
offered a helpful summary of the biblical teaching on the afterlife which will also be
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useful in distinguishing the various interpretations expressed in chapters two and three.
He suggests that the central theme of the Bible on the afterlife is final victory over
death.236 He then identifies four different ways through which the Bible expresses this
belief. The first involves a monistic anthropology that has been noted previously. In this
view,
At death, human beings in their entirety go down to Sheol, where they become
unsubstantial shades, practically lifeless, waiting for the day when God will raise
the righteous (and them only) by giving back to them the physical elements
necessary to their psychic life and at the same time the vital breath.237

The second view is akin to traditional Greek dualism. Accordingly, when someone dies
his/her body decomposes but the soul goes to Sheol, where it awaits God’s judgment. At
that time, the unrighteous souls will remain in Sheol while the righteous are united with
God.238 Those in Boismard’s third category understand that at death the soul is separated
from the body and returns to Christ where it receives a new, glorified body. The fourth
view asserts that at death the soul goes to either heaven or hell where it awaits the
resurrection of the body which is preceded by the return of Christ.239
Boismard indicates that the first and fourth categories are expressions of belief in
resurrection while the second and third are expressions of belief in the immortality of the
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soul. Some scholars include the notion of receiving a new body as a form of
resurrection.240 For this study, the belief that the soul, separated from the body by death,
returns to Christ and receives a new, glorified body will be considered a belief in
resurrection.
There are two questions that enable one to distinguish between Boismard’s
categories. The first is, Does the text in question articulate some sense of embodiment as
the final state of a person? If it does not, Boismard would argue that it is category two
and cannot be understood as belief in resurrection.241 The second question helps to
distinguish between the remaining three categories. It is, How does the text handle the
issue of continuity and discontinuity? By continuity and discontinuity, I am referring to
the various ways that life in the resurrected body is understood to be similar to and
dissimilar from temporal existence. This is important because in most discussions of
belief in the afterlife, the afterlife is understood as either a continuation of this life, a
radical break from this life, or some mixture of the two. While nearly all texts have some
degree of both, most tend to emphasize either continuity or discontinuity. Both
Boismard’s categories and the means of distinguishing between them will be helpful in
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the following chapters.
The next chapter begins the examination of the earliest primary texts that inform
our understanding of early Alexandrian faith in bodily resurrection. While not all of the
texts that will be studied are now considered orthodox, it is important to keep in mind
that the orthodoxy of a text is not germane to this study. Instead, the following seeks to
determine what was meant by the various affirmations of resurrection observable in AnteNicene Alexandrian Christianity.

CHAPTER 2
RESURRECTION FAITH IN EARLY ANONYMOUS
ALEXANDRIAN TEXTS

There are several texts that illuminate the Alexandrian understanding of bodily
resurrection. The first to be studied here are texts of unknown authorship that are
associated with Alexandria and enjoy some scholarly agreement regarding an early date
of composition. They are the Epistle of Barnabas, the Apocalypse of Peter, and the
Gospel of Thomas. Afterward, two additional texts are examined, the Epistle to Rheginos
and the Gospel of Philip.242 Scholars are less certain about the dates of their composition,
but it is generally agreed that they were composed between the middle of the second
century and the middle of the third century.243
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The Epistle of Barnabas 244
The first text to be examined is the Epistle of Barnabas. Barnabas is an
interesting text in that it exhibits an impressive awareness of Judaism, while also being
one of the more anti-Jewish documents of the early Church. Before examining the text of
Barnabas, there are some preliminary elements that deserve consideration such as the
date and provenance.245
Scholars agree that Barnabas must have been composed sometime between 70
and 150CE.246 One of the clues in dating the text is the fact that the first Christian
reference to Barnabas is by Clement of Alexandria. He is also the first to attribute the
text to the apostle Barnabas.247 As is often the case with ancient texts, establishing a date
of composition for Barnabas requires drawing conclusions from clues within the text.
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For example, the text mentions the destruction of the Temple and expresses concern over
its rebuilding (16:4). This establishes the earliest date for the composition sometime after
the Temple’s destruction. Some scholars have suggested a date between 132 and135
CE.248 James Paget has argued that the latest possible date is around 130 CE, citing the
absence of any reference to a second Jewish revolt in a letter that is otherwise antiJewish.249 More specifically, Paget believes that the evidence suggests that Barnabas was
written around the middle 90s CE.250
There is some variety in thought about the provenance of Barnabas, but the
majority opinion is that the text was composed in or around Alexandria.251 The evidence
for this includes Barnabas’ use of allegorical interpretation, the similarities with the work
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of Philo, and the inclusion of the entire text of Barnabas in the Codex Sinaiticus.252 None
of these establishes an Alexandrian provenance with absolute certainty, but the weight of
their significance increases when considered together. Robert Kraft makes a similar
observation in his commentary when he notes that the parallels between Barnabas and the
texts of Clement of Alexandria suggest that they emerge from the same Christian
tradition.253 This means that Barnabas is an appropriate text for this study, since even in
the unlikely event that it was composed somewhere other than Egypt, it is indisputable
that it was known in Alexandria.254 This is deduced from the fact that the vast majority of
references to Barnabas come from people generally associated with Alexandria.
Not only was Barnabas referenced by the Alexandrian fathers, it was given
considerable authority. In fact, there is evidence that suggests that Clement of Alexandria
and Origen may have regarded Barnabas as canonical.255 As mentioned above, the
authoritative status bestowed on Barnabas is further confirmed by its inclusion in the
Codex Sinaiticus from the fourth century. It is now appropriate to examine the text for its
relevance to Alexandrian faith in bodily resurrection.
The first explicit reference to the notion of resurrection is found in Barnabas 5.
Before examining the passage itself, there are a few comments about its context that
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should be made. First, one of the major themes of chapters 5-7 of Barnabas is “the
Lord’s presence in the flesh.”256 In addition, the immediate context of this passage is a
dialogue which is trying to reconcile the Lord’s humiliation with his exalted nature.257
The way in which Barnabas addresses this issue creates a strong connection between
Christ’s incarnation and his resurrection. This will be explored further in what follows.
Barnabas 5:6 states, “He submitted so that he might break the power of Death and
demonstrate the resurrection from the dead (th.n evk nekrw/n avnastasi,n) thus it was
necessary for him to be manifested in flesh (evn sarki,).” While the fact that Christ’s
destruction of death is related to this study, the real significance lies in the second half of
this verse. Christ was raised to point to the future resurrection. The way in which
Christ’s resurrection is discussed here suggests that it was an “object-lesson” of sorts, but
does the resurrection of Christ only reveal (dei,knumi) the fact that there will be a
resurrection, or does it also reveal something about the nature of the resurrection? The
text seems to be only addressing the truth of resurrection, but some inferences can be
made concerning the nature of the resurrected life. For example, it is significant that
Barnabas notes this demonstration of resurrection as one of the reasons that necessitated
Christ’s manifestation “evn sarki..”258 The unspoken implication is that Christ’s temporal

256

Kraft, Barnabas, 93.

257

Kraft, 94. Kraft believes that the dialogue format of this passage indicates that
this issue was a cause for dispute in the Barnabas community.
Barnabas further emphasizes resurrection with his use of u`pomei,nantaen. See
Prostmeier, 245.
258

87
flesh was related somehow to his resurrected body.259
The author continues the subject of resurrection in 5:7. We read, “Also (he
submitted) so that he might fulfill the promise to the fathers and, while he was preparing
the new people for himself and while he was still on earth, to prove that after he has
brought about the resurrection he will judge.” Two points should be understood. First,
Christ is said to be the cause of the resurrection. Second, Barnabas connects the
judgment to the resurrection by indicating that the resurrection occurs first. Pheme
Perkins states that Barnabas “makes resurrection ‘in the body’ a means for judgment.”260

Chapter 21 is also devoted to the subject of the coming judgment. Like the
reference in 5:7, the resurrection of the dead is connected to judgment, but unlike the
preceding occurrence, where the issue seems to be one of chronological order, in this
instance there is a more substantial connection between the two. In 21:1 we read “It is
well, therefore, after learning the written ordinances of the Lord above to live by them.
For the man who does so will be glorified in the kingdom of God; the one that chooses
their opposites will perish with his works. This is the reason for resurrection, this is the
reason for recompense.” In other words, it is the fact that God will judge that makes
resurrection necessary. Katharina Schneider indicates that this is significant in that
Barnabas’ association of resurrection with the final judgment is a sign of development in
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patristic thought on resurrection. In this view the resurrection is simply a precursor to the
final judgment and conveys no value itself.261 In other words, the resurrection is not a
reward for the righteous, but it is a prerequisite for the Endgericht. As Ton van Eijk
observes, “Parce que le jugement présuppose la résurrection, il s’ensuit que la
résurrection est une résurrection de tous, et non seulement des chrétiens.”262
While this is the extent of the overt references to resurrection, there are several
additional passages to observe in order to fully appreciate Barnabas’ teaching on the
resurrection. The first passage with relevance to the topic of resurrection is 6:9, where we
read, “And learn what knowledge says. Hope, it says, in Jesus, who is to be manifested to
you in flesh.” The text states that Christ will soon appear “evn sarki..” There can be little
doubt that this is a reference to Christ’s parousia and not his incarnation, since the context
of this passage is an exposition of the eschatological new creation.263 Later in 6:13
Barnabas states, “Again, I will show you how he says to us that he made a second
fashioning in the last times. And the Lord says: Behold, I make the last things like the
first.” This indicates the continuity between the first and second creations.
The eschatology presented in Barnabas 15 introduces a second issue with
implications for bodily resurrection. The issue is millennialism or chiliasm. Early
millennialists believed the coming thousand-year kingdom of Christ to be a material
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kingdom, which means that they believed in material resurrection of the flesh.264 The
prevailing opinion among scholars is that Barnabas is not a chiliastic text,265 but there can
be little doubt that the author of Barnabas at least employed chiliastic terminology.266
While I believe that there are enough indications of millennial thought in Barnabas to
support a material view of the resurrected body, it is possible to draw conclusions about
Barnabas’ view of resurrection without considering the chiliastic material.
Regardless of whether Barnabas was a chiliast or not, the Epistle of Barnabas is
clearly positive about an embodied final state. This is demonstrated by the references to
Christ’s resurrection and return as being “evn sarki.” (5:6 and 6:9, respectively).267 His
notion of bodily resurrection was also intimately connected with the final judgment. In
light of the evidence in Barnabas, we may safely conclude that Barnabas not only
articulates a belief in an embodied afterlife, it understands the resurrected body to have a
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high degree of continuity with the present temporal body, perhaps even its materiality.

The Apocalypse of Peter 268
Another important text for understanding resurrection faith in early Alexandria is
the Apocalypse of Peter.269 Apoc. Petri is an interesting text, which is thought to have
been composed in the first half of the second century and which offers its readers a vivid
tour of heaven and hell. It is preserved in two forms. One is the Akhmim text,
discovered around 1886 in a cemetery near Akhmim. The text in Greek is believed to
have been copied in the 8th or 9th century.270 The second is an Ethiopic translation. The
Ethiopic version has been known since 1910 and was identified in 1911.271 At present,
scholars agree that the Ethiopic version of Apoc. Petri is a generally reliable preservation
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of the original text.272
Apoc. Petri is a significant text for understanding early Alexandrian Christianity
for several reasons. First, it is clear that Apoc. Petri was a very popular text as early as
the second century.273 This is evidenced by the fact that some in the early Church,
including Clement of Alexandria, considered it as canonical.274 Likewise, while it is
undeniable from the evidence that Apoc. Petri was known in Egypt, there are some
indications that suggest that Apoc. Petri may have been composed in Egypt.275
Apoc. Petri is the account of an experience the apostle has with the risen Christ.
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In it, Peter is given a tour of heaven and hell. Christ shows him “in his right hand the
souls of all (men) and on the palm of his right hand the image of that which shall be
fulfilled at the last day; and how the righteous and the sinners shall be separated and how
those will do who are upright in heart, and the evil-doers will be rooted out for all
eternity” (3). The next section describes what will happen on the day of judgment. Peter
describes that “all the children of men from the east unto the west shall be gathered
before my Father who ever liveth, and will command hell to open its bars of steel and to
give up all that is in it. And the beasts and fowls shall he command to give back all flesh
that they devoured, since he desires that men should appear (again); for nothing perishes
for God, and as all things came to pass when he created the world and commanded all
that is there” (4). Concerning this passage, Richard Bauckham writes that it is “not meant
to explain how the corpses of those consumed by animals could be restored in
resurrection,” rather it is a “means of asserting that they will be.”276
Sections 5 through 11 of the text describe the tortures of hell. A few examples
will serve to illustrate the various types of punishment and how they relate to a person’s
sins. The tortures that are described are graphic and clearly involve one’s body. For
example, people who had deceived others will have their lips cut off and fire poured into
their mouths. Likewise, slanderers chew their tongues continually and have red hot irons
put into their eyes (9).277 The significance of these images is that by expressing the role
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of the body in the experience of judgment, the text assumes a profoundly corporeal
understanding of the nature of afterlife existence. This is also exhibited in the concluding
sections of Apoc. Petri.
At the end of the document, Peter includes what could be called an alternate
account of the Transfiguration.278 As in the record in the canonical gospels, Peter sees a
glorified Jesus, Moses, and Elijah and offers to make them tabernacles. Likewise, in each
account there is a voice from heaven. The major difference between the two versions is
that instead of continuing his earthly ministry as Jesus does in the accounts in the
Synoptic gospels, Peter states, “And there came a great and exceeding white cloud over
our heads and bore away the Lord”(17). This is the context for what is perhaps the most
definitive statement in Apoc. Petri on the nature of the resurrected life. Peter states, “we
looked up and the heavens opened and we saw men in the flesh, and they came and
greeted our Lord” (17). 279
The Akhmim text has an even more vivid description. Verse 5-7 of the Akhmim
text states,
And we, the twelve disciples, went with him and entreated him to show to us one
of our righteous brethren who had departed from the world that we might see in
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what form they are, and taking courage might encourage the men who should hear
us. And when we prayed, suddenly there appeared two men, standing before the
Lord, on whom we were not able to look. For there went forth from their
countenance a ray as of the sun, and their raiment was shining , such as the eye of
man never saw.
In this version, no identification of the two men is supplied other than that they are the
answer to the disciples’ request (12-13). Instead of an account of the tabernacles, there is
an extended description of the glory of heaven (15-20).
There can be little doubt that Apoc. Petri, like Barnabas, expects some form of
bodily existence in the afterlife. For both texts, a body is necessary in order for God to
judge between the good and the wicked. Consequently, both Barnabas and Apoc. Petri
indicate that all, not only the righteous will arise. Likewise, both texts express an
understanding of the afterlife body that includes a significant degree of continuity with
the temporal life. While these texts share some important perspectives on the afterlife,
there are also some significant differences.
The central difference is the role each text ascribes to Christ. In Barnabas, the
author repeatedly ties the Christian hope for resurrection to the resurrection of Christ.
This connection may be implied in Apoc. Petri but is never articulated. On the contrary,
apart from serving as Peter’s guide on his tour of the afterlife and being the main
character in Peter’s version of the Transfiguration, Christ has very little to do with either
the resurrection or the judgment of humanity.
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The Gospel of Thomas280
The next text to be examined is the Gospel of Thomas. There is little agreement
regarding when Thomas was written. Some scholars have suggested a date as early as 60
CE while others believe it to be as late as the beginning of the third century.281 I have
placed it at this point in this study because it is widely thought to have reached a final
form between 120 and 140 CE.282 It also provides a bridge to the discussion of the
Christian-Gnostic texts that follow.283
Most scholars agree that the text probably originated around Edessa and is the
product of Syriac Christianity.284 Despite the great likelihood of its non-Egyptian
provenance, there are at least two ways by which we know the text was present in Egypt.
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First, ancient Greek fragments of the text were discovered at Oxyrhynchus in the early
1900's.285 These fragments are believed to be from around 200 CE.286 They were not
identified until the discovery of the Nag Hammadi codices in 1945, which included a
complete Coptic translation of the text.287 Thus, two of the earliest extant transmissions
of Thomas are from Egypt before the fifth century.
Unlike the canonical gospels, Thomas does not teach any concept that could be
understood as a hope for a future resurrection. In logion 21 Jesus’ disciples are described
as “little children who have settled in a field which does not belong to them. When the
owners of the field come, they will say: Leave us our field. They are naked before them,
in order to leave it to them and give them (back) their field.” It is widely accepted that
Jesus is referring to the deaths of his followers as their undressing. By this undressing,
his followers give back what was not really theirs. The association of death with
disrobing is repeated in logion 37. It states, “His disciples said: On what day will you be
revealed to us, and on what day shall we see you? Jesus said: When you unclothe
yourself and are not ashamed, and take your garments and lay them beneath your feet.”
Jacques Ménard perceives the association of death with disrobing when he interprets this
passage as meaning that death is “la déliverance de l’âme emprisonée dans le corps.”288
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Thomas is discussed here because it is an early Christian text, which is known to
have existed in Egypt and which articulates a faith that some have seen as being in
opposition to the general understanding of the teaching of the canonical Scripture. As
Gregory Riley writes, “The Gospel of Thomas declares that the body will not be
raised.”289 Furthermore, Riley argues that the gospel of John was composed for the
express purpose of combating the form of Christianity of the Thomas sect because of its
notion that the soul could survive the grave in an impalpable form that somehow
remained identifiable with the person’s temporal existence.290
In light of the diversity of beliefs about the afterlife that has been observed in the
last chapter, it is not surprising that some early Christian texts would articulate notions of
the afterlife different from what has been accepted as “orthodox.” The significance of
Riley’s thesis lies in the fact that he believes that the Gospel of Thomas is a very early
text, which causes him to argue that the afterlife belief of the Thomas community is a
more primitive and thus more faithful representation of early Christian faith. If Riley is
correct, one of the earliest forms of Christianity not only fails to affirm bodily
resurrection but it strongly opposes the idea.291
While it is nearly impossible that the version of Christian teaching recognized by
the Thomas community was more primitive than that described in the canonical
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Scriptures,292 it is still very reasonable to assume that early groups of Christians had
dissimilar notions of the nature of the afterlife.293 The question that Thomas raises is,
Was the belief in a recognizable but impalpable form of postmortem existence simply a
different way of understanding resurrection or was it contrary to faith in resurrection?
Currently, there is no definitive answer.

The Treatise on the Resurrection294
Another important text is a Christian-Gnostic document found in codex I, tractate
4 of the Nag Hammadi codices. It is called the Treatise on the Resurrection, or the
Epistle to Rheginos. Like the Epistle of Barnabas, it is an anonymous text, but where
resurrection is a secondary issue to ethical living in Barnabas, the Treatise is specifically
about the subject of resurrection.
The precise date for the Treatise is unknown. In spite of this uncertainty, there is
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significant consensus regarding the parameters of the possible date. It is deduced that a
date after Paul is necessary due to the author’s considerable reliance on his writings.295
The latest possible date is sometime before 350 CE. This is due to the dating of the
existing manuscript to 350 CE and the fact that scholars agree that the present manuscript
is a Coptic translation of a Greek text.296 It is generally agreed that the text is attributable
to somewhere between the middle of the second century and the third century CE.297
As was previously observed, the Treatise has both Gnostic and Christian elements
in them. In the introduction to his translation, Malcolm Peel offers a helpful summary of
the evidence indicating the influence of Valentinian Gnosticism.298 According to Peel,
this evidence includes parallels between “the spiritual resurrection that [had] already
occurred and the charges of Valentinian ‘realized eschatology’” as reported by Tertullian
and Irenaeus.299 Peel also notes references to Valentinian cosmogony in the Treatise with
elements of primordial pleroma and human preexistence.
The evidence for the Christian aspect of the Treatise is strong but slightly less
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obvious. Craig Evans, Robert Webb, and Richard Wiebe dedicate nearly six pages of
their book, Nag Hammadi Texts and the Bible, to cataloging the numerous biblical
allusions in the Treatise.300 This is even more remarkable when one considers that the
Nag Hammadi manuscript of the Treatise is only eight pages long.
There is little scholarly agreement about the nature of the Treatise. Before
examining the text itself, I will briefly explain the spectrum of interpretations of the
Treatise that have been proposed. One view has been proposed by W. C. van Unnik. He
believes the text to be primarily Christian with the intention of bolstering Rheginos’
confidence in the reality of the resurrection. Subsequently, van Unnik emphasizes the
Christian aspects of the text and minimizes the Gnostic aspects,301 and understands the
tension as a sign of an early date of composition, when the distinction between Christian
and Gnostic may have been blurred.302 The second view is offered by Bentley Layton
who believes that the author is attempting to proselytize the Christian, Rheginos, into
Valentinian Christianity. The third view is somewhere between the two and has been
articulated by Malcolm Peel. Peel acknowledges the presence of both Christian and
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Gnostic elements and tries to respect both. Peel believes that the text is the product of a
respected Valentinian-Christian teacher who “has with time become more and more
influenced by his fundamentally Christian faith and by the teaching of the New
Testament.”303
The author begins with a discussion of Christ in 44.13-38. He states, “How did
the Lord proclaim things while he existed in flesh and after he had revealed himself as
Son of God? He lived in this place where you remain, speaking about the Law of Nature but I call it 'Death'” (44.14-15). This passage is significant because it indicates that the
author understood Christ to have flesh and that this life is actually “Death.” He continues
by noting that Christ possessed both divinity and humanity (44.25-26). The author
indicates that the purpose of Christ’s incarnation is so that he may bring about the
restoration of the pleroma (44.27-33).
After briefly acknowledging the difficulty of the instruction being offered (44.3945.13), the author writes,
The Savior swallowed up death - (of this) you are not reckoned to be ignorant - for
he put aside the world which is perishing. He transformed [himself] into an
imperishable Aeon and raised himself up having swallowed the visible by the
invisible and he gave us the way of our immortality (45.14-23).
In order to understand this passage, it is necessary to consider the significance of the
author’s use of the idea of "swallowing up."
Layton observes an interesting parallelism within the Treatise. He believes that
there is a relationship between “The savior swallowed death” in 45.14 and he “raised
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himself up, having swallowed the visible by the invisible” in 45.19.304 The author also
later states that the resurrection being discussed is a spiritual resurrection “which
swallows up the psychic in the same way as the fleshly” (45.40-46.2). Peel observes that
the idea of “swallowing up” is “a Pauline expression meaning ‘destroys’ or renders
irrelevant.”305 Peel’s interpretation is supported by the author’s use of “swallowing up” in
49.2-4 when he describes the effect of light on darkness as one of swallowing. If Peel is
correct, then Christ rendered the visible world irrelevant and the future resurrection
makes the fleshly aspect of the world irrelevant.
One of the most difficult sections to understand is 47.1-10. Our author
encourages Rheginos not to doubt the resurrection (47.2-3). The rationale for this
admonition is the author’s argument in 47.4-10 which states “if you were not existing in
the flesh, you received flesh when you entered the world. Why will you not receive flesh
when you ascend into the Aeon? That which is better than the flesh is that which is for it
(the) cause of life.” The easiest aspect of this passage to grasp is the author’s belief in
human preexistence.306 Rheginos only assumed flesh upon entering this world. If
Rheginos existed before taking on flesh and the end is a return to the beginning, it follows
that the final state is one without flesh. This is how Bart Ehrman understands this
passage. He writes, “The author continues by pointing out that before they appeared in
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this world, people were not in the flesh, and once they leave this world, they will leave
the flesh behind.”307 Pheme Perkins has reached the same conclusion while
understanding the passage a little differently. In addressing this passage she writes, “It is
apparently answering an objection that proposed that if the soul had received a body upon
descent into the world, the body would coexist with the soul in the next.”308 While this is
the view that could be expected of a Gnostic teacher, the question, “Will you not receive
flesh when you ascend into the Aeon?” seems to affirm some type of flesh.309
Malcolm Peel has offered a different view that tries to account for the reception of
flesh in the heavenly realm. He distinguishes between “flesh of the incarnate life . . .
which is inferior to the ‘spirit’ which animates it” and a “spiritual ‘flesh’ which is
received upon ascent into the heavenly sphere.”310 The first is excluded from the spiritual
resurrection, but the second partakes in it.311 I find this interpretation to be the most
convincing since it requires less manipulation of the text.
The next important section is 47.31-48.3, where the author addresses the issue of
the immediacy of people being saved once they physically die. He states, “But there are
some (who) wish to understand, in the enquiry about those things they are looking into,
whether he who is saved, if he leaves his body behind, will be saved immediately.” In
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response, the author teaches, “Let no one doubt concerning this. . . . Indeed, the visible
members which are dead shall not be saved, for (only) the living [members] which exist
within them would arise” (47.36-48.3). This not only teaches the immediacy of salvation,
it reaffirms that the physical body will not rise.
The next section is an extended attempt to define resurrection (48.4-49.9). First,
the author states, “It is always the disclosure of those who have risen” (48.4-7). It is
important to observe this definition of resurrection since it implies that resurrection is a
revealing of what already is, as opposed to the unveiling of a new creation.312 In other
words, resurrection is a present reality not merely a future one. This idea is repeated in
48.34-38 where we read, “It is the revelation of what is, and the transformation of things,
and a transition into newness.” Evidence of this also occurs in the next section.
Following the attempt at defining resurrection, the author turns to the account of
the transfiguration (48.8-11). He instructs, “For if you remember reading in the Gospel
that Elijah appeared and Moses with him, do not think the resurrection is an illusion. It is
no illusion, but it is truth! Indeed, it is more fitting to say the world is an illusion, rather
than the resurrection which has come into being through our Lord the Savior, Jesus
Christ.” Scholars have offered several interpretations of this passage.
The first one to be noted understands the appeal to the transfiguration as a means
of justifying the notion of resurrection presented elsewhere in the text. It has been
312
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proposed by Jacques Menard who writes, “S’il y a discontinuité entre les deux états, il y a
toutefois continuité, grâce à l’homme intérieur et à la chair spirituelle qui conserve des
caractéristiques personelles identifiables.”313 The second view is offered by Layton who
understands the transfiguration to be a challenge to the teacher’s instruction. He writes,
“the objection here entertained is . . . if Elijah and Moses, though dead, could be seen in
their resurrection state, will not the body, vivified by the superior part, continue to exist at
least as a kind of shade, visible but insubstantial?”314 Lastly, Perkins has suggested that
both Layton and Peel are wrong and that the author is appealing to the account because it
supports his notion of the immediacy of the transformation of resurrection.315 I think that
Perkins’ view fits the context best and does not require more from the text than it offers.
Afterward, the author argues that in comparison to the resurrection, it is this life
that is the illusion (48.12-23). In 48.26-28 the author repeats the charge when he teaches
that “Those who are living shall die. How do they live in an illusion? The rich have
become poor, and the kings have been overthrown. Everything is prone to change.”316 On
the contrary, resurrection is firm (48.33).
The author concludes his/her treatment of the topic of resurrection with a final
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exhortation to Rheginos. He writes, “Therefore, do not think in part, O Rheginos, nor
live in conformity with this flesh for the sake of unanimity, but flee from the divisions
and the fetters, and already you have the resurrection” (49.10-16). If Rheginos does not
live according to the flesh, then he already has resurrection. Rheginos ought to then live
as one already in possession of resurrection (49.16-30). The hope is to “receive again
what at first was” (49.35-36), which recalls the idea of the restoration of the Pleroma and
Rheginos’ preexistent state. Bart Ehrman comments on this passage by writing, “And so,
to achieve this return to the realm whence we came, we must refuse to satisfy the
longings of our flesh. This is scarcely the ticket to flagrant immortality that the protoorthodox thought; instead it is a life of freedom of the spirit, no longer yielding to the
demands of the body.”317
So, does the Treatise indicate a bodily existence as the final state? The answer
depends on how several passages are interpreted. It is quite clear that the author offers no
hope to temporal flesh. As has been demonstrated, it is difficult to know for certain the
degree to which the ascended state was understood to have a corporeal dimension to it.
The author’s emphasis on the present availability of resurrection seems to refute a hope
for a final bodily state, but by placing too much emphasis on this point means that the
apostle Paul is susceptible to the same charge.318 In his introduction to the Treatise, Peel
offers a helpful summary of the teaching of the document when he writes,
The resurrection, according to our text, is neither the escape of the bare “spirit”
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(pneu/ma) or “mind” (nou/j) from the physical body, nor is it the survival of the
earthly flesh. . . . After death there is an ascension of the inward, invisible
“members,” covered by a new spiritual “flesh” (sa,rx, 47.408). Thus, in the
author’s view, discontinuity between the earthly and the resurrection body is
occasioned by death and departure from the external, visible members and flesh;
whereas continuity of identity is furnished by the inner spiritual man and his new,
post mortem flesh.319
While I believe that Peel’s assessment of the Treatise is accurate, it is possible the author
was merely using the language of “resurrection” and “flesh” to strengthen his claims of
Christian faith. Additionally, I am not fully convinced that the hope outlined in the text
can be called bodily resurrection given that it involves being covered with new “spiritual”
flesh that has no apparent connection to the temporal flesh.

The Gospel of Philip320
The Gospel of Philip is another Valentinian text that should be considered when
examining early teaching on resurrection. While it is believed that it was written in
Greek in or around Syria, it was included in the texts found at Nag Hammadi. It can be
dated to the second half of the third century.321 Like the Treatise, it is complicated by
having both Christian and Gnostic elements. Unlike the Treatise, it is not specifically
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about the resurrection, although it mentions the subject numerous times. Its primary
focus is on the significance of the sacraments of the Christian Gnostic cult from which it
arose.
Unlike the gospel accounts in the New Testament, Philip is a loosely related
collection of sayings. In light of this and due to the fact that resurrection is not its central
topic, Philip will not be examined in the same way the Treatise was.322 Instead of a line
by line exegesis of the text, Philip will be studied more thematically.
The first aspect of Philip that should be noted is that the text teaches that in the
end everything returns to its original state. In 53.20-21, Philip declares that “Each one
will dissolve into its earliest origin. But those who are exalted above the world are
indissoluble.” In a related theme, the author has a negative attitude toward the created
world which is exhibited throughout the text and has implications for his understanding
of resurrection. It is demonstrated in 56.24-26 by the statement, “Compare the soul. It is
a precious thing and it came to be in a contemptible body.” Another example is found in
75.3 where the author claims that “The world came about through a mistake. For he who
created it wanted to create it imperishable and immortal. He fell short of attaining his
desire.”
The first reference to resurrection sets the tone for how the subject is handled in
the text in Philip. In 53:31, Philip includes resurrection as one of several topics which
322
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most people misunderstand. Later, Philip instructs that resurrection is not only possible
to possess in this life as the Treatise argued, it must be obtained in this life. In 56.17-18
the author claims “Those who say that the Lord died first and (then) rose up are in error,
for he rose up first and (then) died.” In his commentary on Philip, Robert McLachlan
Wilson suggests that there are two possible ways of interpreting this passage. The first
lies “in the different meanings of the Greek words avni,sthmi and evgei,rw.”323 He proceeds
to note how avni,sthmi was used to describe the appointment of a high priest or prophet
and how evgei,rw was employed to describe David’s ascendency to the throne. In this
view, the references to Christ rising are not references to resurrection but to his different
aspects of Christological mission.324 The second view is that the phrase is addressing
resurrection, “since Jesus as Redeemer anticipated, as it were, the journey of the soul, so
he must have risen first.”325 As will become evident, there are other passages that reverse
the expected order of things which makes the second option the more reasonable
interpretation.
In the next verses, Philip proceeds to suggest that we must follow Christ’s
example. Within the context of Christ’s example, the text likely teaches that we should
also attain the resurrection first, but the text curiously states, “If one does not first attain
the resurrection he will not die” (56.18-19).
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ambiguous, it comes into sharper focus when considered alongside similar passages. One
of these is 73.1-4, where the author states, “Those who say they will die first and then rise
are in error. If they do not first receive the resurrection while they live, when they die
they will receive nothing.” Another example is 66.17-19, which states, “It is fitting for us
to acquire the resurrection, so that when we strip off the flesh, we may be found in rest.”
In addition to demonstrating the present availability of resurrection, this last passage
introduces the next issue.
There are several instances in Philip where the notions of nakedness and garments
are used in reference to death and resurrection. The first example of this is a perplexing
section that begins in 56.27. The author begins by attempting to correct those who desire
to rise in the flesh because they believe that without it they will be naked. He states, that
“they do not know that it is those who wear the flesh who are naked” (56.27-30). He
proceeds to quote I Corinthians 15:50, “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of
God.” Philip then argues that it is those who have divested themselves of the flesh
(literally unclothed themselves) who are clothed (56.31-32). He then proceeds to
compare the bread and wine of the Eucharist with the Word and Holy Spirit. In
continuing the interpretation of I Cor. 15:50, Philip states,
What is this which will not inherit? This which is on us. But what is this, too,
which will inherit? It is that which belongs to Jesus and his blood. Because of this
he said "He who shall not eat my flesh and drink my blood has not life in him" (Jn
6:53). What is it? His flesh is the word, and his blood is the Holy Spirit. He who
has received these has food and he has drink and clothing (57.3-8).
Thus for Philip, whoever participates in the Eucharist has clothing (57.8). Van Eijk
notes, “He should not be afraid of rising naked, because he is clothed with the flesh and
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blood of the Lord.”326
The next section complicates the teaching significantly. For after having just
argued against those who think the flesh will rise, the author finds “fault with the others
who say that it will not rise” (57.10). In fact, the author states very plainly, “It is
necessary to rise in this flesh, since everything exists in it” (57.18-19). In observing this
tension, van Eijk notes that the meaning of flesh “had been ambiguous every [sic] since
the days of St. Paul. The gnostics deliberately played on this ambiguity.”327 For van Eijk,
the flesh that is being referenced in 57.18-19 is the flesh of Christ. He states, “ it is only
the flesh of Christ that rises; in this flesh the individuality of the gnostic’s flesh seems to
disappear completely.”328 But, what does the text mean when it states, “necessary to rise
in the flesh”?
Jacques Ménard has suggested that this reference to “this flesh” refers not to the
flesh of the author or audience, but the flesh of Christ in the Eucharist.329 Thus, the idea
of resurrection in Philip is also intimately connected to the group’s sacraments. Pheme
Perkins states, “This Gnostic group is not concerned with speculation about the nature of
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the resurrection or its foundation in a particular anthropology or soteriology. It is
concerned with the cultic experience of the reality of resurrection.”330
If Ménard’s interpretation is correct, it is the first but not the only time that
resurrection is connected to the sacraments of Philip’s audience. In fact, the topic of
resurrection occurs in Philip frequently within the author’s discussion of the sacraments.
A second allusion occurs in 61.12-20, but instead of connecting resurrection to the
Eucharist, the language suggests a connection to baptism.
In 61.12-20 Philip describes God as a person who dyes fabric. The most
significant part of this passage is 61.19-20, which states, “Since his dyes are immortal,
they become immortal by means of his colors. Now God dips what he dips in water.”
The connection between God dipping in water and immortality is undeniable, so the only
question is whether the idea of dipping in water should be understood as baptism.
Bentley Layton subscribes to this view as he translates the passage, “Yet those whom god
dips, he dips in water,” to which he adds a footnote that explains “dips” as being
equivalent to “baptizes.”331 The idea that God’s dyes are immortal, or as Layton
translates them “imperishable” or “colorfast”332 recalls the beginning of this study where
it was noted, “Each one will dissolve into its earliest origin. But those who are exalted
above the world are indissoluble” (53.20-21), which implies the work that God does lasts
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to eternity.333
While we have noted the connection between resurrection, Eucharist, and baptism
in Philip, the author and audience of Philip appear to have another sacrament. In 73.1719 we read, “It is from the olive tree that we get the chrism, and from the chrism,
resurrection.” Chrism is also said to be better than baptism (74.12-13). Not only is
chrism one of the group’s sacraments, it seems to be one of the most important
sacraments, since “He who has been anointed possesses everything. He possesses the
resurrection, the light, the cross, the holy spirit” (74.19-21).334
What can be concluded about the nature of resurrection in Philip? Although
resurrection is a frequent topic in Philip, the author offers no exact definition of what he
means by the term.335 Rather than discuss the nature of the resurrection, the author’s
focus is on his audience’s need to obtain resurrection in this life through the group’s
sacraments. These facts do not mean that nothing about the nature of resurrection can be
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gained from the text. In reality, some things are discernible, but it must be inferred from
the text.
There is no overt discussion in Philip of whether some form of bodily existence is
either included or excluded from the final state, but if there is a body in the final state it is
not the temporal one. Whatever is meant by resurrection in Philip, it cannot be connected
to the physical body, since Christ rose before he died (56:18-19). Statements like this,
combined with the many expressions of a negative attitude toward creation are evidence
that the author has little regard for material creation and holds out no hope for its
participation in any postmortem existence (57.27-30). This is similar to what was
observed in the Treatise, but in Philip it creates a paradox. This is due to Philip’s
insistence that the resurrection must be obtained in this life through the sacraments.
Therefore, while the physical body does not have any role in the resurrection in that there
is no hope for its survival, the body plays a pivotal role in resurrection by being the means
through which it is obtained.

The various notions of the afterlife examined in this chapter differed from one and
in some instances from those observed in the previous chapter. In both Apoc. Petri and
Barnabas the physical body had an integral role in the afterlife and this was connected to
the final judgment. Thomas, on the other hand, was shown to be a Christian text that
deliberately avoids the idea of resurrection. In contrast to both of these, the ChristianGnostic texts studied here utilize the language of resurrection but articulate no hope for
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the physical body and no sense of a final judgment as had been observed in Barnabas and
Apoc. Petri. As we conclude this chapter several questions remain: What should be made
of the use of resurrection in Christian-Gnostic texts such as those examined here? Does
the use of resurrection simply represent the best available term to express the belief of the
communities represented by the Treatise and Philip or was it simply a convenient tool
used by some in their attempts to legitimize their brand(s) of Christianity? While these
questions remain unanswered, we can be certain that by the second century in Alexandria
at least two competing interpretations of resurrection were being used. One expressed
hope for the physical body, and the other did not.

CHAPTER THREE
RESURRECTION FAITH OF BISHOPS AND TEACHERS

This chapter continues the investigation into early Alexandrian faith in bodily
resurrection, but where the last chapter studied early anonymous texts, this chapter
examines works that have been attributed with some degree of certainty to a bishop or
teacher that has some connection to early Egyptian Christianity.336 The first section of
this chapter examines the works of the earlier and more prominent individuals.
Afterward, the relevant works of later and lesser-known Egyptian bishops are considered.

Major Theologians Known in Ante-Nicene Egypt
The theologians examined in this section are some of the most famous of the
Ante-Nicene fathers. They are Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen. They are all
connected in some way to early Egyptian Christianity and have several extant texts. In
light of the volume of their material that is available, I will begin the study of each
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theologian by examining his anthropology and proceed to investigate his specific
statements on the resurrection.
Irenaeus337
Given the fact that the focus of this chapter is on bishops and teachers connected
to Egyptian Christianity, it may be somewhat surprising to begin with Irenaeus. While
Irenaeus is not personally associated with Alexandrian Christianity, there is irrefutable
evidence that his views were known in Egypt. In fact, some of his writings were not only
known in Egypt, they appear to have arrived relatively early.338
Among the many texts discovered at Oxyrhynchus is a fragment which has since
been identified as part of his Against the Heresies (Haer. hereafter).339 Even before its
identification, it was believed to be from the late second or early third century.340 It is
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commonly agreed that Haer. was written about 180 CE. The proximity of the date of the
original manuscript to that of the Oxyrhynchus fragment may mean that Colin Roberts is
only slightly exaggerating when he wrote that the work arrived “not long after the ink was
dry on the author’s manuscript.”341
Of the various texts examined in this dissertation, Irenaeus’ Haer. presents one of
the most easily intelligible views of resurrection. Scholars agree that Irenaeus articulates
a view of resurrection that is materialistic in that it emphasizes the corporeal
dimension.342 His position is summarized by Brian Daley when he states, “Irenaeus
insists on the fleshly reality of risen bodies.”343 Irenaeus states that the raising of all flesh
is part of what “the church, dispersed throughout the world to the ends of the earth,
received from the apostles and their disciples” (Haer. I.10.1).344 But on what bases does
Irenaeus make his case? There are several aspects of Irenaeus’ argument upon which
scholars agree. These include God’s omnipotence, the concept of recapitulation, and
Irenaeus’ anthropology.345
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God’s Omnipotence
For Irenaeus, the reality of the resurrection stands or falls with the power of God
(V.3.2). Joanne McWilliam states that Irenaeus’ refutation of the Gnostics’ notion of
resurrection “is argued first on the basis of God’s power.”346 The argument is that if God
is all-powerful, then he is able to raise flesh. Conversely, if God cannot raise dead flesh,
he is not all-powerful nor has Christ been raised. Irenaeus reasons that if God can make
flesh live once, then he can make it live again. Among the passages that indicate this is
Haer. V.3.2 where Irenaeus writes,
Those men, therefore, set aside the power of God, and do not consider what the
word declares, when they dwell upon the infirmity of the flesh, but do not take
into consideration the power of Him who raises it up from the dead. For if He
does not vivify what is mortal, and does not bring back the corruptible to
incorruption, He is not a God of power. But that He is powerful in all these
respects, we ought to perceive from our origin, inasmuch as God, taking dust from
the earth, formed man. And surely it is much more difficult and incredible, from
non-existent bones, and nerves, and veins, and the rest of man's organization, to
bring it about that all this should be, and to make man an animated and rational
creature, than to re-integrate again that which had been created and then
afterwards decomposed into earth, . . . For He who in the beginning caused him to
have being who as yet was not, just when He pleased, shall much more reinstate
again those who had a former existence, when it is His will [that they should
inherit] the life granted by Him. And that flesh shall also be found fit for and
capable of receiving the power of God, which at the beginning received the
skillful touches of God.347
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Recapitulation
Mary Clark has observed, “the center of Irenaeus’ theology is Paul’s doctrine of
the ‘recapitulation of all things in Christ.’ Human nature in its entirety is assumed by the
Word of God. Christ as the new Adam renews all creation and leads it back to its author
through the incarnation and redemption.”348 The result of this recapitulation is that in
Christ the original purpose for creation can be fully realized. In a sense, it is possible to
assert that the end to which all things are moving is a return to their original or intended
state and purpose, since in Christ “the whole history of salvation is resumed, so that the
beginning, middle, and end are brought together.”349
One of the numerous occurrences of the idea of recapitulation is found in Haer.
I.10.1, where Irenaeus instructs that Christ is coming again “to recapitulate all things and
to raise up all flesh of the whole human race.”350 A passage that has a similar theme is
found in V.32.1 where Irenaeus indicates that the goal is the return of creation to its
pristine condition (ipsam conditionem redintegratam ad pristinum). In terms of the
account of creation, Irenaeus taught that the image of God is possessed in the flesh or
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carni quae est plasmata secundum imaginem Dei (V.6.1). This is significant for
Irenaeus’ argument because if God did not raise the flesh, it would mean that God had
forsaken his own image. This is why scholars like John Behr write, “For Irenaeus, the
rhythm of the events of the last times is based upon the opening verses of Genesis.”351
Interestingly, Irenaeus’ reverence for human flesh causes him to argue that Adam
and Eve were not originally nude but clothed with God’s glory. Accordingly, “La nudité
du péché est la nudité d’un corps sans gloire.”352 It can therefore be assumed that the
resurrected body will be like that of Adam and Eve before the fall. It will be flesh that is
clothed in glory.

Irenaeus’ Anthropology
According to Irenaeus, the Gnostics whom he was refuting believed in three
elements to a person. They were the material, the psychic, and the spiritual (I.6.1), and
each had its own eschatological fate. The material will naturally perish because it is
“incapable of receiving the breath of imperishability” (I.6.1). The psychic is “in the
middle between spiritual and material and will go where it makes a turn” (I.6.1). The
spiritual “has been sent forth so that joined with the psychic it will receive formation,
instructed with it during its life” (I.6.1). In contrast to this, Irenaeus expressed a unified
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understanding of the human person that was a “single composite of spirit and flesh.”353
Pheme Perkins calls this Irenaeus’ “central contribution to the development of Christian
understanding of resurrection.”354 While the focus of this study is on Irenaeus’ view of
resurrection, it is worth noting that his anthropology also means a rejection of the idea of
reincarnation355 and a refinement of the notion of an immortal soul.356
One of the fundamental arguments against Irenaeus’ material resurrection is that
the temporal flesh was incapable of receiving eternal life since “salvation is only for the
soul” and “the body is perishable by nature” (I.24.5).357 Among the arguments that
Irenaeus employs to refute this position is an insightful appeal to the Eucharist.
According to Irenaeus, the Church in its celebration of the Eucharist is a symbol of the
unity between the spiritual and the material. In IV.18.5, Irenaeus argues “Then, again,
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how can they say that the flesh, which is nourished with the body of the Lord and with
His blood, goes to corruption, and does not partake of life? Let them, therefore, either
alter their opinion, or cease from offering the things just mentioned..”358 If flesh cannot
experience redemption, then the celebration of communion is pointless, despite the
importance it was given in some Gnostic communities. Similarly, in V.2.3 we read,
“When, therefore, the mingled cup and the manufactured bread receives the Word of
God, and the Eucharist of the blood and the body of Christ is made, from which things
the substance of our flesh is increased and supported, how can they affirm that the flesh is
incapable of receiving the gift of God, which is life eternal, which is nourished from the
body and blood of the Lord, and is a member of Him?”
The notion that the flesh is capable of experiencing redemption is also evident in
Irenaeus’ attack on his opponents’ understanding of I Corinthians 15:50 which states that
“flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God” (V.9-15). In addressing this issue,
Irenaeus interprets the flesh of I Corinthians 15:50 as referring to the carnal aspects of life
rather than as literal flesh like the Gnostics do. For Irenaeus, the term spiritual describes
those who “partake of the Spirit” not those whose “flesh has been stripped off and taken
away” (V.6.1). Irenaeus argues that otherwise, the promise in I Corinthians 15:53 of God
giving life to mortal bodies would not make any sense. He states,
What therefore is there left to which we may apply the term “mortal body,” unless
358

In reference to this passage, Ysabel de Andia writes, “L’intention du texte est
claire: montrer, contre ceux qui nient la salus carnis, la participation de nos corps à
la vie incorruptible dans l’eucharistie et l’espérance de résurrection qu’elle suscite.”
Andia, 239-240.
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it be the thing that was moulded, that is, the flesh, of which it is also said that God
will vivify it? For this it is which dies and is decomposed, but not the soul or the
spirit. For to die is to lose vital power, and to become henceforth breathless,
inanimate, and devoid of motion, and to melt away into those [component parts]
from which also it derived the commencement of [its] substance (V.7.1).359
This interpretation is important because it allows Irenaeus to affirm the truth of both I
Corinthians 15:50 and his belief in the resurrection of the flesh. As Anders Lund
Jacobsen writes, “The argument is clear: flesh and blood understood as substance can
inherit the kingdom of God because the substance of the flesh will not be destroyed when
man has received the Spirit, but the physical and the ethical qualities of the flesh are
improved so that the renewed flesh will be able to inherit the kingdom of God.”360
Irenaeus’ inclusion of the flesh in the resurrected life can not be overstated, since
“only such a hope can take seriously God’s continued involvement with his creation.”361
For Irenaeus, the resurrected body is the temporal body in every way. As John Behr
observes,
The most significant feature . . . is that there is a direct continuity between the life
which human beings (even the Gnostics) presently live and the eternal life which
will vivify them in the resurrection. The only distinction made between the two is
that of “weaker” and “stronger,” with their correlates “temporal” and “eternal.”
There is no suggestion that they are two different types of life.362
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This passage is from Grant’s translation.
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Anders Lund Jacobsen, “The Philosophical Argument in the Teaching of
Irenaeus on the Resurrection of the Flesh,” in Studia Patristica XXXVI, ed. M.F.
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Clement of Alexandria363
The first person in this study known to have lived in Alexandria and who is of
major theological significance is Clement of Alexandria. Scholars believe that Clement
was born in Athens around 150 CE.364 This makes him a younger contemporary of
Irenaeus. He arrived in Alexandria around 180 where he met Pantaenus, who was the
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References to the Greek text and English translation of his sermon Quis Dives
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head of the school there.365 Apparently, Clement was well educated. David Runia has
indicated that Clement is the first Christian known to have read Philo.366 Eventually,
Clement succeeded Pantaenus as the head of the Alexandrian school.367
It was noted above that Irenaeus presents one of the easily discernible views on
bodily resurrection. The opposite is true of Clement of Alexandria. In the first place,
very few scholars give any attention to his thought on resurrection. Secondly, those who
do examine his work agree that Clement’s thought on resurrection is difficult to
understand. Joanne McWilliam, for example, has concluded that Clement’s work
“leaves certain questions - notably his understanding of the resurrection body -
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Heine, 117-118. A good summary of the existing scholarship on Pantaenus can
be found in Attila Jakab’s Ecclesia alexandrina, 107-115. There is some possibility
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unanswered, or answered only partially.”368 Charles Hill takes the ambiguity surrounding
Clement’s notion of resurrection a step further when he asserts that “a perceived difficulty
for Clement’s eschatology is the preservation of a traditional doctrine of the resurrection
of the body.”369 In light of all of the surviving texts from Clement, why is there so much
ambiguity concerning his view on bodily resurrection?
There are several factors that have contributed to the present assessment of
Clement’s statements on resurrection. One of the most significant is the fact that an
explicit treatment on the resurrection by Clement does not exist.370 Another is the
numerous streams of influence that have affected Clement’s thought, thereby adding to its
complexity.371 While this can be said of many authors, it is particularly true of Clement.
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McWilliam, 114. The difficulty of providing a definitive account of Clement’s
thought on resurrection is demonstrated in several popular treatments of early
Christian faith in resurrection. In his The Hope of the Early Church, Brian Daley
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Hill, 172. It is assumed that Hill’s use of the term “traditional” means an
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Clement’s treatise On the Resurrection is lost (Paed. I.vi.46). Charles Bigg
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on the Resurrection.” Charles Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1913; reprint Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2001), 148.
371
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education, opted to renounce it.” Peter Karavites, Evil, Freedom, and the Road to
Perfection in Clement of Alexandria (New York: Brill, 1999), 2. Similarly, Brian
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In the words of Salvatore Lilla, “The problem of reconciliation and synthesis between
Christianity and Hellenism was felt by no other Christian author of the second century
A.D. so deeply as by Clement.”372 At times, these sources of influence conflict with one
another. As Jaroslav Pelikan states, “Neither the Christian account of man’s origin nor
the Christian picture of his destiny can be bent into congruity with the Greek circle of
immortality.”373 Lastly, the genre and intended audience of his various works influence
how Clement articulates his thoughts.374 In addressing the eschatological hope espoused
by Clement, Brian Daley writes, “The importance he assigns the traditional features of
that hope, and the interpretations he suggests for them, vary with the character of the
work he is writing and with the kind of audience - popular or intellectual - for which it is
intended.”375

Daley writes of Clement’s eschatology that “Clement draws on both the
intellectualist, anthropocentric speculations of Platonic and Stoic cosmology, and on
the esoteric, mythically couched revelations of the New Testament apocrypha and the
Gnostic documents.” Daley, 44.
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Gnosticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 9. Henry Chadwick has also
described Clement as being “hellenized to the core of his being.” Henry Chadwick,
Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1966): 64.
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Daley, 44. Daley reasserts his opinion later when he states, “In his works of a
more popular nature, Clement alludes occasionally, although without a great deal of
elaboration, to more traditional Christian expectations of an afterlife.” Daley, 46.
Charles Hill also writes, “It is especially in the Paedagogus . . . that the doctrine
receives a place that seems to be quite keeping with traditional orthodox emphasis.”
Hill, 173.
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Both Daley and Hill have raised the question of the “traditional” aspects of the
Christian hope in reference to Clement. Consequently, the following will explore both
the “traditional” and the creative elements of Clement’s thought concerning resurrection.
It is important to keep in mind that Clement’s orthodoxy is irrelevant to this study. The
division between the traditional and creative aspects of his view is simply a means of
investigating an issue raised by current scholarship. It also provides a structure for
examining Clement’s works.
The texts that are considered first give indication of being intended for a general
audience. They include a small work entitled Who is the Rich Man Being Saved? (Quis
Dives), the Instructor (Paed.), in which Clement “instructs Christians in the way they
should live and the virtues they should try to acquire,”376 and a fragment containing
Clement’s interpretation of I Peter. Texts that are more esoteric are considered later and
include the Stromateis (Strom.) which has been described as “an artful construction of
clues, rooted in advanced ethics, directing disciplined and initiated Christian Gnostics
toward the third stage of philosophy, esoteric knowledge (gnosis),”377 and the Excerpta ex
Theodoto (Excerpta) in which Clement has preserved numerous statements from a
Gnostic teacher along with his own comments.
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Studia Patristica, 31, ed. Elizabeth Livingstone (Louvain: Peeters, 1997), 517-521.
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In order to appreciate Clement’s thoughts on bodily resurrection, it is helpful to
begin with an understanding of his overall theological enterprise. For Clement, the
incarnation of Christ provides the possibility of “transforming earth-born man into a holy
and heavenly being” (Paed. I.xii.98).

Thus, the Christian life consists of a gradual

progression or prokoph. toward perfection (Strom. VI.xiii.107.2-3). This goal of
perfection is also known as deification or divinization. This is fundamental to Clement’s
thought, and everything else is secondary to it. Joanne McWilliam expresses the
ramification of this for Clement’s view of the body when she writes, “Clement’s primary
interest lay not in its fate, but in the perfection of the knowledge of faith.”378 It is also
important to understand this element of Clement’s thought because it is connected to his
understanding of the resurrected life, since the one “who has first moderated his passions
and trained himself for impassibility, and developed to the beneficence of gnostic
perfection, is here equal to the angels” and is “luminous already” (Strom VI.xiii.107.2-3).

Traditional Elements in Clement’s Writings
While most forms of Gnosticism and some forms of Greco-Roman philosophy
understood creation to be evil, there is no question that Clement understood creation to be
inherently good. This is apparent when Clement credits the existence of creation to the
divine Logos rather than attributing it to a mistake of a demiurge as in Gnosticism. As
Clement quotes John 1:3 approvingly:“All things were made by him” (Excerpta 8.2).
Likewise, Clement cites Wisdom 2.23 that God created humanity “for immortality, and
378

McWilliam, 120-121.
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made him an image of His own nature" (Strom. VI.xii.97.1).
As was noted previously in the section on Irenaeus, many Gnostics taught that
people had different natures. The same is reported in the Excerpta, “From Adam three
natures were begotten. The first was the irrational, which was Cain's, the second the
rational and just, which was Abel's, the third the spiritual, which was Seth's. Now that
which is earthly is "according to the image” (Excerpta 54:2). In Excerpta 56 we read,
“Therefore many are material, but not many are psychic, and few are spiritual.” Clement
rejects the threefold distinction of people made by the Gnostics. Based on Paul’s concept
of equality in Colossians 3:11, Clement instructs that “It is not, then, that some are
enlightened Gnostics and others are only less perfect Spirituals in the same Word, but all,
putting aside their carnal desires, are equal and spiritual before the Lord.” (Paed.
I.vi.31).379
As a result of its positive view of creation, “traditional” Christian thought
believed in the cooperation between the body and soul. As Jaroslav Pelikan wrote, “The
Christian doctrine of creation forbids setting body and soul into such an antithesis that
they appear alien to each other.”380 One way in which Clement demonstrates a
compatibility between body and soul is by rejecting the idea of a pre-existent soul.381 A
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Pelikan, 35 and 36. In addition, it is clear that some believed that the account of
God’s covering Adam’s and Eve’s nakedness with “coats of skin” in Genesis 3 was a
description of the embodiment of the soul. This implies a pre-existent soul and
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very helpful passage for understanding Clement’s view of the relationship between the
body and soul is Strom. IV.xxvi. Clement writes,
Those, then, who run down created existence and vilify the body are wrong; not
considering that the frame of man was formed erect for the contemplation of
heaven, and that the organization of the senses tends to knowledge; and that the
members and parts are arranged for good, not for pleasure. Whence this abode
becomes receptive of the soul which is most precious to God; and is dignified
with the Holy Spirit through the sanctification of soul and body, perfected with
the perfection of the Saviour. And the succession of the three virtues is found in
the Gnostic, who morally, physically, and logically occupies himself with God. . .
For "the flower of grass," and "walking after the flesh," and "being carnal,"
according to the apostle, are those who are in their sins. The soul of man is
confessedly the better part of man, and the body the inferior. But neither is the
soul good by nature, nor, on the other hand, is the body bad by nature. Nor is that
which is not good straightway bad. . . . The constitution of man, then, which has
its place among things of sense, was necessarily composed of things diverse, but
not opposite - body and soul (Strom. IV.xxvi.163.1-3; 164.2-3,5).
The main theme of this passage is that soul and body are different from one another but
they are both good. This differs significantly from the dualism of many Greek
philosophies, since for Clement the soul and body are not opposite forces but partners
working toward the same goal of perfection. Perhaps the most striking feature of this
passage is Clement’s claim that both the soul and body are sanctified.382
As a result of the cooperation between the body and soul, Clement can affirm the
body’s participation in the afterlife. This both aligns him with the “traditional” elements

makes the physical body a result of sin. Clement rejects the interpretation of Genesis
3 that allows some to argue for the soul’s pre-existence when he writes that the
“‘coats of skins’ in Cassia’s view are bodies. . . . both he and those who teach the
same as he does are wrong” (Strom. III.xiv.95.2).
382

This can also be found in Strom. III.vi.47.1 where Clement teaches that “in us it
is not only the spirit which ought to be sanctified, but also our behavior, manner of
life, and our body.” See also Paed. I.xiii.102.

133
of the Church and distinguishes him from most Gnostics. We find evidence of this in the
first book of the Paed., where Clement states that God “concerns Himself with the whole
creature, and as the Physician of the whole man heals both body and soul” (Paed. I.ii.6.2).
He also opposes the Gnostics by teaching that the resurrection of the believing dead is a
future event and that we do not presently possess it. He writes that at present, we can
only anticipate that which we will have “as an actuality after the resurrection” (Paed.
I.vi.29.3). He argues the same point more strongly in Strom. III.vi.48.1-2 where he states,
“If, as they say, they have already attained the state of resurrection, and on this account
reject marriage let them neither eat nor drink.”383
Clement’s most direct comments on resurrection occur in a fragment preserved in
Latin by Cassiodorus, where Clement is commenting on I Peter. He begins by rejecting
the idea of metempsychosis or reincarnation when he indicates that the soul never returns
a second time to the body in this life - “Decebat autem iterum nunquam reverti secundo
ad corpus animam in hac vita.”384 While the soul does not return to the body in this life,
it will be reunited to it in the resurrection.385 The principle that Clement employs is that
the soul will seek out its body at the resurrection according to its proper form, iuxta
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genus proprium.386 Clement also declares “quoniam non est naturaliter anima
incorruptibilis, sed gratia dei per fidem et iustitiam et intellectum perficitur
incorruptibilis.”387 Another explicit affirmation of bodily resurrection is found in the
Paed. where Clement states that the Tutor “wants to save my flesh” (sw/sai bou,letai// mou
th.n sa,rka) by wrapping it in the robe of immortality (Paed. I.ix.84.3).

Evidence of Clement’s Creativity
It is difficult to overstate the significant contribution that Clement’s creativity has
had on Christian theology.388 In terms of bodily resurrection, there are several points to
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philosophy. Karavites observes that he “is the first among the early ecclesiastic
writers to deal extensively . . . with the freedom of man’s will.” Peter Karavites, Evil,
Freedom, and the Road to Perfection in Clement of Alexandria (New York: Brill,
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speculative point of view.” A. van den Hoek, “Clement of Alexandria on
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Divinization of the Christian According to the Greek Fathers, trans. Paul Onica
(Anaheim, CA: A & C Press, 2002), 134. Brian Daley has observed that Clement was
“the first Christian exponent of the doctrine of purgatorial eschatological suffering” as
well as “the first Christian writer to suggest universal salvation for all intelligent
creatures.” Daley, 47.
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observe. First, while Clement affirmed the relationship between the body and soul, he
also understood the departure from the temporal body to be a positive change. Among
the passages that express this are some from the Stromateis. In addressing the subject of
persecution, Clement states that if we had the right perspective, “we should feel obliged
to those who have afforded the means for speedy departure” (Strom. IV.ii.80).389
Furthermore, Clement teaches that in terms of conformity to the image of God, “the
words ‘after the image and likeness,’ as we have said before are not directed to physical
matter - it is not right to compare mortal and immortal - but to intellect and reason,
whereby the Lord can stamp his seal appropriately on the likeness related to his
beneficence and his authority” (Strom. II.xix.102.6).

Thus, conformity to the image and

likeness of God is not meant for the body. But how can Clement affirm the existence of a
visible body in the afterlife, if it is not intended for perfection? He is able to affirm the
presence of a body in the afterlife by emphasizing the existence of several different kinds
of bodies.
The Excerpta is a particularly helpful text at this point. In Excerpta 10.1, Clement
argues that all things have shape and a body, even if it is radically different from our
understanding of bodies in this world. He states, regarding the Son,
But not even the world of spirit and of intellect, nor the archangels and the FirstCreated, no, nor even he himself is shapeless and formless and without figure, and
incorporeal; but he also has his own shape and body corresponding to his
preeminence over all spiritual beings, as also those who were first created have
bodies corresponding to their preeminence over the beings subordinate to them.
389

Another passage is Strom. VII.xii.83, where Clement describes the death of the
true gnostic as “leaving all hindrances, and despising all matter which distracts him,
he cleaves the heaven by knowledge.”
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The inference from his statements is that even God can be said to have a body.390 In other
words, incorporeality for Clement is a matter of perspective. In Excerpta 11.2-3, he
quotes I Cor. 15.40, “There is one glory of the heavenly, another of the earthly, another of
angels, another of archangels, because in comparison with bodies here, like the stars, they
are incorporeal and formless, as in comparison with the Son, they are dimensional and
sensible bodies.” Later, he states, “even the soul is a body. . . . And how can the souls
which are being punished be sensible of it, if they are not bodies? Certainly he says, ‘Fear
him who, after death, is able to cast soul and body into hell.’ Now that which is visible is
not purged by fire, but is dissolved into dust. But, from the story of Lazarus and Dives,
the soul is directly shown by its possession of bodily limbs to be a body” (Excerpta 14.24).
This means that according to Clement, the resurrected body is different from the
temporal one. One example of this is Clement’s use of Matt. 22:30 and its parallels that
“souls are neither male nor female” (Strom. VI.xii.100.3), and that we become like or
equal to angels (Strom. VI.xiii.105.1). As will be demonstrated below, another example
of the radical difference of the resurrected body occurs in Strom. III where Clement offers
his rationale for the continued validity of marriage.
It appears that some people were claiming that they had already attained a
resurrected state, which means that they were finished with the temporal desires of life
and were no longer in need of marriage. Clement’s response has been noted earlier when
390
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he asks why, if some people have conquered life’s temporal desires, do they continue to
eat and drink, since we know that the stomach will not be included in the resurrection
(Strom. III.vi.48.1-2)? He continues by stating that “the apostle says that in the
resurrection the belly and food shall be destroyed. Why then do they hunger and thirst and
suffer the weaknesses of the flesh and all the other needs which will not affect the man
who through Christ has attained the hoped for resurrection?” While Clement’s basis for
excluding the stomach from the afterlife is interesting, it is not particularly germane here.
Rather, it is significant that for Clement the resurrected body does not appear to include
all of the organs involved in the common functions of bodily life.
There are several points which I wish to recall as I conclude this section on
Clement of Alexandria. First is Clement’s profound admiration for creation. The
material body is not evil nor the result of a mistake. Second, Clement was convinced that
the human person consisted of both body and soul, designed to work together toward the
goal of conformity to Christlikeness.391 Third, while Clement articulated a faith in bodily
resurrection, it was one that anticipated considerable change to the material body.
Describing the change that occurred in Christ’s resurrected body, he wrote, “He says that
He is flesh, and very likely means flesh that has risen after having passed through the fire,
as wheat destined to become bread rises from the destruction of the seed, and flesh which
yet has gathered all the churches together in gladness of heart through fire, as the wheat is
gathered together and baked by fire to become bread” (Paed. I.vi.46).
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I am not suggesting that there are only two elements in Clement’s view of a
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This passage accentuates the difference between bodies by extending the seed
metaphor beyond what has been noted previously. Where the comparison in other
authors was often between the seed that is buried and the wheat that springs up, in this
passage it is between the seed and the baked bread.392 Subsequently, the body will
experience dramatic change, but this should not be understood as an end of corporeality.
Arkadi Choufrine explains Clement’s notion of incorporeality, by stating that he “means
the operations of the mind freed from the “flesh” in the sense of passions only, not from
corporeality per se. For even the demons, angels, and human souls have, for Clement,
some kind of bodies peculiar to them. Nothing of that which has come into being
transcends corporeality.”393 As Clement writes, “if we renounce the deeds of the flesh
and clothe this pure flesh with incorruption, we are living a life like that of the angels”
(Paed. II.x.100).

Origen394
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The fact that the baked bread is a reference to communion does not diminish the
significance of the way in which Clement has expanded the metaphor.
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Origen was born around 185 and was reared in Alexandria.395 This means that he
is the first person examined in this study who was a native Alexandrian. Despite the fact
that there is no mention of Clement in any of Origen’s surviving writings, it is generally
assumed that Origen was influenced, perhaps even instructed by Clement.396 Around 203,
he became the head of the catechetical school in Alexandria.397
Origen’s view of resurrection is the most complex view of resurrection of those

Exhortation to Martrydom and book IV of De Princ. are from Origen, An Exhortation
to Martyrdom, Prayer, First Principles: Book IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the
Song of Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers, trans. Rowan Greer (New York: Paulist
Press, 1979). References to the Greek text of the Dialogue with Heraclides is from
Origène, Entretien d'Origène avec Héraclide, Sources chrétiennes (Paris: Éditions du
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examined here. Consequently, there is little about it that enjoys scholarly consensus.398
One of the primary reasons for the diversity of opinion is the fact that Origen both
defends and opposes the doctrine of bodily resurrection. Henri Crouzel writes that
Origen
is concerned about opinions that he considers erroneous, with shortcomings which
he is anxious to overcome. In fact he wants to affirm the reality of the
resurrection of bodies in the face of infidels and heretics who deny it. But he
perceives acutely that the conceptions many Christians hold of this mystery are
largely responsible for this denial. . . . So Origen begins by opposing the doctrine
of the resurrection current among many Christians of his own day.399
In what follows, we shall consider both Origen’s defense and opposition to bodily
resurrection. By exploring these diverse approaches, we shall obtain a better
understanding of Origen’s view on bodily resurrection.
Among Origen’s works that are consulted in this section are his Homilies on
Genesis and a fragment of a commentary on Psalm 1 which has been preserved by
Methodius and Epiphanius. More extensive reference will be made to his defense of his
teaching found in Dialogue with Heraclides (Dial. Her.), his Exhortation to Martyrdom,
his defense and explanation of the faith in Contra Celsus (Celsus), and his most famous
work, De Principiis (De Princ.). It is important to understand that while the De Princ.
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expresses Origen’s thought, it is an expression of his theological exploration and
speculation and not necessarily his understanding of dogma. He states, “the reader must
carefully consider and work out for himself; for we must not be supposed to put these
forward as settled doctrines, but as subjects for inquiry and discussion” (De Princ.
II.8.4).400

Origen’s Defense of Bodily Resurrection401
In the preface to De Princ. Origen includes “the resurrection of the dead” as an
element of the rule of faith having been taught by the apostles. He states that “erit
tempuo resurrectionis moruorum cum corpus hoc . . . surget in gloria” (De Princ. praef.
5). He repeats this belief in II.10.1 and proceeds to vigorously defend the doctrine. The
II.10.1 passage is particularly noteworthy as I believe it is a fitting description for the
present state of the doctrine in the twenty-first century. Origen offers his rationale for
discussing the resurrection when he states, “it seems not reasonable to repeat a few of the
arguments from our former works, particularly because some make this objection to the
faith of the church, that our beliefs about the resurrection are altogether foolish and silly.”

400

This statement is offered in the context of Origen’s treatment of the soul which
will be addressed later. It nevertheless serves as a helpful word of caution.
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It should be noted that Origen operates with two definitions of resurrection.
The first refers to the partial resurrection that occurs in the soul as it becomes morally
conformed to God’s likeness. The second is the final resurrection. Since this study is
only about the latter, the first will not be discussed. See Henri Crouzel, “La
‘première’ et la ‘seconde’ résurrection des hommes selon Origèn,” Didaskalia 3
(1973): 3. See also Mark J. Edwards, “Origen’s Two Resurrections,” Journal of
Theological Studies 46 (1995): 502-518.
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In responding to those who find the Creed to be foolishness, he argues that one
must either deny the resurrection of the dead altogether or admit that there is a
resurrection of the body, since “the expression ‘rise again’ could not properly be used
except of that which had previously fallen” (De Princ. II.10.1).402 Therefore, “no one can
doubt that these bodies rise again in order that at the resurrection we may once more be
clothed with them” (De Princ. II.10.1). This means that the resurrected body must be
“our own individual bodies, existing in some recognizable form.”403
Mark Edwards explains the significance of this when he writes, “if anywhere, he
might have been expected to disguise this Pauline stumbling-block; yet in fact he rather
insists it is faith in a corporeal resurrection that sets apart the Christian from the
Greek.”404 In his argument against Celsus, Origen even goes as far as to affirm “the
doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh,” which he says is “preached in the churches”
(Celsus V.18).

Origen’s Refutation of Bodily Resurrection
While Origen acknowledges that the doctrine of bodily resurrection is a
fundamental part of the Church’s kerygma, he goes to great lengths to refute the views of
resurrection belonging to simple-minded Christians who believe that the resurrected body
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is simply the temporal flesh that has been reanimated. He writes,
Now some men, who reject the labour of thinking and seek after the outward and
literal meaning of the law, or rather give way to their own desires and lusts,
disciples of the mere letter, consider that the promises of the future are to be
looked for in the form of pleasure and bodily luxury. And chiefly on this account
they desire after the resurrection to have flesh of such a sort that they will never
lack the power to eat and drink and to do all things that pertain to flesh and blood,
not following the teaching of the apostle Paul about the resurrection of a “spiritual
body.” (De Princ. II.11.2).
In rejecting Celsus’ accusation on the subject, he states, “Neither we, nor the
divine scriptures maintain that those long dead will rise up from the dearth and live in the
same bodies without undergoing any change for the better; and in saying this Celsus
falsely accuses us” (Celsus V.18). Instead, “the end will be like the beginning” (De
Princ. I.6.2). As will be demonstrated, this means that for Origen the nature of the
resurrected body is spiritual not temporal. In order to appreciate his argument it is
necessary to briefly consider his anthropology.
Origen understands the two accounts of creation in Genesis 1 and 2 as describing
two acts of creation.405 In Genesis 1:26, we are told of God’s decision to make man in his
own image. In reference to this passage Origen writes, “We do not understand, however,
this man . . . to be corporeal. For the form of the body does not contain the image of God,
nor is the corporeal man said to be ‘made,’ but ‘formed,’ as it is written in the words
which follow. For the text says: ‘And God formed man,’ that is fashioned, ‘from the
405

Origen not only suggests that the two counts refers to two different creations, he
completely rejects the idea that they are two accounts of the same act. As he states in
Dialogue with Heraclides, “Some people think that it is a repetition in the creation
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(Dialogue with Heraclides 12.7-17).
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slime of the earth’” (Homilies on Genesis I:13).406 The body cannot contain the image of
God, because God is the only one who is perfectly incorporeal (De Princ. I.6.4 - sine
materiali substantia).
Instead of the body, the object that is in the image of God in Genesis 1:26-27 is
the nou/j , mens, or rational soul. As Origen states, “It is our inner man, invisible,
incorporeal, incorruptible, and immortal which is made ‘according to the image of God’”
(Homilies on Genesis I:13). While these passages suggest that the fundamental nature of
humanity is incorporeal, it should be remembered that only God was truly incorporeal.
He writes, “the original creation was of rational beings, it is only in idea and thought that
a material substance is separable from them, and that though this substance seems to have
been produced for them or after them, yet never have they lived or do they live without it;
for we shall be right in believing that life without a body is found in the Trinity alone”
(De Princ. II.2.2).
There are other elements of Origen’s anthropology that should be noted. For
example, the nou/j or mens is intricately related to the soul. According to Origen, “Mind
when it fell was made soul, and soul in its turn when furnished with virtues will become
mind” (De Princ. II.8.3). Origen also articulates an interesting view of the body. He
states, “Those rational beings who sinned and on that account fell from the state in which
they were, in proportion to their particular sins were enveloped in bodies as a punishment;
and when they are purified they rise again to the state in which they formerly were,
406
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completely putting away their evil and their bodies” (De Princ. II.8.3).407 In addition,
Origen employs sw/ma in a variety of ways, because as was observed with Clement, there
are different kinds of bodies that exist. He invites his readers to
Consider whether one ought to agree with a man who criticizes the Christians
when he puts forward such doctrines, and if one should abandon a philosophy
which accounts for the diversity of bodies by the hypothesis that different qualities
are given to them. For we also know that there are “both heavenly bodies and
earthly bodies.” (Celsus IV.57).
Later in the same passage Origen notes differences in heavenly bodies, which leads him
to conclude, “Therefore also, as we believe in the resurrection of the dead, we affirm that
changes occur in the qualities of bodies” (Celsus IV.57).408
Michael O’Laughlin explains the interaction of the various elements of Origen’s
anthropology by stating, “The spirit and the flesh impose on or influence the core of the
human person, the soul. The pneu/ma attempts to guide the soul towards God and away
from the distractions of materiality.”409 In spite of the inferiority of the material body,
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Origen unequivocally maintains that the material body is the work of God, thus
countering Celsus’ claim that “the soul is God’s work, but the nature of the body is
different,” which is to say that nothing corruptible can be the work of God (Celsus IV.56).
One of the difficulties of Origen’s position arises at this point. Joseph Trigg asks,
“If the ultimate source of all things is the incorporeal godhead, will not corporeal
existence, entailing, as it does, the possibility of a differentiation from God, ultimately
cease to exist when God is all in all?”410 In order to appreciate the nuances of Origen’s
position, it is necessary to understand his multiform use of the idea of incorporeality.
Crouzel has noted that Origen employs the idea of incorporeality in two distinct
ways.411 The first addresses the state of the soul after death and before the final

William Petersen (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1988), 359. Among the
passages that support this idea is Origen’s discussion of the soul of Christ, where we
read, “Into the hands of His Father He commends not His soul, but His spirit; and
when He says that the flesh is weak, He does not say that the soul is willing, but the
spirit: whence it appears that the soul is something intermediate between the weak
flesh and the willing spirit” (De Princ. II.8.4).
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resurrection and refers to being without any body.412 The second refers to being without a
temporal body.413 While Origen frequently uses the term incorporeal in reference to the
human soul, as Crouzel writes, “La plupart des textes d’Origène présentent l’âme sans
corps entre mort et résurrection.”414 While I do not find Crouzel’s distinction helpful in
completely alleviating the problem raised by Trigg, it should be noted that Origen
emphatically rejects the idea “that in this ‘end’ material or bodily nature will utterly
perish” (De Princ. I.6.4).415
In light of Origen’s emphasis on the transformation involved in resurrection, how
does Origen account for continuity between the temporal and resurrected lives so as to
affirm personal survival?416 Origen understands life to be in a perpetual state of “flux”
which means that the materiality of the body is particularly susceptible to change (De
Princ. III.1.2). In a fragment on Psalm 1:5 preserved by Methodius and Epiphanius,
Origen suggests that in light of the body’s state of continuous change that a “river is not a
bad name for the body, since strictly speaking, the initial (proton) substratum
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(hypokeimenon) of the bodies is perhaps not the same for even two days.”417
Consequently, according to Origen’s thought, it is not only unnecessary but erroneous to
link personal survival to the temporal body, given the fact that the temporal body is itself
continually changing.
This does not mean that Origen ignores the issue of continuity, however. It
simply means that rather than the body,
the principle of continuity between present and future forms of the human body is
clearly the soul, which acts throughout life as an ‘inherent principle of
intelligibility. . . . In this sense, it is more correct to say - as Scripture does - that
the incorruptible soul ‘clothes’ the body with its own permanence than that the
body, as the garment of the soul, is itself made immortal.”418
While the soul is the fundamental means of continuity for Origen, he also provides further
means of continuity through his use of the terms o;chma and “ei=’doj.
Lawrence Hennessey writes, “Origen’s use of the Middle Platonic o;chma helps to
clarify a critical problem in his Christian theology of resurrection: there must be real
continuity between the earthly and the glorified body.”419 In his commentary on Psalm 1,
Origen states that there is a vehicle (o;chma) of the soul at the moment it departs which has
the same form of the earthly body.420 This text is also helpful in understanding Origen’s
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use of “ei=’doj. Dechow explains Origen’s notion of “ei=’doj when he writes that while we are
always changing, the real part of us “is always the same - [and] not merely in [the] soul. .
. even if the nature of the body is in a state of flux, because the form (“ei=’doj)
characterizing the body is the same.”421 We can conclude that for Origen , the “ei=’doj
preserves the form that “shapes and integrates the material body.”422 Jon Dechow
observes that this “form (ei=d’ oj) must be understood to be the same in the future.”423
It is clear from this study of Origen that he believed in an embodied final state. It
is also clear that this final embodiment varies significantly from the physical body. As
was noted above, this does not mean that there is no continuity from the temporal to the
resurrected life in Origen’s thought. As Jon Dechow notes,
Origen’s eschatology, in its own setting, is then an attempt at clear affirmation and
articulation of the resurrection against the wide background of late Hellenistic
thought. . . . Featuring a sophisticated conception of the corporeal form in the light
of ancient philosophy and sciences, it offered a plausible option to many thirdand fourth- century Christians for stressing the manner of the whole body’s
resurrection - and of the whole flesh properly understood. Analogous to Platonic,
Aristotelean, and gnostic views of corporeality, Origen’s belief was nevertheless
basically a way of professing traditional Pauline/New Testament resurrection
421
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doctrine in the contemporary terms of intellectual Alexandrian Christianity.424

Later Ante-Nicene Egyptian Bishops
While the previous section of this chapter examined the works of the three most
prominent names connected with Alexandrian Christianity, this section focuses on later
individuals who are considerably less famous. Unlike the previous section where none of
the individuals were Egyptian bishops, all of the people in this section were. In addition,
while a significant amount of the writings of Irenaeus, Clement, and Origen have
survived, the bishops examined below either wrote little or, as is more likely, little of
what they wrote has survived. For this reason, rather than considering the existing
material categorically as was done above, the following will examine the relevant texts
individually.

Dionysius425
The first Egyptian bishop to be discussed is Dionysius of Alexandria. After his
conversion, he became a pupil of Origen and was placed in charge of the catechetical
school when Heraclas vacated the position for the episcopacy. He served as bishop from
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Alexandrien zur Frage des Origenismus im dritten Jahrhundert (New York: Walter
de Gruyter & Co., 1978), which will be cited as Bienert, Dionysius hereafter.
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248 to 264 CE. During his episcopacy, the Church in Alexandria experienced significant
persecution, which resulted in his fleeing from Alexandria. Dionysius is best known for
his biblical scholarship which is exhibited in different texts that have survived.426
There are only a handful of texts by Dionysius which are related to the subject of
resurrection. The one most pertinent to this study is Dionysius’ response to the followers
of Nepos. According to Dionysius, Nepos was an Egyptian bishop who tried to prove the
kingdom of Christ will be on earth: “Let me say that in many other respects I approve and
love Nepos, for his faith and devotion to work, his study of the Scriptures, and for his
abundant psalmody by which many of the brethren have till this day been cheered; and I
am full of respectful regard for the man, all the more for that he has gone to his rest
already.”427 While Dionysius appears to take great care to not dishonor the memory of
Nepos, he nevertheless rejects the chiliasm that Nepos taught.
Dionysius’ response, which is referred to as On the Promises, is his attempt at
correcting the error of Nepos’ millennial views.428 Only a fraction of the original text has
survived, and most of what has is about Dionysius’ understanding of the nature of the
Apocalypse. There is one brief reference early in the text that illuminates Dionysius’
understanding of the afterlife. Dionysius explains that the chiliasts he is addressing are
preventing others from believing any “high and noble thoughts” about the resurrection or
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being made like Christ.429 In contrast, Dionysius understands the view of chiliasts as
being ignoble. In fact, he states that the chiliasts adhere to the materialism of their
chiliastic beliefs because of their fondness for bodily pleasure.430
Until recently, there was conflicting information regarding the extent to which
Dionysius’ agreed with Origen on the subject of the soul’s pre-existence. Procopius from
the fifth century argued that Dionysius rejected Origen’s interpretation, but Feltoe
includes a fragment attributed to Dionysius that is consistent with Origen’s
interpretation.431 Feltoe summarizes the confusion when he writes, “Either Procopius is
mistaken or the last-named extract is not genuine or Dionysius changed his views in the
course of his studies.”432 This ambiguity remained for 70 years.
In 1973 Wolfgang Bienert published an article introducing new fragments from
codex Vatopédi 236.433 One of these is from Dionysius’ commentary on Ecclesiastes.
The fragment is a comment on Ecclesiastes 12:17 and it clearly states that the soul and
body were created at the same time, which eliminates the possibility of the soul’s preexistence: “Concerning the soul, . . . the one who formed (humanity) . . . created [it] at
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the same time as the body.”434 Later, it states that the soul does not exist before the
body.435 Wolfgang Bienert concludes, “Dies aber widerspricht eindeutig der Lehre des
Origenes von der Präexistenz der Seelen sowie einer ewigen geistigen Welt, einer ewigen
Schöpfung, die sich vorübergehend mit der Materie verbindet.”436 By rejecting this
fundamental part of Origen’s understanding of the resurrected state, it is only reasonable
to expect that Dionysius’ notion of resurrection differs considerably from Origen’s.437
But what did Dionyisus believe?
In assessing Dionysius’ understanding of resurrection, there are several facts to
keep in mind. First, Dionysius firmly believed in bodily resurrection. In a letter to
Stephanus, who was Bishop of Rome, Dionysius specifically condemns anyone who
“despises the doctrine of bodily resurrection.”438 He teaches that those who despise the
doctrine should “be at once ranked with the dead.”439 Second, by rejecting the preexistence of the soul Dionysius rejected the understanding that the original state of
humanity was bodiless. Third, while he rejected some of the support for a highly
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spiritualized notion of resurrection, Dionysius also rejected the materialistic view of the
chiliasts.
As was noted, Dionysius’ objection to chiliasm was not merely that Scripture did
not support the idea of an earthly kingdom lasting 1,000 years but that its understanding
of the Christian hope was not as grand as it should be. Therefore, the available evidence
supports the notion that for Dionysius, resurrection had a strong bodily component, but it
is one that is far more glorious than the present earthly existence. While he apparently
expected the resurrected body to be significantly different from the temporal body, how
and to what extent it will differ remains a mystery.

Phileas440
The next bishop to be considered is Phileas. While this creates a 40 year gap in
this study, little is known or has survived from this time that has relevance for
understanding early Alexandrian faith in resurrection.441 Phileas was bishop of Thmuis,
which was along the Nile in lower Egypt. We know from Eusebius that he was
imprisoned in Alexandria with three other Egyptian bishops and that their captivity
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figured in the origins of the later Meletian schism. During his imprisonment he wrote a
letter praising the faithfulness of the Alexandrian martyrs.442 He died as a martyr around
305 CE.
The text of relevance for this study is known as the Acts of Phileas (Phileas
hereafter). Phileas is an account of the bishop’s inquisition before the Roman prefect
Culcianus. Since the relevant dialogue is brief, I will provide the passage here.
Culcianus: "Do we have concern here for the soul?"
Phileas: "Yes, both for the soul and the body."
Culcianus said: "Why?"
Phileas said: "I have said (that we do), that you may receive there recompense for
the good deeds it has done for God."
"The soul alone," said Culcianus, "or the body as well?"
"The soul and the body," said Phileas.
Culcianus said: "This body?"
"Yes," said Phileas.
Culcianus said: "This flesh will rise again?"
In amazement he asked once again: "This flesh will raise again?"
Phileas said, "This flesh will rise again."
It is immediately apparent that Phileas’ hope involves both body and soul. The
flow of the conversation suggests that Culcianus is shocked by Phileas’ faith. His
response causes Phileas to repeat his answer that there is hope for both body and soul.
Further indication of his apparent disbelief is found in the fact that Culcianus asks Phileas
twice if Phileas means “this flesh.” Having summarized the more obvious aspects of the
passage, I want to mention several issues which the text raises.
First, it is fascinating to note how astonished Culcianus is at the idea of
resurrection. It may suggest the degree to which resurrection was an unacceptable belief
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in the culture outside of Christianity. The question the text poses is, Was the idea of
extending hope for bodily life after death surprising, but not as unbelievable as
attributing a future hope to the physical flesh?
Second, Phileas does not only express hope for the body and soul but notes that
they are both objects of God’s judgment and reward. The connection of the body and
soul to the idea of judgment is a common theme of early resurrection belief and has been
observed previously in Barnabas and Apoc Petri. It is, therefore, interesting that in his
discussion of recompense (avmoibh,n), Phileas only mentions reward for the good deeds
done and not punishment for wrongs.
Third, in responding to the incredulity of Culcianus, Phileas makes it clear that he
believes that this sa.rx will rise again. I believe that it is reasonable to conclude that
Phileas was affirming a resurrection of a fleshly body. This is based on Phileas’ emphasis
on the sa.rx and Culcianus’ amazement. In spite of Phileas’ clarity about the inclusion of
the flesh, it is impossible to determine whether Phileas’ affirmation refers to the
reanimation or the transformation of the temporal flesh. Either way, the Acts of Phileas
testifies to a definite hope for resurrection that includes flesh.

Peter of Alexandria443
Saint Peter of Alexandria became bishop in 300 CE, which means he was a
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contemporary of Phileas. He lived a few years longer than Phileas and died a martyr in
311 CE. Over time he has received the reputation of being one of the first anti-Origenist
bishops. In his important work on Peter, Tim Vivian has successfully questioned several
of the presuppositions upon which that claim is based.444 In what follows, both Peter’s
disagreement with and his similarity to Origen on the matter of resurrection will be
demonstrated.
The first text to be considered is a Greek fragment of an exposition on the soul
(Peri. yuch/j).445 In it Peter indicates the simultaneous creation of humanity. He states,
“it is not possible for souls to sin in heaven before they assume corporeal form, nor for
that matter is hypostasis . . .possible before corporeal existence” (II.1a). The result of
this statement is a rejection of Origen’s pre-existent soul.446 The Syriac version has the
interesting addition: “Whence it is known that the body, which is killed by men, also
arises united again with the soul in order that both might receive retribution in judgment
for those things which they did in this life” (II.2).
The second text of significance to Peter’s understanding of resurrection is a
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fragment from a Paschal letter by Peter.447 In Vivian’s fragments III.1-2 from codex
Vatopédi 236, we read that when we arise from the dead we will be changed
“metaschmatizo,menoi kai. summorfou,menoi” into his body of glory (III.1) and that “when
we arise from the dead we receive a different body, not according to substance, but
according to the quality made manifest in him” (III.2).448 The subtlety of this difference is
clearer when we consider how the texts describe Christ’s risen body. Vivian points out
the fact that “The Greek fragments do not claim the identity of the resurrection body with
the risen body: Jesus, when he rose from the dead, ‘received his own body’(to. I;dion
avpe,labe sw/ma) not the same (to. auvto.n sw/ma) body.”449
A second issue from Peter’s Paschal letter is the fact that, as Vivian says, he
implies a realized resurrection for Christians, by which he means that it is something that
is already a present reality.450 He discusses the hope that his audience is being made alive
- zwopoiou,meqa (III.2). This is the same word that is used a few lines earlier when
referring to Christ’s resurrection.451
All of the comments thus far have been on the existing Greek texts. There is a
Syriac fragment attributed to Peter that also deserves comment. The text On the
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Resurrection states, “even if the soul leaves the body at the time of separation and
dissolution, we are nevertheless a work of art and the work of an artificer, whence we are
able to return from the dead since it is known that at the resurrection our mortal bodies
put on immortality in order that the body united with the soul might receive the reward
which it deserves” (IV.1).452 While this understanding of resurrection would be expected
if Peter was as anti-Origenist as has traditionally been suggested, it is not supported by
the texts believed to be earlier and most reliable. Apart from the Syriac fragments, Peter
is like Origen in that he does not refer to the resurrection of the flesh. Instead, his focus is
on the radical change that the mortal body will undergo.

Alexander of Alexandria453
In the introduction, I expressed my belief that the testimony of Alexandrian
Christianity has been neglected by scholarship. It is likely that this statement is most true
in connection with Alexander of Alexandria. Since the purpose of this study is to
examine the Ante-Nicene Alexandrian Fathers, Alexander is the last person to be
discussed for this retrieval of early Christian faith. This is because Alexander became
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bishop in 313CE and died in 328.454 The two events that have given him notoriety are the
rise of Arianism which occurred during his episcopacy and his ordination of Athanasius,
who accompanied him to the Council of Nicaea.
While the majority of the existing texts attributed to Alexander address the Arian
controversy, there is one that has particular relevance to this study. It is a homily referred
to as De Anima et Corpore. In 1910 E. A. Wallis Budge published his Coptic Homilies in
the Dialect of Upper Egypt, which is a collection of texts he has edited from papyrus
Oriental 5001. In it he included a translation of a homily which the manuscript attributes
to Athanasius. In the introduction of his book, Budge notes that there is a Syriac version
of the same homily in the British Museum that attributes the sermon to Alexander.455
Both the Syriac version and a Latin translation by Matthaeus Sciabuanus and Franciscus
Mahesebus have been reprinted by Migne. From the time of Budge’s comment, this
homily was largely ignored by scholars for almost 50 years.
In 1957, Wilhelm Schneemelcher published an essay on this text as part of a
Festschrift.456 In the article, Schneemelcher investigates the issue of the homily’s author.
While Schneemelcher is careful to note that it is impossible to definitively attribute De
Anima et Corpore to anyone, he leaves open the possibility of Alexander’s authorship and
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seems to be intrigued by the idea.457 Before considering what the sermon teaches relevant
to bodily resurrection, I want to briefly explore some of the textual reasons for supporting
Alexander as the author of De Anima et Corpore.
Schneemelcher indicates that the Coptic manuscript is likely to be relatively
late.458 This gives prominence to the Syriac version with its ascription of the homily to
Alexander. In addition, while Schneemelcher never asserts the authorship of Alexander
with certainty, he flatly rejects the possibility of Athanasius as the author of the Coptic
homily.459 In addition to the prominence of the Syriac version, Schneemelcher finds
further evidence against Athanasius as author in the fact that both the Coptic and Syriac
versions have a noticeable absence of specific references to biblical passages.460 This
contrasts with the way in which the identifiable writings of Athanasius display an acute
awareness and use of Scripture. Instead of Athanasius, he attributes some of the material
in the homily to Melito.461 In the end, he concludes that “Es wäre denkbar, daß
tatsächlich Alexander eine frühere Predigt, die von Melito stammte, benutzt hat.”462
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The Syriac states, “Now the soul, having been taken to Sheol, is bound in fetters
by the Evil Tempter. But the king reconstructeth a city which hath fallen down, ,or a
general collecteth together [again] the soldiery who has been scattered, or the steersman
maketh ready [again] the ship which had foundered, so also is it with the soul.

463

Thus,

while the soul and body have their own destinies as in other forms of dualism, the body is
not the prison of the soul. Instead, the body is seen as a boat and the soul as the
captain.464 This is reminiscent of Origen’s concept of o;chma - the body as the soul’s
vehicle.
There is an interesting aspect of the anthropology presented in De Anima et
Corpore that is worth noting. The homilist seems to believe that anthropology has
changed as a result of Christ’s incarnation. He states, “Now at the time when He
fashioned us with His hand, He had not suffered [on our behalf]; but now that He hath
begotten us a second time, through the suffering of his death, He suffereth with us even as
doth she who gave birth.”465 The Coptic text states, “He has made man one again, the
soul with the body.”466
In terms of resurrection, the Syriac and Coptic versions include different material.
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The Syriac version clearly asserts that Christ arose, but it does not give any details about
the nature of his resurrected body.467 The same hope awaits those who are in his image
and likeness.468 The most explicit treatment of the nature of the resurrected life is found
in the homilist’s belief that Christ can gather again that which was separated, which
almost certainly means the body and soul separated by death.469
The Coptic version is slightly more explicit than the Syriac version regarding the
nature of the resurrected body, but it is much more extravagant in its celebration of the
hope of resurrection. For example, there is a stronger connection between the soul and
the body in the Coptic version which seems to extend more hope for the involvement of
the physical body in the resurrection. Alexander states, “The Savior Jesus . . . set free the
soul from its bonds, and He bound the flesh together inseparably, and He brought the two
towards each other, and made them one of one, the soul and the body, and He rejoined
them each to the other.”470 Regarding the extravagance of the Coptic version, every time
Christ’s victory over death is recounted, the homilist launches into praise. I will conclude
this chapter with one example. A few lines after the previous passage, we read, “And
now, O soul, sing thou hymns of praise in the body wherein thou art, to thine own
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Imperishable God, because Christ died for us, in order that we might live with Him
forever.”471
It is clear from this passage that Alexander had hope for an embodied final state,
where the soul would be connected to the body once again. While both versions express
hope for bodily resurrection, the Syriac version of the sermon is less explicit than the
Coptic regarding the degree to which the temporal flesh participates in the resurrected
life.

Conclusion
In the first chapter, I referenced Boismard’s taxonomy for understanding the
biblical testimony regarding life after death. I further suggested that distinguishing
between Boismard’s categories was possible by answering two questions. The first was,
Does the text in question articulate some sense of embodiment as the final state of a
person? The second question was, How does the text handle the issue of continuity and
discontinuity between the temporal and resurrected bodies? As I conclude this chapter, I
will apply these questions to the texts examined in chapters two and three. I will also
utilize an additional question for added clarity.
The new question that I believe will supplement the understanding of the texts in
chapters two and three is, If the text in question anticipates a bodily final state, how does
it interpret I Corinthians 15:50, which excludes the participation of “flesh and blood” in
the kingdom of God? Admittedly, not all of the texts in this study address the verse, but I
471
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am confident that it is possible to hypothesize a reasonable interpretation for each text.
There are two approaches to the verse. The first interprets the “flesh and blood” of I
Corinthians 15:50 figuratively. This means that the text understands the phrase to refer to
the sinful state of humanity rather than materiality. In this view, the temporal body is not
precluded from participating in the final state. The other understands it literally, so that
the body of the resurrection is radically transformed, in some instances even being able to
be understood as a new body. When these questions are applied to the texts in the early
texts from Alexandria, three distinct views are observable.
The first is similar to Boismard’s second view. It does not articulate an embodied
final state. These texts believe that the nature of afterlife existence is quite dissimilar to
the temporal life since there is no body. Consequently, these texts emphasize the
discontinuity over the continuity between the two lives, and any continuity that does exist
is attributed to the soul. These texts typically understand I Cor. 15:50 from excluding a
bodily component to the afterlife. The texts that are most similar to this description are
the Epistle to Rheginos, the Gospel of Thomas, and the Gospel of Philip.
All of these texts have a negative view of material creation and look forward to
the soul’s liberation that occurs at death. As Brian Daley writes, “resurrection for Gnostic
theology could hardly be called bodily even at all; it is an experience of inner
enlightenment, of release from the present bodily world, of radical reinterpretation of the
self, its history, and its future.”472
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Both the second and third perspectives articulate a hope for an embodied final
state, but they differ in their understanding of the resurrected body. As a result, the issues
of continuity/discontinuity and the interpretation of I Cor. 15:50 become important.
The second view is similar to Boismard’s first category. It expects the greatest
amount of continuity between the present and future lives believe in the reanimation of
the physical body at the return of Christ. In fact, there is such a high degree of continuity
between the temporal and resurrected bodies that the resurrected body is the temporal
body. This view understands that a person’s physical body is a fundamental part of being
completely human. Within this perspective, there tends to be an emphasis on the
resurrection of the flesh specifically, not just the body. These texts also understand the
“flesh and blood” of I Cor. 15:50 as addressing something other than the nature of the
resurrected body. In light of the above, the texts that fit this category are Barnabas, Apoc.
Petri, Irenaeus’ Haer., and the Acts of Phileas.473
The remaining texts express the third view which is similar to Boismard’s fourth
category. These texts articulate faith in bodily resurrection but in a way in which the
resurrected body is more a symbol of dissimilarity than continuity. In this view, the soul
functions as the means of continuity between death and resurrection. Thus, while this
view expects an embodied final state, the emphasis is on the transformation that occurs in
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before Nicaea. It has been demonstrated that while Clement and Origen did not
understand the resurrected body to be the temporal body, they nevertheless affirmed
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resurrection. These texts tend to understand I Cor. 15:50 as referring to literal flesh and
blood. This means that the temporal flesh has no place in the kingdom of God. These
texts, like the Gnostic texts above, interpret “flesh and blood” literally, but rather than
understanding it as a reason for dismissing the possibility of bodily existence in the
afterlife, they understand the verse to be indicating a resurrected body that is spiritual
rather than temporal. In this view, the soul continues to exist after the death of the body
until the resurrection of the body. While this view expects an embodied final state, the
emphasis is on the transformation that occurs in resurrection. Therefore, any continuity
that exists between the temporal and spiritual body is attributed to the soul. This
describes the works of Clement, Origen, Dionysius, and Peter of Alexandria, and
Alexander.
Before considering contemporary affirmations of the doctrine, there are several
conclusions that can be drawn. First, it can be said that apart from the Gnostics, the
Alexandrian Christians articulated a faith in bodily resurrection. Some expected the
resurrected body to be very materialistic while others expected a spiritual body similar to
the angels. Second, while even the Alexandrian “problem child” Origen affirmed that the
flesh will arise, the preferred manner of referring to the resurrection by those most closely
associated with Alexandria, was the phrase, “resurrection of the body,” not “resurrection
of the flesh.” Third, the general view of the texts studied here was that while there would
be some continuity between the temporal and resurrected bodies, the transformation
involved in resurrection was emphasized significantly more. This means that for most of
the authors studied here, the resurrected body was more dissimilar than similar to the
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temporal body. As a result, personal continuity between the temporal and resurrected
state was attributed to the soul.

CHAPTER FOUR
CONTEMPORARY AFFIRMATIONS OF RESURRECTION FAITH

In chapters two and three, I have shown the range of Alexandrian Christian beliefs
about resurrection and the issues at stake regarding some of them. How can that
knowledge enrich our theology and preaching today? In this final chapter, I intend first to
consider how the Creed's affirmation of belief in "the resurrection of the body" and life
everlasting is treated in a few theological texts, chosen for their representative character.
The texts considered in this chapter are treatments of the Creed by some of the
most distinguished and widely studied theologians of today: Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope
Benedict XVI); Wolfhart Pannenberg; and Hans Urs von Balthasar. This will not be an
analysis of each man's theology of resurrection, but only a consideration of what they
have felt it worth saying on the subject in a popular work, one that any Christian might
pick up.
I shall close this chapter and this dissertation by proposing a good way of
presenting faith in resurrection of the body today in preaching and catechesis. Both in
what I propose should be said and in what I would leave unsaid or even argue against, I
shall draw on the Alexandrian tradition and the debates that are reflected in the writings
of that time.
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Ratzinger’s Introduction to Christianity474
The first modern interpretation of the Creed to be studied here is Joseph
Ratzinger’s Introduction to Christianity. The material was first presented as lectures to
students at Tübingen in the summer of 1967 and were first published in 1968. The
original audience is significant in that the lectures represent Ratzinger’s attempt to make
the Creed understandable to students familiar with modern philosophy. The impact that
the audience has on Ratzinger’s presentation is evident when one compares the
explanation of the doctrine in his Introduction to that found in his Eschatology.475 The
Introduction is being considered here because it is intended to be an exposition of the
creed.
The key to understanding the interpretation of resurrection which Ratzinger
presents in his Introduction is his anthropology, and the most important aspect of his
anthropology is his position that humans are whole creatures, not a sum of components.
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As will be demonstrated, Ratzinger carefully tries to find a balance between two
extremes: a) understanding the ancient Greek notion of an immortal soul as an acceptable
substitute for the Creed’s doctrine on bodily resurrection and b) overemphasizing the
bodily component of the resurrection.
Ratzinger begins his treatment of the Creed’s article on resurrection by explaining
the implications of his monistic anthropology when he writes, “from this angle we can
understand afresh the biblical message, which promises immortality, not to a separated
soul but to the whole man.”476 He then proceeds to explain the relationship between the
Greek notion of the immortal soul and the biblical doctrine of resurrection.
Ratzinger’s first step is to help his audience see that the doctrine of bodily
resurrection and the idea of immortality are not mutually exclusive. He states, “the hope
for the resurrection of the dead simply represents the basic form of the biblical hope for
immortality.”477 He then explains how these concepts came together “each being
understood as half the answer to the question of the fate of man.”478 Lastly, he
differentiates between the classical Greek anthropology that understands people as
combinations of “two mutually foreign substances,” and the “biblical train of thought”
that “presupposes the undivided unity of man.”479 As a result of this unified
anthropology, Ratzinger is able to write,“the idea of immortality denoted in the Bible by
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the ‘resurrection’ is an immortality of the ‘person.’”480 In other words, while Ratzinger
readily embraces the term immortality for understanding the Creed’s doctrine of
resurrection, he rejects the anthropology that is often associated with it.
Rather than affirm that any particular part of a person is immortal, such as the
soul, Ratzinger teaches that immortality is a result of being in dialogical relationship with
God. He states, “Immortality results not simply from the self-evident inability of the
indivisible to die but from the saving deed of the lover who has the necessary power: man
can no longer totally perish because he is known and loved by God”481
After rejecting the Greek notions that the soul is the true essence of the person and
that the soul is naturally immortal, Ratzinger advises caution against an overemphasis on
bodies. In addressing the biblical testimony, Ratzinger observes that the New Testament
has “no word denoting only the body (separated and distinguished from the soul).”482
Elsewhere he writes, “The awakening of the dead (not bodies!) of which Scripture speaks
is thus concerned with the salvation of the one, undivided man.”483 After making this
observation, Ratzinger writes that it is “clear that the real heart of the faith in resurrection
does not consist at all in the idea of the restoration of bodies.”484 Later, he states,
It should be noted here that even the formula of the Creed, which speaks of the
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“resurrection of the body”, the word “body” means in effect “the world of man”
(in the sense of biblical expressions like “all flesh will see God’s salvation”, and
so on); even here the word is not meant in the sense of a corporeality isolated
from the soul.485
Ratzinger repeats this idea later when discussing the immortality of people.
For Ratzinger, the fundamental teaching of the Bible on the subject of resurrection
“is not the conception of a restoration of bodies to souls after a long interval.”486 Instead,
it is that the person is the essential part that lives on by the power of God.487 This is
demonstrated by his understanding of the teachings of John and Paul. “Both John (6:63)
and Paul (I Cor. 15:50) state with all possible emphasis that the ‘resurrection of the flesh’,
the ‘resurrection of the body’, is not a ‘resurrection of physical bodies’.”488 Paul, in
particular does not teach “the resurrection of physical bodies, but the resurrection of
persons, and this not in the return of the ‘fleshly body’.”489 Ratzinger seems to be aware
that this diverges from traditional notions of resurrection, when he asks, “If this is the
position, is there really such a thing as a resurrected body or can the whole thing be
reduced to a mere symbol for the immortality of the person?”490
Ratzinger responds to the question in three ways. In my opinion, the strongest and
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most easily understood response is his acknowledgment that we will be like Christ.491

It

is only reasonable to conclude that this means that there is a bodily component to the
resurrection, inasmuch as Christ appeared to his followers after his resurrection. In his
description of the resurrected Christ, Ratzinger notes, “the life of him who has risen from
the dead is not once again bios, the bio-logical form of our mortal life within history; it is
zoe, new, different, definitive life; life that has stepped beyond the mortal realm of bios
and history, a realm that has been surpassed here by a greater power.”492
The second way by which Ratzinger affirms an embodied final state is his
rejection of the alternative. As was noted previously, Ratzinger explicitly rejects the
Greek idea of an immortal soul as a sufficient expression of the person.493 The weakest
response is his somewhat obscure statement that “in reality this means that the self, which
now appears in a body that can be conceived in chemico-physical terms, can, again,
appear definitively in the guise of a transphysical reality.”494 The hope that Ratzinger
offers a bodily resurrection is best summarized in an earlier passage where he states, “the
essential part of man, the person, remains; that which has ripened in the course of this
earthly existence of corporeal spirituality and spiritualized corporeality goes on existing
in a different fashion.”495
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The evidence is clear that Ratzinger does not extend hope to the physical flesh in
his Introduction. This was demonstrated most clearly in his interpretation of I
Corinthians 15:50. On the other hand, it is also not possible to understand Ratzinger’s
presentation as rejecting any bodily component, as the texts in my second category do.
Instead, Ratzinger’s presentation in his Introduction is most similar to the texts that
affirm a bodily component to the final state that involves considerable change from life in
the present temporal body.
Ratzinger’s exclusion of the temporal flesh in the resurrected state does not mean
that the resurrected life has no connection to the material world for him. He concludes
his presentation by affirming that “there is a final connection between matter and spirit in
which the destiny of man and of the world is consummated, even if it is impossible for us
today to define the nature of this connection.”496 While this statement does little to aid in
understanding the nature of the resurrected life, it allows him to not only affirm the
participation of matter in the final state but preserve the mystery of the resurrection as
well.

Pannenberg’s Apostles’ Creed
The second interpretation is provided by Wolfhart Pannenberg and was published
in 1972 with the title The Apostles’ Creed in the Light of Today’s Questions. As the title
indicates, Pannenberg is aware that questions or doubts about particular elements of the
Christian faith exist. While he does not specifically indicate which doctrines people find
496
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most troublesome, it is safe to assume that the doctrine of bodily resurrection is among
them. Pannenberg expresses the problem which this study addresses when he writes,
If the Apostles’ Creed has become incomprehensible for many Christians today,
or is even a stumbling block in some of its formulations, this is probably due to
the circumstance that the facts of redemption listed in its articles seem to have no
relation to - or even seem to contradict - reality as it is experienced today; and
consequently they are felt to be a hindrance to present-day faith rather than the
expression or primary foundation of personal faith. It would therefore seem
reasonable to let the statements of the creed drop and to withdraw to the personal
act of faith, to trust in Jesus and his message of love. For the ancient church,
however, the love of God would have been an idle phrase without the resurrection
of the dead, and trust in Jesus would have seemed groundless unless it held fast to
the power of God which is present in him and was revealed in his resurrection.497
Thus, Pannenberg, like Ratzinger is endeavoring to present the Creed to a modern
audience.
In addition to providing evidence of the importance of this study, this statement
indicates one of Pannenberg’s central themes on the subject of resurrection: the Christian
hope for bodily resurrection is inextricably linked to the resurrection of Jesus. It is,
therefore, not surprising that Pannenberg begins his treatment of the Creed’s article by
referring the reader to his comments on the Creed’s earlier article on the resurrection of
Jesus. Consequently, Pannenberg’s interpretation of Christ’s resurrection will serve as
our starting point as well.
When considering the resurrected Jesus, one of Pannenberg’s frequent
observations is the radical difference between the resurrected life and what we currently
experience. For example, he states, “the resurrection of Jesus was not a return to life as
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we know it; it was a transformation into an entirely new life.”498 Later, he indicates that
the language of being “raised from the dead” is metaphorical because “we are dealing
with a transformation into a reality which is entirely unknown to us.”499
The idea of transformation is a recurring theme in Pannenberg’s understanding of
resurrection. As the following passage demonstrates, Pannenberg is interested in both
emphasizing the change that must occur and maintaining a sense of continuity between
this body and the resurrected body. He states,
The transformation of what is mortal into a spiritual body will therefore be on the
one hand so radical that nothing remains unchanged. On the other hand, however,
it is this present earthly body which will experience the transformation. . . . What
is to be created in place of the present body is not something totally different from
it.500
Elsewhere, when attempting to address Paul’s description of a spiritual body, Pannenberg
is careful to note that Paul does not mean a disembodied spirituality but a radical change
to this body.501
In light of the radical change that the temporal body will experience, it cannot be
the means by which personal identity is preserved. This would seem to leave the soul as
the only logical option. However, Pannenberg, like Ratzinger, does not attribute the
postmortem survival of that which individuates one person from another to either the
body or the soul. Instead of the body or soul, Pannenberg’s solution is to propose a
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different view of time. The perspective he proposes can be understood by considering the
apocalyptic aspect of Scripture. He states, “For the apocalyptic understanding of time
held by early Christianity, that which is to be revealed on earth in the future already
stands ready in divine concealment.”502 The implication for hope in resurrection is that
“the future resurrection of the dead will reveal what already forms the secret life of our
history for the eternal God who is present in our lives.”503
By this move, Pannenberg has established the resurrection not as one of the
eschata but as an event that finds its significance in the ultimate telos, which is God. In
addition, since it is the telos that truly defines each person and not any particular moment
in the sequence of time, Pannenberg has no difficulty with continuity. He states,
This then means that the continuity of our present life with the future life of the
resurrection of the dead must not be sought in the linear sequence of time, but that
it lies in the hiddenness of the eternal God, whose future is now already present
for our lives. In this vertical dimension of our present life, the truth about this life
- for judgment or salvation - is already present, the truth which has none the less
still to be decided in the course of our life. Accordingly the future life can now . .
. really be understood as being materially identical with the present one; for the
content of this future life will be what fills the still-hidden vertical dimension of
our present life.504
While I am trying to limit my discussion of these theologians’ comments on the Creed, a
separate essay by Pannenberg helps to illuminate this point. In an essay entitled, “The
Task of Christian Eschatology,” Pannenberg identifies the difficulties in attributing
continuity to either the body or soul and then writes,
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The conceptual difficulties can be solved, it seems to me, only on one condition:
the assumption that our life, whose history ends in the moment of death, passes
away in that moment from our experience, but not from the eternal presence of
God. In God’s memory our individual life is preserved. Thus, there is no element
of earthly existence that would escape death in order to guarantee our continuous
existence beyond death, but only God himself is able, because of his unlimited
power, to preserve our temporal lives in his memory and to grant them a new form
of existence of the own.505
Rather than I Corinthians 15:50, Pannenberg cites I Corinthians 15:53. Thus,
Pannenberg not only affirms the bodily component to the final state, he emphasizes that it
is “this perishable” body that is raised.506 He continues,
The stress on the identity of the body despite its transformation is directed against
the Platonic idea of the rebirth of the soul in a different body. I mean that man’s
identity depends on the uniqueness and non-recurrence of his physical existence.
That is why the creed insists on the identity of the matter of “the body” with a
rigidity which must have already seemed barbarous to the Hellenistic world.507
In light of the fact that Pannenberg identifies the resurrected body with the
temporal one, as well as previous statements like it is “this present earthly body which
will experience the transformation, ”508 it is clear that Pannenberg believes in an
embodied final state and that there is a very close relationship between the physical and
resurrected bodies.
While he affirms that resurrection happens to the temporal body, Pannenberg is
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equally clear that in the resurrection, the physical body will experience dramatic changes.
Therefore, Pannenberg’s view is similar to the view shared by Clement, Origen,
Dionysius, and Peter. Yet in spite of the similarities, the texts differ in the way in which
they account for continuity between this life and the afterlife. Rather than attribute
personal survival to the soul or the body, Pannenberg, like Ratzinger appeals to God who
is the ultimate end.

Balthasar’s Credo
Hans Urs von Balthasar was about twenty years older than Ratzinger and
Pannenberg, but his treatment of the Apostles’ Creed was published about twenty years
after theirs. It was published as separate articles for a pastoral bulletin in 1988 that were
not collected until after his death later that year. According to Medard Kehl, they are
“undoubtedly among the last things to be written by him.”509
The fact that Credo was written as individual meditations for a pastoral bulletin is
more important than it might first appear. For instance, the previous texts on the Creed
were written for a general audience in order to offer some doctrinal explanation. Credo,
on the other hand, was originally written for priests. The emphasis in the book is less
about the didactic role of the Creed than it is about its role in spiritual formation. Thus,
Credo is a wonderful reminder of the fact that the Creed is for all Christians, not only the
newly converted.
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Balthasar begins his meditation on the article on the general resurrection by noting
his objection to the tendency in some traditions to substitute the phrase “resurrection of
the body” with the phrase “resurrection of the dead.” He responds to this trend by noting
that Christ’s victory is “for the benefit of the embodied human being who is destined for
eternal life. A bodiless soul is not a human being, and reincarnation would never be able
to redeem us from entrapment in death.”510
As was observed in the works of Ratzinger and Pannenberg, the resurrection of
Christ is the basis for understanding the Christian hope for resurrection. Balthasar’s
thought is so intricate that, in order to understand his view of Christ, it is necessary to
have a sense of the role that love plays in his overall theological program. While
Balthasar acknowledges various definitions of the term love, he understands it most
clearly as the act of self-giving for another.511 This understanding of love is one of the
cornerstones of Balthasar’s thought.512
This understanding of love sets up a poetic irony regarding Christ. As Balthasar
states, “He has died purely from love, from divine-human love; indeed, his death was the
supreme act of that love, and love is the most living thing that there is. Thus his really
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being dead . . . is also an act of his most living love.”513 This statement indicates that for
Balthasar, Christ’s self-giving is connected to both a form of death and an expression of
life. This in turn effects Balthasar’s understanding of our life, death, and resurrection.
The significance of this for humanity is that our death “can become for us an
expression of our purest and most living love,” provided that we give ourselves
completely to God, and “death becomes purification.”514 In interpreting I Corinthians
15:54, which states that the sting of death has been removed, Balthasar writes, “The
reality of dying, as the human being’s giving up of self - this reality has lost its sting.”515
In addition to these intricate concepts, Balthasar offers plain statements that
indicate his view of resurrection. For example, Balthasar references Luke 24:39 where
Christ’s resurrected body is said to have “flesh and bones” and then proceeds to note the
uselessness of speculating on when this miracle will happen to us.516 It is possible to infer
from the fact that he offers no comment or explanation of the meaning of “flesh and
bones” that he is understanding them literally. Thus, this passage suggests that Balthasar
would understand I Cor. 15:50 figuratively, since a literal interpretation precludes flesh
from participating in the kingdom of God. Later, Balthasar explains the significance of
the resurrected Christ’s retaining the marks of his crucifixion, because it is “proof that all
earthly suffering will pass with us to the other side and be transfigured into luminous
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eternal life.”517 In the section on the New Testament, both the “flesh and bones” and his
visible wounds were presented as evidence of the continuity between Christ’s temporal
and resurrected bodies. While Balthasar affirms the continuity, he also expects
significant change.
I believe that Balthasar’s most succinct statement about the nature of the
resurrected life occurs at the end of the treatment of the article when he writes, “the
materiality of nature will not dissipate into Spirit but rather take on a new form beyond
the reach of decay.”518 This description of resurrection as a taking on of a new form is
evidence of Balthasar’s emphasis on the transformation connected to resurrection.
Balthasar’s discussion of Revelation 21:1 is another example of his emphasis on change.
He explains that the “new heaven and new earth” that is experienced is a transformed
creation and not a second creation.519
Balthasar has clearly expressed a belief in an embodied final state. This is not
simply a resuscitation of the temporal body nor is it an entirely new creation. For
Balthasar, the resurrected life should be understood as including the material body which
has experienced profound transformation. The close association of the material body
with the resurrected life would seem to suggest a high degree of continuity between the
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temporal and eternal lives, but it is not explicitly affirmed or explained.520 Consequently,
Balthasar’s Credo is most similar to the view of Ratzinger and Pannenberg, which
anticipates a spiritual and radically transformed resurrected body.

Ratzinger, Pannenberg, and Balthasar in Light of
Early Alexandrian Faith in Resurrection
Each of the contemporary theologians examined above has aspects of his thought
that are similar to some of the Alexandrian Christians studied in the previous chapters.
Most significantly, it was noted above that Ratzinger, Pannenberg, and Balthasar all
emphasize the radical change that must be a part of resurrection. On this point, their
views closely resemble those of Clement, Origen, Dionysius, and Peter.
Given this similarity, it is noteworthy that the contemporary theologians give
evidence of operating with substantially different anthropologies from their predecessors.
You will recall that for Clement and Origen in particular, the postmortem survival of that
which individuates one person from another is ascribed to the soul.521 Ratzinger,
Pannenberg, and Balthasar, on the other hand, each argue for the indivisibility of the
human person, albeit in diverse ways and with differing emphases.
A second way in which the contemporary theologians differ from their
Alexandrian counterparts is the unique contribution that each of their presentations makes
that cannot be found in the works of the ancient Alexandrians. In Ratzinger’s
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presentation, he notes the “communal character of human immortality.”522 This is a
particularly helpful reminder for contemporary Christian faith, which often
overemphasizes the importance of the individual. Pannenberg notes the political aspect
of the resurrection in his closing paragraphs in his treatment of the doctrine. He states,
“there is no direct approach to the kingdom of God via political change, but only
conversely, social effects deriving from religious trust in the kingdom’s nearness and its
power to determine the present.”523 Balthasar identifies the cosmic significance of the
resurrection. He writes, “Not only will humanity, which is something like the result or
sum total of the created world, be resurrected, but the created world, too, which was its
precondition and, in a certain sense its family tree, keeps pressing on from within, toward
its own perfection.”524
Lastly, the contemporary interpretations of bodily resurrection differ from some of
the Alexandrian texts by not explicitly connecting the idea of judgment to resurrection. I
am not suggesting that all of the texts studied in chapters two and three emphasized
judgment as being related to resurrection, but several of them did such as Barnabas,
Apoc. Petri, and Adv. Haer. While I believe that a final judgment is part of the Christian
faith, I believe that there is wisdom in not including it in a contemporary presentation of
the faith.
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Professing Faith in Bodily Resurrection Today
The guiding principle for this study has been Gaudium et spes, which states,
“With the help of the holy Spirit, it is the task of the whole people of God, particularly of
its pastors and theologians, to listen to and to distinguish the many voices of our times
and to interpret them in the light of God’s word, in order that the revealed truth may be
more deeply penetrated, better understood, and more suitably presented.”525 The final
step in this process is a more suitable presentation of the doctrine of bodily resurrection. I
am convinced that this study can contribute to this endeavor in two ways: first, by
attending to the manner of the doctrine’s presentation and second, by considering how it
is understood. Consequently, the first part of this section offers an approach for
proclaiming faith in bodily resurrection in contemporary homiletical and catechetical
contexts. The second part will explore the content of that proclamation.

The Manner of the Proclamation
In the introduction to this study, I proposed that the renewed understanding of
bodily resurrection that is needed is one that seeks to maintain the tension between
fidelity to the faith and relevancy to the world. In order to understand the importance of
this balance, it is necessary to be aware of the dangers of both extremes.
In terms of fidelity to the faith, Christians who readily sacrifice relevancy in order
to remain true to the fidei depositum are likely to believe that the antidote to the present
525
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apathy and antipathy lies simply in the insistence on a particular understanding of the
doctrine in spite of modern objections. While overemphasizing fidelity is unhelpful, the
opposite extreme is also problematic. When the concern for relevancy is emphasized so
much that there is little or no attention to fidelity, it is often accompanied by a willingness
to ignore or discard aspects of the faith viewed as difficult or troublesome.526 As I have
suggested, a renewed faith in bodily resurrection is a hope that is maintained in the midst
of the uncertainty that current objections create, not by ignoring the objections. All of
this leads to the question, To whom are we seeking to present the faith today and what are
their objections?
On several occasions during this study, the presentation of the doctrine of bodily
resurrection has been adapted in order to make it accessible to particular contexts with
particular philosophical assumptions. In terms of the ancient texts, this is observable
most vividly in the works of Clement and Origen. We have noted previously in Brian
Daley’s description of Clement’s work that “the importance he assigns the traditional
features of that hope, and the interpretations he suggests for them, vary with the character
of the work he is writing and with the kind of audience - popular or intellectual - for
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which it is intended.”527 A similar observation can be made regarding Origen.528 Both
Clement and Origen restated the faith of the Church in a manner that is accessible to
those influenced by the philosophy of the day.
This is also true of the texts studied in this chapter. For example, there is clearly a
difference between Ratzinger’s treatment of bodily resurrection in his Introduction and
that of his Eschatology. This is most easily explained as being attributable to the
intended audience of each work. In light of the examples that have been encountered in
this study, the following proposal seeks to present bodily resurrection in a way that is
accessible to an audience that has become dissatisfied with older forms of justifying
knowledge.
Previous generations have been satisfied with the rational self as the basis of
knowledge. This involved an emphasis on reason and natural science which was believed
to be able to arrive at objective truth.529 Epistemologically, this is a form of philosophical
foundationalism. Stanley Grenz offers the following definition of this epistemology:
In its broadest sense, foundationalism is merely the acknowledgment of the
seemingly obvious observation that not all beliefs we hold (or assertions we
formulate) are on the same level, but that some beliefs (or assertions) anchor
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others. Stated in the opposite manner, certain of our beliefs (or assertions) receive
their support from other beliefs (or assertions) that are more “basic” or
“foundational.” Defined in this manner, nearly every thinker is in some sense a
foundationalist. . . . In philosophical circles, however, “foundationalism” refers to
a much stronger epistemological stance than is entailed in this observation about
how beliefs intersect. At the heart of the foundationalist agenda is the desire to
overcome the uncertainty generated by our human liability to error and the
inevitable disagreements that follow. Foundationalists are convinced that the only
way to solve this problem is to find some means of grounding the entire edifice of
human knowledge on invincible certainty.530
Recently and for reasons beyond the scope of this study, there has been a loss of
confidence in the continual progress of knowledge that was expected to be achieved
through technology. As philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff has advised, “On all fronts
foundationalism is in bad shape. It seems to me that there is nothing to do but give it up
for mortally ill and learn to live in its absence.”531 In light of the loss of these
epistemological foundations, How can the Church continue to affirm the doctrine of
bodily resurrection as truth?
In his book, A Primer on Postmodernism, Stanley Grenz offers several
characteristics for a postmodern presentation of the gospel. He recommends the
presentation of the gospel that is “post-individualistic, post-rationalistic,” and “postdualistic.”532 The meaning of a “post-individualistic” presentation is self-explanatory and
requires no comment. A post-rationalistic affirmation must not be understood as
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irrational. Instead, it is reasonable, but rather than simply being asserted as dogma to be
believed, doctrinal statements should be “treated as hypotheses to be tested by means of
their coherence with other knowledge.”533 Moreover, church doctrines function “not as
expressive symbols or as truth claims but as communally authoritative rules of discourse,
attitude, and action.”534 A post-dualistic presentation emphasizes wholeness and
integrity. Having considered an approach to presenting bodily resurrection that is
sensitive to some current philosophy, it is necessary to consider what a proclamation may
include that is “post-dualistic,” “post-individualistic,” and “post-rationalistic.”

The Content of the Proclamation
A Post-Dualistic View of Resurrection. This study has demonstrated that the
doctrine of bodily resurrection has been understood in a variety of ways in ancient
Alexandria. I believe that faith in resurrection must involve some notion of bodily
existence. More specifically, the resurrected body must have some integral relationship
to the temporal body. There are numerous reasons for this assertion.
First, this study has recognized that Scripture teaches a strong relationship
between the resurrected and temporal bodies. This was demonstrated by the empty tomb
and abandoned grave clothes, Christ’s visible wounds, and his eating with his followers.
Second, I believe that this is supported by the faith of the early church that affirmed “only
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that which has fallen can arise.” Third, in my understanding of theology, God cares for
his creation. Is it possible that humans could care more about what happens to their
physical bodies after death than God does? Lastly, in endeavoring to apply Grenz’s
principles, it would seem necessary to affirm some kind of participation of the temporal
body in the resurrected life in order to be “post-dualistic.”
Having made this affirmation, I acknowledge that there are numerous ways that
the resurrected body can be understood to be continuous with the temporal body. I
believe that it is possible to affirm that the body which rises is the same body that died,
without necessarily having to ascribe to the resurrected body all of the qualities of the
temporal body, such as its materiality. Rather, just as the temporal body must participate
in resurrection, it is equally necessary to affirm the radical changes which are a part of
resurrection.535
Not all Christians would agree with me on this point. Some in my tradition
believe that it is necessary to understand the resurrected body as being fundamentally
physical and identical to the temporal body.536 Yet, to demand that one understands the
resurrected body to be as physical as the temporal body is to ignore the numerous
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Scriptures that express a radical change in the nature of the resurrected body. I believe
that on this issue a renewed awareness of the early Alexandrian Christians, such as the
one provided by this study, can be instructive. In particular, Origen’s various senses of
corporeality may provide new ways of conceptualizing a bodily existence that differs
from the temporal one.537
While I believe that the temporal body must be understood to participate in the
resurrected life somehow and that radical change is an integral part of resurrection, the
profundity of resurrection in the Christian faith extends beyond bodies. I agree with
Ratzinger that the general teaching of Scripture is the resurrection of whole persons.538
In the first place, resurrection affects more than bodies. The resurrection is not simply an
event that will reanimate or transform only bodies. It is not merely the resumption of
corporeal life; it is the transformation of life into a radically different mode of existence
beyond our present ability to completely understand. The emphasis on whole persons
also allows for a “post-dualistic” presentation of the faith.
A Post-Individualistic View of Resurrection. Just as resurrection is not only about
bodies, it is also not only about individuals. The contemporary theologians studied at the
beginning of this chapter are especially helpful on this point. Ratzinger offered his notion
of the communal dimension of the afterlife, Pannenberg reminded us of the political
dimensions of the resurrection, and Balthasar emphasized the cosmic implications such as
a greater concern for the environment. These are by no means the extent of the
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significance of resurrection. Rather, I offer this brief list in an attempt to demonstrate the
significance of bodily resurrection beyond the issue of the postmortem survival of the
personal body.
A Post-Rationalistic View of Resurrection. This category addresses the issue of
epistemology. Rather than establish the reality of bodily resurrection on the basis of the
authority of the Bible or the Magisterium, or on some self-evident principle or universal
human experience, a post-rationalistic approach to revelation looks to other bases. Two
of the contemporary texts considered in this chapter demonstrate an awareness of this
approach. Both Ratzinger and Pannenberg ground the truthfulness of the faith in the
eschaton. Ratzinger refers to the consummation in the final complexity and Pannenberg
looks to God as the ultimate justification of the faith. This approach does not mean that
the doctrine of bodily resurrection cannot be based upon the Bible. It simply means that
the final truthfulness of bodily resurrection will not be established until the eschaton.
While this attempt at a postfoundationalist articulation of the doctrine avoids the
pitfalls of foundationalism, it does not establish the truthfulness of Christianity. This
leads Grenz to ask
Why give primacy to the world-constructing language of the Christian
community? As Christians we would likely respond by asserting that we believe
that the Christian theological vision is true. But on what basis can we make this
claim? Must we now finally appeal to some court beyond the Christian faith
itself, some rational “first principle” that supposedly carries universality? In the
end, must we inevitably retreat to a foundationalist epistemology?539
Grenz answers his own question by stating
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The task of systematic theology is to show how the Christian mosaic of beliefs
offers a transcendent vision of the glorious eschatological community that God
wills for God’s own creation and how this vision provides a coherent foundation
for life-in-relationship in this penultimate age, life that ought to be visible in the
community of Christ as the sign of the age to come.540
Therefore, the goal for a postfoundationalist approach to the issue is not absolute
certainty but validity. In other words, rather than argue that bodily resurrection is the
correct understanding of the final state, a postfoundationalist approach affirms that the
doctrine of bodily resurrection offers the best transcendent vision of the glorious
eschatological community that God wills for God’s own creation and also offers a
coherent foundation for life-in-relationship to others. The issue of whether the Christian
hope of bodily resurrection is the correct vision or not, or which understanding of bodily
resurrection is most accurate will only be confirmed in the eschaton.541 This means that
from the postfoundationalist perspective, Christian truth claims are only provisional
pending their justification in the eschaton. Consequently, while these affirmations can be
made confidently, they must also be asserted humbly.

Conclusion
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Grenz, Beyond Foundationalism, 54. It is possible to discern indications of a
similar mindset in the approaches that Pannenberg and von Balthasar take to the
Creed. Pannenberg does not seek to establish the truthfulness of doctrine on the basis
of revelation or reason but in the telos. As he states, “the future revelation of the rule
of God does not only reveal what is already decided even without this happening. It
rather finally decides for the first time that from eternity God was the all-determining
reality.” Pannenberg, Apostles’ Creed, 174. Similarly, von Balthasar does not seek
to establish the truthfulness of Christianity on some self-evident first principle but on
the unique expression of love that Christ demonstrated.
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The goal of this study has been to retrieve early Christian faith in resurrection in
order to enhance the Church’s understanding of the doctrine. In the previous chapters, I
have set the belief in bodily resurrection from the Ante-Nicene Church in Alexandria
within its context of competing religious and philosophical ideas as well as within the
stream of its own tradition. The result has been the identification of diverse
interpretations of the resurrected life which were proposed by those who called
themselves Christians.

The retrieval of ancient Alexandrian faith in bodily

resurrection broadens our understanding of the doctrine through the recovery of
unfamiliar or forgotten material. As has been demonstrated, this increased awareness of
the various interpretations of the Church’s doctrine can contribute to the Church’s
catechetical, liturgical, and kerygmatic efforts. At the least, we are challenged by the fact
that with the exception of the Gnostics, they affirmed hope in bodily resurrection.
The question that is seldom asked is, Was the idea of resurrection really any more
plausible to people living in the first three centuries of this era than it is for people today?
By being aware of the objections of Celsus or the reaction of Culcianus, we are
confronted with the likelihood that resurrection was just as implausible then as it is today,
and yet the early Christians still articulated their hope in this mystery. I submit that it is
no more difficult to affirm the idea of bodily resurrection in contemporary society than it
was in Ante-Nicene Alexandria.
Ancient Alexandrian faith does not only challenge contemporary Christianity, it
has a contribution to make. The main contribution is the creativity that Alexandrians like
Clement and Origen demonstrated in their attempts at being both relevant to their culture
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and faithful to the Church’s doctrine. Their efforts are an enduring example for the
Church, and it is in that spirit that I offered a postfoundationalist affirmation of bodily
resurrection. There is an additional benefit to contemporary faith made possible by this
retrieval. I am convinced that the way in which Origen wrestled with issue of constant
change has great potential for assisting the affirmation of bodily resurrection in an age
where information travels around the world at the speed of light.
In light of the fact that life is filled with continual changes, the call of Gaudium et
spes is never finished. The Church still needs people who will explore the boundaries of
the faith in order to keep the faith accessible. I conclude with a thought from Wolfhart
Pannenberg that summarizes my goal for this study:
The life to come is the strength of this life, the liberal theologian Ernst Troeltsch
said . . . . Contemporary secular men and women have lost this strength. The
Christian proclamation should once more make it available to them and that could
be done if only contemporary Christians would ourselves recover the authentically
Christian confidence in a life beyond death, in communion with our risen Lord
and with the eternal life of God the Father in his kingdom to come.542
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